Volume Twenty One, Issue One, Fall 2014
Stacy A. Nowicki
Feral dogs occupy an ambiguous position, challenging standard categories
of domestication, wildness, and property ownership. This ambiguity, in
turn, complicates the legal status of feral dogs. Feral dogs’ property status is particularly critical, as whether a feral dog is owned by someone, or no one at all, hold implications not only for civil and criminal liability in incidents
involving feral dogs, but also the legal ability of animal rescue organizations to intervene in the lives of feral dogs. Part II of this Article summarizes the application of property law to animals, particularly highlighting the role played by an animal’s status as wild or domestic; Part III explores the factors distinguishing feral dogs from other canines, determining that feral dogs should properly be situated as domestic animals; Part IV discusses the legal landscape relevant to feral dogs, focusing particularly on ownership and liability; and Part V examines the ways in which the property status of feral dogs may impact an animal rescue organization’s ability to care for those animals.
Within South Korea, the dog meat trade occupies a liminal legal space—
neither explicitly condoned, nor technically prohibited. As a result of existing in this legal gray area, all facets of the dog meat trade within South
Korea—from dog farms, to transport, to slaughter, to consumption—are
poorly regulated and often obfuscated from review. In the South Korean context, the dog meat trade itself not only terminally impacts millions of canine lives each year, but resonates in a larger national context: raising environmental concerns, and standing as a proxy for cultural and political change. Part II of this Article describes the nature of the dog meat trade as it operates within South Korea; Part III examines how South Korean law relates to the dog meat trade; Part IV explores potentially fruitful challenges to the dog meat trade under South Korean law; similarly, Part V discusses growing social pressure being deployed against the dog meat trade.
In this Article, I contend that a belief in animal liberation qualifies as religion
under the Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence of the United States Constitution. Thus, every time a prison warden, public school teacher or
administrator, or government employer refuses to accommodate the ethical belief of an animal liberationist, they are infringing on that person’s religious freedom, and they should have to satisfy the same constitutional or statutory requirements that would adhere were the asserted interest based on more traditional religious exercise. One possible solution to the widespread violations of the First Amendment rights of animal liberationists
would be the incorporation of a ‘Church of Animal Liberation’ under the
Internal Revenue Code (as a proper church or as a religious organization).
This would help to protect the free exercise rights of those who believe in
animal rights because it would give them a religious organization to reference—with articles of incorporation that align with the jurisprudential definition of religion—in making their requests for religious accommodation. First, this Article discusses the constitutional definition of religion, what it means to believe in animal liberation, and animal liberation beliefs that circuit court precedent already recognizes as religious. Then, it discusses how animal liberation-based free exercise conflicts would play out in practice (e.g., identifying when infringing on the rights of animal liberationists would require strict scrutiny and when it would not). Lastly, this Article suggests that incorporating a group (e.g., a ‘Church of Animal Liberation’) as a religious organization under the Internal Revenue Code might help to secure constitutional rights for animal liberationists, and explains what would be required to incorporate such an organization.
Antonio M. Haynes
Addressing a taboo rarely discussed in scholarly works, this Article analyzes frequently advanced arguments supporting prohibitions on bestiality. Though on a superficial level the arguments seem appealing, upon closer inspection the standard justifications break down under internal inconsistencies. A differently constructed theory may not only provide a rationalized, consistent basis for regulating bestiality, but also lend greater coherence to laws regulating sexuality in general. Part II of this Article explores arguments related to consent; Part III discusses bestiality impermissibly using animals as a means; Part IV examines public health arguments, largely relating to those diseases that can spread easily from humans to animals and vice versa; Part V explores arguments analogizing zoophilia to either pedophilia or homosexuality; and Part VI offers a new rationale for justifying prohibitions on bestiality.
Though bison are iconically associated with the United States, their historical fortunes have often been opposite those of the U.S. As the nation expanded westward, government policy, demand for bison products, and
changing land use perilously reduced bison numbers. Efforts to restore bison have been complicated by overlapping legal concerns: state, federal, tribal, and constitutional. This Article examines the legal context surrounding bison restoration, focusing particularly on the critical herd connected with Yellowstone National Park. Former members of the Yellowstone herd, in turn, are the subjects of the Montana Supreme Court’s 2013 ruling in Citizens for Balanced Use v. Maurier, which this Article examines closely, arguing it will significantly improve the legal landscape in which Native American bison restoration efforts function. Finally, this Article ends on a hopeful note: suggesting that federal and tribal efforts, combined with economic and environmental interests may presage the resurgence of bison herds.