THE SAFEGUARDS OF PRIVACY FEDERALISM

by

Bilyana Petkova

The conventional wisdom is that neither federal oversight nor fragmentation can save data privacy. I argue that, in fact, federalism promotes privacy protections in the long run. Three arguments support my claim. First, in the data-privacy domain, frontrunner states in federal systems promote races to the top but not to the bottom. Second, decentralization provides regulatory backstops that the federal lawmaker can capitalize on. Finally, some of the higher standards adopted in some of the states can, and in certain cases already do, convince major interstate-industry players to embed data-privacy regulation in their business models.

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I. INTRODUCTION: U.S. PRIVACY LAW STILL AT A CROSSROADS

It is hardly surprising that in the wake of rapid technological developments on the one hand, and a constant push toward a “surveillance state” on the other, data-privacy law is in flux in the United States. It is surprising, however, how little the debate has progressed over the years. As noted by Professor Hoofnagle, the conversation on data privacy has changed strikingly little since the 1973 landmark report of the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) published the Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs) that were to become the backbone of privacy laws worldwide. Yet, the United States—where as far back as 1890, Warren and Brandeis proclaimed a “right to be left alone” and where the FIPPs originated in the influential HEW report—has hesitated to take a decisive stance on data privacy since then. In providing legal cer-

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1 Chris Jay Hoofnagle, The Origin of Fair Information Practices: Archive of the Meetings of the Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems (SACAPDS) (July 15, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2466418; see also Oliver Diggelmann & Maria Nicole Cleis, How the Right to Privacy Became a Human Right, 14 Human Rights L. Rev. 441, 441–42 (2014) (arguing that international agreements after World War II preceded the incorporation of the right to privacy in national constitutions around the globe); Robert Gellman, Fair Information Practices: A Basic History 3 (Feb. 11, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=2415020 (referring to a 1972 study in Great Britain that focused on private organizations’ threat to privacy and, like the HEW Report, revolved around a version of fair information principles); Paul M. Schwartz, The EU-U.S. Privacy Collision: A Turn to Institutions and Procedures, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 1966, 1969–70 (2013) (discussing early concurrent developments on both sides of the Atlantic, the importance played by the United States in information privacy debates worldwide at that early stage, and the initial convergence in the United States, European countries and on the supranational level by the 1980s that led to a “consensus that information privacy statutes were to be constructed around Fair Information Practices”).


3 The HEW Report resulted in no small measure from the creative work and leadership of Willis Ware from the Rand Corporation of California. See, e.g., Robert Gellman, Willis Ware’s Lasting Contribution to Privacy: Fair Information Practices, IEEE Security & Privacy, July–Aug. 2014, at 51, 51.

4 This is all the more puzzling because the U.S. Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) anticipated the FIPPs in 1970 and was one of the first statutory attempts to regulate the use of personal information by private entities worldwide; see infra note 20 pointing to the FCRA’s later amendments. For an overview of consumer reporting in the United States, see Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Federal Trade Commission Privacy Law and Policy (2016). The primary problem with the FCRA might be enforcement: “[T]he consumer reporting industry never embraced the various privacy and fairness mandates imposed by Congress . . . . Things may change now, however, as the [Consumer Financial Protection Bureau] can supervise and examine companies for compliance with the FCRA.” This is likely to be more effective than
tainty, a level of consolidation of data-privacy laws can be beneficial to individuals, businesses, and law enforcement alike, but how to arrive at the right level of regulation? The value of privacy is constantly debated, as is the legal framework within which to protect it. Should U.S. courts pronounce an autonomous right to informational privacy, as they once did about decisional privacy? If so, should a right to privacy be designed to protect sensitive data and minority rights only, or instead, does the sensitivity of the data depend on its use? Or, perhaps, might the Fourth Amendment be stretched to cover a broader scope, or, in cases of automated decision-making should (technological) due process kick in? Alternatively, should privacy advocates look into resuscitating tort law or giving broader purchase to the notion of confidentiality, or should they place their bets on privacy as a property right? Ultimately, can consumer privacy be realized through co-regulation between the public and the private sectors or left to the gradual development of a common law approach, which some claim is emerging through settlements enforced by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)? Many worthy ideas have been put into enforcement actions, because the Federal Trade Commission does not bring cases over minor compliance matters.

5 For a springboard of accounts going beyond the mainstream understanding of privacy as an individual value, see Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy in Context: Technology, Policy, and the Integrity of Social Life (2010) (theorizing the deficits of the privacy-as-control paradigm and offering to address these through contextualized norms) and Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort, 77 Calif. L. Rev. 957 (1989).


12 See Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 2055, 2125–26 (2004); Lauren Henry Scholz, Privacy as Quasi-Property, 101 Iowa L. Rev. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 33).


on the table but thus far none have gained sufficient traction among U.S. policy makers and other interested parties.\textsuperscript{15}

At the same time, while the European Union (EU) is not a fully-fledged federation, in the area of data privacy, it has opted for a high level of harmonization.\textsuperscript{16} Historically, Germany was the first nation to adopt a data-protection statute—first, on the local level, in the state of Hessen in 1970, and then as federal German legislation.\textsuperscript{17} A few other European states followed suit, and by the time the (General) European Data Protection Directive of 1995 and the overall EU data protection framework were established, privacy was increasingly understood across the European Union as a fundamental right\textsuperscript{18} that protects self-determination and which must be balanced through proportionality with other rights and interests.\textsuperscript{19} By way of comparison, current U.S. privacy law is mostly composed of federal sector-specific statutes that offer variegated protection in the public


\textsuperscript{17} See Spiros Simitis, Privacy—An Endless Debate?, 98 Calif. L. Rev. 1989, 1996 (2010) (“The Hessian Parliament’s nearly unanimous and astonishingly quick enactment of the Data Protection Act was due, in part, to the limited scope of the Act—it addressed only the public sector’s automated processing of personal data . . . . Thus, the German Federal Data Protection Law was passed only after five years of intense controversies shaped by the requests to mitigate the duties of private data processors.”).

\textsuperscript{18} Privacy is conceptualized as a fundamental right, enshrined in the constitutions and statutes of many of the EU Member States, as well as in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 7, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 391 [hereinafter EU Fundamental Rights Charter] and the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 22. Moreover, alongside the established right to privacy, the EU Charter includes a separate right to data protection in Article 8.

\textsuperscript{19} Worth mentioning is the German Federal Constitutional Court’s judgment in the Microcensus case of 1969, which set up a framework allowing proportionality balancing. For an English excerpt, see DONALD P. KOMMERS & RUSSELL A. MILLER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 356–57 (3rd ed. 2012). The proportionality test, similar to strict scrutiny in the United States, would become the relevant framework within which the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) adjudicate on privacy protection.
and private sectors with regard to different types of data.\textsuperscript{20} Despite the differences between Europe and the United States, however, this Article demonstrates that often one state—in this case, California—is a frontrunner, while other states and the private sector gradually follow suit.

Overall, the federated nature of lawmaking in both the United States and the European Union is seen to deliver sub-optimal results.\textsuperscript{21} In particular, in the United States, there are concerns regarding the increased fragmentation of American data privacy law and the lack of relevant federal consolidation, whereas in the EU, the recently enacted General Data Protection Regulation and currently debated anti-terrorism measures have generated opposition regarding the over-centralization of powers in European institutions.\textsuperscript{22} The aim of this Article is not to evaluate the various legal and policy proposals on their merits, but rather to challenge a commonly held assumption that obstructs lawmaking in this area. Even the most fervent data privacy advocates in the United States can be wary of centralizing data privacy solutions for fear of regulatory “ossification” that would stymie innovation.\textsuperscript{23} Even the most fervent opponents of intrusive surveillance methods temper their zeal for fear of tilting the balance too far to one side.\textsuperscript{24} The underlying assumption seems to be that privacy regulation would be too “sticky” and impossible to undo or modify in correspondence with present-day technologies or security threats.

Recognizing that path dependence factors into any choice of regulation, I provide evidence for the dynamism of privacy law through federalism: As federalism studies show, independent state institutions are challenging the status quo of privacy policies both in the United States and in the EU, thereby contributing to well-functioning democracies. The national parliaments, data-protection authorities, and constitutional courts of EU


\textsuperscript{21} See Paul M. Schwartz, The Value of Privacy Federalism, in Social Dimensions of Privacy: Interdisciplinary Perspectives 324 (Beate Roessler & Dorota Mokrosinska eds., 2015).

\textsuperscript{22} Johannes Masing, Herausforderungen des Datenschutzes [Challenges in Data Protection], 2012 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW] 2305-11 (Ger.).

\textsuperscript{23} See Paul M. Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, 118 Yale L.J. 902, 928 (2009).

\textsuperscript{24} The recent difficulties surrounding the reform of the National Security Agency (NSA) surveillance practices—even in the wake of public outcry after the Snowden revelations and despite the firm stance subsequently taken by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit—provide a ready example. See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Surveillance Court Rules that N.S.A. Can Resume Bulk Data Collection, N.Y. Times (June 30, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/01/us/politics/fisa-surveillance-court-rules-nsa-can-resume-bulk-data-collection.html.
countries, but also, increasingly, the state legislatures, attorneys general, and the highest state courts in the United States provide substantive input to privacy lawmaking. Ultimately, I argue that the centralization of privacy policies does not carry with it the risk of ossification, as long as the “democratic churn” created by independent state institutions and put into practice in state regulation continues to prompt the U.S. national or the EU-wide system to change. What is more, technology increases the potential for “races to the top” in data-privacy regulation both across state jurisdictions and in the private sector. Unlike in other fields where competitive federalism might also provoke “races to the bottom,” the data privacy field presents a more or less clear-cut choice between effective regulation and non-regulation. Yet options for leveling up privacy protections get overlooked in what has become known as “the privacy thicket.” The opportunity structures for “races to the top” need to be carefully studied by the relevant decisionmaker (e.g., the FTC, the U.S. Congress, or European institutions) that can capitalize on such trends to enhance privacy protection without excessive costs for businesses and law enforcement. Therefore, in an attempt to go beyond the binary divides, I compare the U.S. and the EU privacy systems in a vertical fashion, focusing on how little-theorized structural incentives play a role in the development of privacy law in each of the two respective legal orders. In this sense, the Article’s

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26 See William L. Cary, *Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware*, 83 Yale L.J. 663, 665 (1974) (“Delaware is both the sponsor and the victim of a system contributing to the deterioration of corporation standards. This unhappy state of affairs, stemming in great part from the movement toward the least common denominator, Delaware, seems to be developing on both the legislative and judicial fronts . . . . Perhaps now is the time to reconsider the federal role.”); Richard L. Revesz, *Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation*, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1210, 1219 (1992) (distinguishing the environmental from the corporate-charter and bank-charter literatures and pointing out that even if races to the bottom indeed existed in the environmental field, a federal response could not be the answer to such problems); Kirsten H. Engel, *State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a “Race” and Is It “To the Bottom”?*, 48 Hastings L.J. 271, 283 (1997) (arguing in rebuttal to Revesz that the interstate market for industrial development and environmental benefits is substantially distorted and that a federal framework is needed to avoid social welfare loss).
goal is not to directly compare the two regimes’ compatibility but rather to provide insights on privacy law formation in each of the two federated contexts. By advancing a general argument in favor of federal data privacy consolidation, I do not mean to suggest that the United States should necessarily follow the EU model of omnibus regulation. Instead, privacy consolidation in the United States can take place by extending the standards of protection applicable in one sector to another, by introducing new sectoral federal legislation, or through a Privacy Restatement that draws on state law, among other things, as a source. Equally, I do not mean to suggest that Europeanizing data protection laws presents an ideal type of privacy consolidation. Instead, I explore some of the built-in institutional mechanisms at the disposal of both the United States and the European Union to help safeguard the two systems from over-centralizing while still consolidating data privacy.

Part I summarizes the U.S. and EU scholarly and policy debate on data privacy. Part II suggests a federalist theoretical lens, applicable to U.S. and the EU privacy contexts alike. Looking at privacy as a case study of federalism helps to dissipate the assumption of federal or European privacy regulation being too inflexible or burdensome to businesses. Part III presents empirical evidence for the role of state institutions in the United States and the EU state regulatory models as catalysts in federated privacy lawmaking. The empirical material is complemented by several semi-structured interviews with representative U.S. interstate businesses, civil rights organizations, and government officials conducted in 2015. Part IV offers tentative conclusions about the intersection of privacy and federalism.


II. WHAT PRIVACY CAN LEARN FROM FEDERALISM AND FEDERALISM FROM PRIVACY

A condition *sine qua non* for states to function as “vital cells . . . of democratic sentiment, impulse, and action”\(^32\) is some degree of state autonomy. Both the U.S. and EU governments have limited powers but deeply interconnected systems. State autonomy can thus be understood as preserving meaningful regulatory responsibilities in a densely intertwined interstate web of federal and quasi-federal constructs. In contrast to the allure of sovereignty and the resultant “double spheres” approach\(^33\) that likely generates a more manageable judicial doctrine but is long outdated and outpaced by present-day realities,\(^34\) state autonomy is a malleable concept. It inevitably invites questions of what exactly constitutes valuable self-government or meaningful regulatory responsibilities. To be sure, scholars of U.S. federalism might reject or accept the anti-commandeering string of case law of the Supreme Court\(^35\) and see the “power of the servant” as ei-


\(^33\) See Ernest A. Young, *The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms*, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 105 (2004) (“Dual federalism’s demise suggests the futility of trying to divide up the world into separate and exclusive spheres of governmental competence. The respective state and federal spheres always turn out to overlap.”). Young's rejection of the “double spheres” understanding holds well both for the United States and the EU. For the European context, see Robert Schütze, *From Dual to Cooperative Federalism: The Changing Structure of European Law* 47–48 (2009). Young notes the U.S. Supreme Court’s focus on state immunity at the expense of other aspects of state sovereignty. Young, supra, at 31; cf. Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-6/90, Francovichi & It. Repub., 1991 E.C.R. I-05357 (describing federalized governance in the European context, where unlike in the United States, the EU Member States can be found liable for failure to implement EU law).


ther a form of autonomy gain or autonomy loss. In contrast, “commandeering” constitutes the bread and butter of everyday EU law functioning, but (perhaps due to the different structure of the Union) it has never been questioned as a serious threat to Member States’ autonomy. A prominent school of thought in the United States locates state autonomy as lying outside the courtroom, preserved through the political process, primarily via states’ representatives in the Senate. With the consolidation of federal power, however, the political process has come to be uniformly criticized as an inadequate safeguard of federalism. As for the European Union, though its political safeguards are far stronger, the incremental consolidation of EU competences in a number of areas through the case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and subsequent Treaty amendments has given rise to debates on “competence creep” and fears of the contin-

36 See Heather K. Gerken, Commentary, Of Sovereigns and Servants, 115 Yale L.J. 2633, 2635 (2006) (discussing the leverage gained by state administrators over the federal government in the oversight and implementation of federal programs).


38 The Member States implement EU statutes, be they directives or regulations. Under EU law, a regulation is directly applicable, i.e., it does not need to be transposed by a national legislative act into the domestic legal order, whereas a directive is binding as to its effect but leaves the choice of means to the Member State. In principle, the Member States retain more leeway when implementing directives. See Daniel Halberstam, Comparative Federalism and the Issue of Commandeering, in The Federal Vision: Legitimacy and Levels of Governance in the United States and the European Union 213, 230–31, 234 (Kalypso Nicolaidis & Robert Howse eds., 2001).


40 The conclusions drawn from such criticisms, however, are diametrically different. Compare John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1311, 1314, 1321 (1997) (arguing that the Court should step in to defend state sovereignty), with the New, New Federalists: Heather K. Gerken, Federalism as the New Nationalism: An Overview, 123 Yale L.J. 1889, 1890–94 (2014) (arguing that the states continue to play an important role, albeit through other means, in the U.S. federal system and rejecting calls for aggressive judicial review in federalism cases).

41 See generally Mark Tushnet, How (and How Not) to Use Comparative Constitutional Law in Basic Constitutional Law Courses, 49 St. Louis U. L.J. 671, 677 (2005).


43 See Paolo Carozza, The Member States, in The European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights 35, 39–45 (Steve Peers & Angela Ward eds., 2004); Sasha
uous transfer of policies to the hands of unaccountable bureaucrats in Brussels. Like the Supreme Court before the “federalist revolution” of the Rehnquist bench, the ECJ is generally seen as an unreliable protector of Member States’ competence, often applying a double standard of review that is stringent toward the Member States but lenient toward the Union. The adoption of a legally binding EU charter of fundamental rights and its contested scope of applicability to the Member States have recently fueled this debate. However, in an attempt to protect state interests, the European Union has amended the founding Treaties to introduce mechanisms such as a subsidiarity check on EU legislation and a provision on protecting national constitutional identities.

Fortunately, in the United States, most federalism scholars concur in their opposition to preemption as a necessary precondition for state autonomy. The “new federalism” of the 1980s and 1990s brought this debate into sharp focus as state legislatures began enacting laws that, in many areas, went beyond the federal floor of protection, and as state courts began reaching more rights-protective results than the Supreme Court when interpreting analogous provisions of their own constitutions. However, in the EU, under the ECJ’s current interpretation of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, the primacy and effectiveness of EU law is considered in


45 Article 4(2) reads: “The Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the Treaties as well as their national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government. It shall respect their essential State functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security. In particular, national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State.” Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 4(2) Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C326/01) [hereinafter TEU & TEFU].

46 See, e.g., Gerken, supra note 34, at 94.


48 See infra note 49. The text of the EU Fundamental Rights Charter certainly gives the possibility for reliance on more rights-protective sources. Article 53 reads: “Nothing in this Charter shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely affecting human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognised, in their respective fields of application, by Union law and international law and by international agreements to which the Union or all the Member States are party, including the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and by the Member States’ constitutions.” EU Fundamental Rights Charter, supra note 18, at art. 53.
almost absolute terms. Rejecting this monolithic understanding, scholars of EU law have started making the case that, even in areas under the scope of EU law, the Member States can and should be given a certain leeway to espouse stronger rights protection under their constitutions.\(^{49}\) Similarly, scholars have advocated against judicial application of the Dormant Commerce Clause or statutory preemption in the United States, as new state statutes eventually force controversial policy issues onto the agenda of the federal (and by extension, it can be theorized—the European) lawmaker.\(^{50}\) This may well be favorable to the democratic process: individuals and the states both benefit since, on the one hand, what can be politically thorny problems like air pollution, workplace safety, student privacy, or the balance between privacy and security will have to be addressed despite Congress or the EU institutions dragging their feet. On the other hand, a federal (or EU-level approach) can avoid externalization of costs by some states and “race[s] to the bottom” by others.\(^{51}\) Additionally, the industry will be able to reduce costs by working with one instead of multiple standards. The U.S. Supreme Court has mainly attacked preemption on grounds of states’ “police powers.”\(^{52}\) Yet this approach might lead autonomy to be associated with zero-sum fistfights between state and federal governments.

\(^{49}\) Whereas the Spanish Constitutional Court interpreted the EU Fundamental Rights Charter as a floor of protection to the right of fair trial in *Melloni*, the ECJ insisted on an absolute understanding of EU primacy. Aida Torres Pérez, Case Note, *Melloni in Three Acts: From Dialogue to Monologue*, 10 Eur. Const. L. Rev. 308, 315–16 (2014). Thus, the fact that state courts may still be able to enforce more protective constitutional rights in situations not entirely determined by EU law under *Melloni* might be little consolation for rights enthusiasts. And yet, as it is argued, “if the [ECJ] has admitted restrictions on [EU] primacy and effectiveness on the basis of more protective constitutional rights when the states derogate from the EU fundamental freedoms of movement [as in the *Omega* case], why not when the states implement secondary legislation? . . . [E]ven if primacy, unity, and effectiveness [of EU law] were compromised, [domestic] constitutional rights should not be automatically set aside, but rather the [ECJ] should examine whether a restriction on those principles might be justified in order to accommodate more protective constitutional rights.” *Id.* at 328–29.


\(^{52}\) “[W]e start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress,” *Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.*, 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); see Ernest A. Young, “The Ordinary Diet of the Law”: The Presumption Against Preemption in the Roberts Court, 2011 Sup. Ct. Rev. 253, 255–56, (trying to rationalize the Supreme Court’s case law on preemption, otherwise categorized as a “muddle”).
the result being that the very concept of autonomy collapses into sharp distinctions of sovereignty or a “double spheres” approach, albeit with a softer edge.\textsuperscript{53} Therefore, there seems to be no ready-made solution to the dilemma faced by both the ECJ and the Supreme Court in want of a doctrine that preserves space for the states while reflecting the intertwined nature of federal and state interactions.

With data privacy in particular, federalism’s potential to generate regulatory experimentation is especially valuable to ensure a well-functioning and democratic system in both the United States and the EU. The states can provide the celebrated “laborator[i]es” of democracy\textsuperscript{54} effect needed in the search for innovative regulatory solutions to balance privacy with countervailing interests. Moreover, in both the United States and the European Union, time is of the essence. Whereas the checks and balances of U.S. federal lawmaking could be understood as originally designed to guard the states against federal overreach,\textsuperscript{55} at present the acute gridlock in Congress raises serious concerns on both sides of the political spectrum. Similarly, European lawmaking is a protracted process—for example, in the case of the General Data Protection Regulation that was adopted recently, four-and-a-half years have passed since the lawmaking procedure was initiated until the final vote of the European Parliament. In the face of rapid technological developments on the one hand, and the structural exigencies of federal or EU lawmaking on the other, state regulation presents a compelling, if temporary,\textsuperscript{57} response to the privacy conundrum.

Therefore, if Brandeis’s dissent is taken to heart, and “[t]here must be power in the states and the nation to remould, through experimentation, . . . economic practices and institutions to meet changing social and economic needs,”\textsuperscript{58} then preemption, “the boogeyman of public interest regulation,”\textsuperscript{59} has to be restricted in data privacy too.\textsuperscript{60} In the United

\textsuperscript{53} See Young, supra note 33, at 30.

\textsuperscript{54} See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

\textsuperscript{55} See Young, supra note 33, at 59.


\textsuperscript{57} See, e.g., B.J. Ard, The Limits of Industry-Specific Privacy Law, 51 IDAHO L. REV. 607, 609–11 (2015) (discussing the deficiencies of quickly enacted state laws such as the California Reader Privacy Act).

\textsuperscript{58} New State Ice Co., 285 U.S. at 311.


\textsuperscript{60} See Schwartz, supra note 23, at 930. For an argument in favor of applying an anti-discrimination approach to preemption, see Bilyana Petkova, The Long-Term Promise of Privacy Federalism, Part I, TECH. & MARKETING BLOG (Sept. 1, 2015),
States, industry’s push of Congress toward the establishment of weak legislation vis-à-vis private sector regulation, also referred to as “preemptive federalization,” 61 has given rise to justified fears of the centralization of privacy policies in the past. 62 Similarly, ahead of the European Commission’s proposal for an EU-wide General Data Protection Regulation, American as well as European businesses 63 have actively lobbied to further harmonize the existing EU law framework, a fact interpreted by some as a harbinger of lowering existing privacy protections. 64 As Professor Hills writes, “federal regulation frequently results from lobbying efforts by industry interests that oppose regulation. The apparent paradox of this statement dissolves when one takes into account industry’s desire for uniformity of regulation.” 65

But what of “preemptive federalization”? Consider this scenario: when enabled, independent state models develop autonomously, although not in isolation. Horizontal interaction and spillovers between the state jurisdictions create a dynamic of horizontal adaptation between states and institutions. 66 This dynamic, even if powerful, does not result in full harmonization, but is likely to facilitate “races to the top” in the private sector, too. If the federal government (or the EU Parliament) refrains from preempting state law for a period of time, at least some of the higher standards of consumer or fundamental rights protection introduced in at least some of the states


63 “Today European enterprises support harmonization and it is their dissatisfaction with the current diverging national rules that has been a main impetus in the choice of a regulation instead of a directive. From a historic point of view, it is interesting that back in the 1990s the attitude was quite the opposite. Enterprises argued strongly against harmonization and this was a main reason for the failure of the first proposed directive (1990) and the enactment of the current directive. The times have been changing.” Peter Blume, Will It Be a Better World? The Proposed EU Data Protection Regulation, 2 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 130, 131 (2012). American businesses, and in particular Google, were similarly lobbying the EU Commission for harmonization.
64 Jan Philipp Albrecht, No EU Data Protection Standard Below the Level of 1995, 1 EUR. DATA PROTECTION L. REV. 3, 3–4 (2015) (discussing attempts of some EU member state governments lobbied by industries to weaken the principles of data limitation and data minimization three years after the original draft regulation was tabled but also asserting the determination of the EU Parliament to block such attempts in the legislative process).
66 See Gerken & Holtzblatt, supra note 50, at 106.
are likely to be voluntarily taken up by the industry. This would then minimize “preemptive federalization” as the starting point for negotiations of a new federal or EU-wide regulation, and would be driven beyond a point where its impact on individuals might be arbitrary. Think of data-breach notification or student privacy laws, as well as location-tracking practices in the United States, where at present there is no comprehensive federal statute but instead various divergent statutes in the states.\textsuperscript{67} Several targeted expert interviews with privacy litigators and chief privacy officers of representative major U.S. interstate businesses, as well as amicus briefs submitted by leading national telecommunication companies, reveal a certain pattern. For reasons of consistency and uniformity in consumers’ treatment, but also in order to avoid legal challenges in potential cross-border lawsuits, and to save costs from developing technologically differentiated products or services, in cases of multiple jurisdictions that pose different requirements, businesses tend to voluntarily adopt the higher standard. Since uniformity is beneficial for industry, once there is a need for privacy protection spurred by new technological developments and a perceived lack of clarity among the divergent state laws, the federal legislator or agency (e.g., the FTC or Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB)), can step in and evaluate which strategies were successful in the states and which were less so. Since industry is more willing to accept centralized regulation or even actively lobby for such, and “first mover” states have managed to disseminate a higher standard among at least some important industry players, the incentives for businesses to insist on significantly lowering a standard on the federal or EU level dwindle. This is partly because some businesses have already conformed to the higher standard, and partly because the higher standard has become embedded in their business models. Such companies might favor centralizing data privacy legislation around the higher bar in order to achieve a level playing field with their competitors. The U.S. federal or EU lawmaker could capitalize on such developments when standardizing privacy laws. To be sure, given the compromise-driven nature of federal and EU lawmaking, as well as the strong temporal dimension of this area of the law, the space to maneuver for the federal or EU law policymaker is hardly unlimited. Ultimately, either in conjunction with preserving features pertinent to (member) states’ national identities (when such identities can later become a part of federal or EU identity), or based on a theory that allows state experimentation\textsuperscript{68} to

\textsuperscript{67} See supra notes 20–22, 24–26, 43–44 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{68} Such an approach in the EU, however, would not tolerate national legislation to experiment with surveillance once national measures go beyond the protection set out in the EU Charter. See, e.g., Alissa J. Rubin, \textit{Lawmakers in France Move to Vastly Expand Surveillance}, \textit{N.Y. Times} (May 5, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/06/world/europe/french-legislators-approve-sweeping-intelligence-bill.html. It can be argued that the proposed French law that would allow bulk data collection and analysis of
be stimulated for a period of time, a judicial “presumption against preemption” in data-privacy regulation\(^6\) seems like a necessary safety valve against ossification. Moreover, a one-size-fits-all approach is sometimes both unfeasible and undesirable: hence, some state standards are best left to the states.

State institutions have a role to play in that story, too. Influencing both the public and the private sector, they catalyze change. Much as data privacy has a life cycle presenting an array of potential harms that can vary when the data is being collected, processed, disseminated, or intruded upon, in the European Union, different state institutions have varying levels of involvement and input at the different stages of the privacy policymaking cycle in (quasi)federal systems. In the United States, the state legislatures and attorneys general are becoming privacy agenda-setters and -enforcers, while the state supreme courts oppose warrantless search practices, offering arguments that could help replace current U.S. Supreme Court precedent. In the EU, the national parliaments are given a voice in EU privacy lawmaking, and data-protection authorities’ important involvement in its implementation is even reinforced by the reformed law. At the same time, the EU national constitutional courts have already quashed the implementation of security-enhancing measures that lack privacy protection. By defying the status quo, state institutions help safeguard privacy federalism: they guard against ossification while allowing for a level of centralization and consolidation of data privacy to the benefit of individuals, businesses, and law enforcement alike. Next, I examine these insights by looking into the interaction of state institutions and regulatory models with the federal level, and the concurrent role of industry in aspects of U.S. consumer privacy and law enforcement.

III. THE SAFEGUARDS OF PRIVACY FEDERALISM IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPEAN UNION

A. The Role of State Legislatures in Consumer Privacy in the U.S.

In the absence of a comprehensive federal approach to data privacy in the United States, the states have long stood at the forefront of privacy policies. Unlike the federal Constitution, several states explicitly en-
shrine the right to privacy in their constitutions. Surprisingly, scholarly attempts to systematize the hodgepodge of state legislative and policy initiatives and their impact on federal-level developments are rare. The relationship between state and federal regulation in data privacy can be divided into three main categories: first, state privacy laws that have yet to be attempted at the federal level; second, state statutes that have begun to be canvassed by the federal government; and third, state statutes that go beyond the already existing federal standard of protection.

Regulations within the employment sector fall within the first group of state regulations without a federal analogue (or without any attempt at such thus far). Ten states have enacted bills protecting the private social-media accounts of employees since 2013, beginning with Arkansas, Colorado, Illinois, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Vermont, and Washington; at least twelve other states are in the process of enacting or considering similar laws at the moment of writing. State legislatures have navigated around the preemption provisions of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) in order to modernize and ameliorate employment opportunities for constituents with criminal records often incurred decades ago, as well as to tackle issues related to identity-theft problems and the inclusion of medical debt in consumer reports. Apart from the wide-

70 According to the California Constitution: “All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.” CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1. The Alaska Constitution provides: “The right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed.” ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22. Unlike the U.S. Constitution and most state constitutions in the United States, but similarly to how privacy is protected in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and in the European Member State constitutions, California’s constitutional right to privacy applies not only to state actors, but also to private parties. See Sheehan v. San Francisco 49ers, Ltd., 201 P.3d 472, 479 (Cal. 2009); Hill v. NCAA, 865 P.2d 633, 644 (Cal. 1994).
71 For the exception that proves the rule, see supra notes 21 and 23.
72 A fourth category might encompass state resistance to centripetal trends. See Priscilla M. Regan & Christopher J. Deering, State Opposition to REAL ID, 39 PUBLISIUS 476, 476–78 (2009) (documenting state legislative initiatives against the Real ID Act and analyzing possible motivations for state resistance from a political science perspective). For the response of state courts opposing federal or EU surveillance legislation, see supra notes 53–59 and accompanying text.
74 See Elizabeth D. De Armond, Preventing Preemption: Finding Space for States to Regulate Consumers’ Credit Reports, 2016 BYU L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 23–24), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2448950 (documenting the shortcomings of FCRA and charting a way forward for the states to regulate shoulder-to-shoulder with the federal tier); see also Gail Hillebrand, After the FACTA: State Power to Prevent Identity
spread problem of inaccuracy in credit records, even accurate credit reports may unduly blacklist otherwise well-qualified job candidates by drawing the attention of the employer to often irrelevant information. In Hawaii, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Rhode Island, state legislatures have prohibited companies from asking job candidates upfront if they have a criminal record (the so-called “ban-the-box” laws), and Illinois and Washington, D.C. are expected to enact similar bills.75

As mentioned above, data-breach-notification laws fall in the second category. Since 2002, when the first such law was enacted in California, 76 46 other states have put in place laws of a similar kind.77 The Democratic leadership wanted to enact a data-breach-notification legislation reflecting California law in the 112th Congress, but the initiative was abandoned, likely due to gridlock, until President Obama renewed his call for action in 2015.78 Questions of where exactly to set the federal standard on breach notification now abound. In the negotiations, the federal lawmaker should take into account the expertise of privacy lawyers arguing that:

many companies that have been subject to data breaches involving multiple states have chosen to provide notice in a manner that is compliant with the statute with the strictest or most detailed state breach notification law. The reasons for this tend to be: (1) consistency in the content and timing of notices, (2) uniformity in the treatment of consumers, regardless of their state of residence, (3) perceived “safety” on erring on the side of providing notice to all affected individuals and including more detail in such notices and (4) simplicity and economy is sending out one or two forms of notice rather than 20, 30, etc. Where a breach affects residents of states that have a “harm threshold” as well as residents where there is a lower or no such “harm threshold”, I think most businesses

Thrift, 17 Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 53, 54 (2004) (analyzing FCRA’s preemption provisions after the additions made in 2003 by the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA) of 2003 and arguing that the states retain significant regulatory control).


(based on my experience) will provide notice to all affected individuals even where there might be a technical legal argument that notice is not required in all the affected states.

Further excerpts from interviews with representative interstate industries and members of a Washington, D.C.-based think tank, the *Future of Privacy Forum* (FPF) Advisory Board, reveal similar insights:

A few years back, there was a lot of angst among companies about the divergence in breach notification statutes in the states. Certainly, most of the businesses have been taking up the higher bar especially after the ChoicePoint incident when, after the breach, ChoicePoint only alerted victims in California since it was legally obliged to give notification there. Narrowly adhering to legal obligations in this sense generally creates bad PR. The momentum for a federal statute on breach notifications might have been lost, however: there was a feeling of urgency and the push was harder five to six years ago. Over time, companies have learnt to live with the divergent statutes.

and

There are two separate issues when it comes to breach notification statutes: what to do before the breach and what to do after. A risk-based approach, which seems to be the one espoused by most companies, weighs in the costs of encryption against the costs provoked by compensating mechanisms. What is protected under state laws, as a baseline, is reasonable encryption. Hypothetically speaking, if one state adopts a very prescriptive form of encryption, it is unlikely that such a statute would exert a lot of influence outside its jurisdiction. However, it is absolutely true that efficiency is important given state law inconsistencies that create compliance problems: how to notify and who . . . . If one statute scheme covers around 85% of the requirements in the other states, companies may prefer to follow that statute. That way, even if an attorney general decides to start an enforcement action and a company is not 100% in compliance, the attorney general might take into account that the company in question is complying with the spirit of the law. And yes, California has certainly been a leader in that area and it is also where we are based . . . . When considering the necessity of a federal bill, one has to keep in mind that wide variations in the 47 different state breach notification statutes will continue to exist. The way personally iden-

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79 E-mail interview with partner in a law firm specializing in privacy litigation (Feb. 15, 2015).

80 About one-hundred leading U.S. companies are part of the Future of Privacy’s (FPF) Advisory Board. See Supporters, Future of Privacy F., https://fpf.org/about/supporters/. All interviews were anonymous.

81 Telephone interview with a Chief Privacy Counsel from a member-company of the FPF (June 24, 2015).
tifiable information (PII) is defined continues to change in the states: what used to be an account number and a name is now [in state law] often [including] an e-mail address too . . . .

The trend of adopting the higher standard in breach notifications is certainly not uniform. Another interviewee shared that:

Companies do not decide to standardize in a one-dimensional sort of way . . . . My company has preferred to deal with breach notifications on a one-off basis instead of adopting a single standard. The current status quo of conflicting standards is not preferable, though. We have only so much “peanut butter” to go around with, after all . . . so we might want to standardize depending on what the alternative is . . . . Every day there are attempted breaches but what is the degree of certainty we need to have to give a notification? . . . All in all, a federal proposal that includes preemption and reasonable triggers [such as the current one presented by the White House] can be a good starting point for negotiation.

Clearly, in some sense, preemption remains the preferred default for businesses, but the question remains whether, based on a cost-benefit analysis, the industry might be ready to accept a compromise that would allow for a relatively high federal standard. It should be noted that the government has already managed to set a limited nationwide data-breach-notification obligation for health care information covered by federal health privacy law. Ultimately, as one of the industry representatives mentioned, there is no way that businesses can reap the benefits of regulation without incurring some cost.

Even more controversial has been California’s 2013 minor-protection privacy law requiring websites to give minors the possibility to erase information that they had posted on websites. The law defined minors as under the age of 18—not under the age of 13 like the federal Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) does—and outright forbade providers from marketing to minors certain products, including

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82 Telephone interview with a Chief Privacy Counsel in a member-company of the FPF (June 26, 2015); see, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.29(g)(2) (2014) (expanding California’s definition of PII to include username and password). In addition, the same interviewee added that “FCRA and GLBA have certainly allowed for state variations too but the differences are not that big of a deal, at least for my industry. It might be that this is so because the federal standard has come in first.”

83 Telephone interview with a Chief Privacy Officer in a member-company of the FPF (Apr. 29, 2015).


85 See Supporters, supra note 80.

alcohol, firearms, cigarettes, tattoos, and tanning devices. The bill seems to have inspired the Do Not Track Kids Act of 2011, 2013, and 2015—thus far, unsuccessful federal legislative proposals aimed at expanding the scope of COPPA against the collection of personal or geo-location information from children and minors, and redefining “minor” as an individual over the age of 12 and under the age of 15. To be sure, the state-to-federal dynamic has not been a one-way street, since causality can also run in the other direction: for instance, California might have been influenced by earlier efforts of the FTC regarding COPPA. New FTC guidelines or reinterpretation of federal statutory legislation can thus feed back into the policy debates underway in the states, prompting and reinforcing processes there. For instance, since 2010, the FTC had reviewed COPPA to ensure the introduction of updates in line with “evolving technology and changes in the way children use and access the Internet, including the increased use of mobile devices and social networking.” Although the changes did not concern an increase in the age threshold as in the California bill, the list of PII that cannot be collected without parental notice and consent was expanded on the federal level to include geo-location information, photographs and videos (through the soft-law mechanism prompted in FTC’s guidelines). Among other elements, the required security measures for websites that collect children’s information were strengthened, and covered website operators were required to adopt reasonable procedures for data retention and deletion. Facebook’s policies were challenged in a California class action suit on the grounds that the company misused users’ personal data by sharing it with third parties for the purposes of behavioral advertising. Facebook attempted to reach a settlement in the case, but a number of class members objected because the settlement did not ensure valid parental consent to a minor’s participation in sponsored stories. The district court dismissed that objection in part because, in its view, the federal statute preempted state law. However, in the case of Fraley v. Batman, recently decided by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the FTC submitted a neutral amicus brief to oppose that view of federal preemp-

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87 Id.
90 Id.
93 “[COPPA may] bar any efforts by plaintiffs to use state law to impose a parental consent requirement for minors over the age of 13.” Id.
The FTC argued that “[n]othing in COPPA’s language, structure, or legislative history indicates that Congress intended for that law to preempt state law privacy protections for people outside of COPPA’s coverage, including teenagers.” In an expression of cooperative federalism, the federal tier represented by the FTC has tried to reinforce a state legislative initiative, which in turn may at some point seep into the federal level.

In 2014, the California legislature passed a package of bills that protect student privacy. The Student Online Personal Information Protection Act (SOPIPA) prohibits online operators from compiling profiles on students for purposes other than those for which the information was originally collected; even if those operators do not contract with educational agencies, they cannot sell students’ information or target advertising on their website or any other website using information acquired from students. Moreover, local educational agencies that adopt a program that gathers pupil information obtained from social media in its records need to first notify the students and their parents about the proposed program and provide an opportunity for public comment at a regularly scheduled public meeting before such programs are adopted. Having the California bill as a point of reference, and in the wake of public outcry regarding the lack of any privacy protection in the growing use of education software, Representatives Luke Messer, a Republican from Indiana, and Jared Polis, a Democrat from Colorado, introduced the Student Digital Privacy and Pa-

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95 Id.
96 2014 Cal. Stat. ch. 839 (S.B. 1177) (codified at CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 22584–22585 (West 2015)); see also 2014 Cal. Stat. ch. 799 (A.B. 1442) (codified at CAL. EDUC. CODE § 49073.6 (West 2015)). More generally, see 2014 Cal. Stat. ch. 800 (A.B. 1584) (codified at CAL. EDUC. CODE § 49073.1 (West 2015)), which provides for the local educational agency to maintain and control student records. Students can keep control of content created for school purposes, along with a way to transfer their information to a personal account later. Id.
rental Rights Act of 2015, aimed at closing some of the flagrant loopholes.\textsuperscript{100} Companies active in student software provision shared that:

There is a lot of activity on the state level in this area and we try to support it. In general, we are supportive of a lot of privacy legislation because company practices are one thing but the lack of baseline legislation hurts everybody, it hurts trust. . . . Congress can build on the state legislative activities on student privacy, there are enough state statues by now: basically, with student privacy we are at a point that resembles the dynamics with breach-notification statutes a few years back. It would be interesting to see whether the opportunity [for a federal statute] is seized within the next few years. . . . In terms of the state laws, the first few set a relatively low bar of protection. SOPIPA is relatively more protective and since other states and industries de facto are starting to follow it, it may provide a good base for a new federal law.\textsuperscript{101}

We just cannot keep up with all the state laws even if we try. . . . Some of the proposed state legislation is too restrictive, for instance Louisiana has just tabled a new law that completely prohibits the sharing of student data.\textsuperscript{102} This actually means that a school in Louisiana can not legally provide the names of the students that a public or private entity is contracted to provide services for, including bus companies, special education service providers and many more. It also makes it illegal for high schools to provide information to universities that may offer scholarships to their students. They are working on fixing the bill but have not. . . . We are active in about twenty states but cannot afford lobbying across the country to go about fixing such bills. . . . SOPIPA has some irrelevancies too: for example, it only applies to external vendors and it does not impose penalties for school districts that are in violation of the law. This is an expensive rule and creates competition issues for us. . . . What is more, the problem is that SOPIPA only refers to K-12 school purposes: it does not cover post-secondary education. As a company, we would prefer a consistent set of rules for education. People, too, really want to have control over their information and to know what it is used for. The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) fails to impose strong penalties and is generally not a good mechanism to go for since it does not give to students or parents control over PII.\textsuperscript{103} For example, FERPA [currently] does not offer the pos-

\textsuperscript{100} H.R. 2092, 114th Cong. (2015).
\textsuperscript{101} Telephone interview, supra note 81.
\textsuperscript{103} Senators Edward Markey, a Democrat from Massachusetts and Orrin Hatch, a Republican from Utah, proposed some amendments to the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) in July 2014. A different FERPA amendment proposal in 2015 (by John Kline, a Republican from Minnesota and Robert Scott, a
sibility for copying and downloading student information. The suggestion of the Department of Commerce some time ago to fine companies but not the school districts and the non-profit sector is unworkable as well. . . . Generally, a federal statute that provides control mechanism, consistency and coverage for school districts and non-profit organizations (who are often the ones actually selling students’ data!) can be a plus. Higher privacy standards are actually beneficial for folks like us: we are supporting economies of scale, this is good for us, and it’s good for education . . . . But everyone has to do it . . . .

The FTC also weighed in on the process by updating its guidelines for student data privacy in March 2015. Although clearly less strict, the FTC guidelines nevertheless draw on California’s package.

Finally, a third category of state legislation goes above the federal floor. Whereas the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act (GLBA) establish data-security requirements for the organizations that fall under their jurisdiction, and the FTC enforcement actions work to the same effect even in the absence

Democrat from Virginia) might be one of the most robust to date. Aiming to complement the Messer–Polis proposal, it expands the definition of student education record and holds that under threat of fines of up to $500,000, schools, as well as local and state education mechanisms, are required to not provide to third parties access to student data for marketing and advertising purposes; it also gives access and correction rights to parents and introduces the possibility for opt-outs of certain uses of data. See Discussion Draft of a Bill to Amend the General Education Provisions Act, 114th Cong. (1st Sess. 2015), http://dataqualitycampaign.org/wp-content/uploads/files/FERPA_001_xml.pdf.

Telephone interview, supra note 81.

Based on the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), a school district may act as a parent’s agent providing consent to the collection of children’s information on the parent’s behalf, as long as the consent is limited to the educational context. The FTC recommended as best practices that parents are allowed to review the personal information collected and that operators delete children’s personal information once it is no longer needed for educational purposes. In addition, schools have to provide notice of the right to opt-out to parents that can opt their children out of participation in activities involving the collection, disclosure, or use of personal information collected from students for the purpose of marketing or sale to third parties. Complying with COPPA: Frequently Asked Questions, COPPA and Schools, Fed. Trade Comm’n (2015), https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/complying-coppa-frequently-asked-questions#Schools. One of the interviewees further hoped that student software will soon be standardized across the U.S. because “there is need for consistency on the one hand, and there is political salience, on the other . . . . We do one-off deals with the schools now but this is becoming too hard to manage. The FTC’s guidelines on the subject, although they do not exactly specify which projects are in and which are out, are altogether solid and can serve as a first draft for federal legislation. California’s standards for kids’ protection might be going too far, however . . . but we are complying within their jurisdiction, trying to achieve local accommodation whenever possible . . . .” Telephone interview, supra note 82.
of a security leak, some states have innovated further. Currently 26 states have legislation in place mandating the destruction of personal information, with California and Massachusetts establishing substantive requirements in that regard. Under Massachusetts law, for example, covered entities need to provide security programs with specific technical, administrative, and physical safeguards. Whereas one of the chief privacy officers I interviewed shared that their company on its own initiative complies with the Massachusetts standard in all states because “it substantively makes sense,” another interviewee shared that:

[State] breach notification laws are probably the primary example of how state laws have driven national data privacy practices for businesses (in particular large, nation-wide businesses). Other influential developments include the 2010 Massachusetts data security regulation, which at the time it was enacted was the most detailed regulation addressing administrative and technical security measures. A handful of other states have followed that regulation to some extent, but, again, Massachusetts became a sort of de facto data security standard for some businesses. Many data services contracts, such as in outsourcing, reflect the influence of that regulation by referencing the regulation. That sort of practice is another example of how state laws have “moved the needle” in corporate security practices.

Other representatives of corporate entities shared: “[E]ven if we don’t do business in Massachusetts, we try to keep up with that standard . . . .”; and “[M]y sense is that this statute did set a default standard then: you cannot build security only for Massachusetts; however, industry mandates for encryption have significantly surpassed the Massachusetts standard [in the time] since,” especially given that “the health and finan-

107 Schwartz, supra note 21, at 327.
109 Telephone interview, supra note 82.
110 E-mail interview, supra note 79.
111 Telephone interview, supra note 81; see also Jared A. Harshbarger, Cloud Computing Providers and Data Security Law: Building Trust with United States Companies, 16 J. TECH. L. & POL’y 229, 245 (2011) (“[I]t is apparent that this Massachusetts law has brought together many of the elements of its federal and state predecessors to compose the most comprehensive data security regulation for cloud providers.”).
112 Telephone interview, supra note 81.
cial sectors are already regulated by HIPAA and GLBA, and European and Canadian laws have played a role, too.\footnote{Id.}

B. The Role of State Attorneys General for Consumer Privacy in the United States

Also, state attorneys general play an active role in the promotion and institutionalization of privacy-friendly initiatives in the United States. As Professor Paul Schwartz has remarked, attorneys general are elected officials and as such, are typically motivated to act upon “hot-button” issues that receive media attention.\footnote{Schwartz, supra note 21, at 332. For a comprehensive overview of the role of Attorneys General for U.S. data privacy law, see Danielle K. Citron, Privacy Enforcement Pioneers: The Role of State Attorneys General in the Development of Privacy Law, NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2016).} Kamala Harris, California’s Attorney General (now running for a Senate seat), and her Special Assistant Attorney General Travis LeBlanc (now heading the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) Enforcement Bureau) have played decisive roles in establishing a new Privacy Enforcement and Protection Unit in California and doubling the number of prosecutors protecting privacy enforcement of state and federal privacy laws in their state. What is more, in 2012, Harris entered into an agreement with major industry players such as Google, Microsoft, Apple, Amazon, Hewlett-Packard, Research-In-Motion, and later Facebook, requiring these companies to adopt privacy policies for their mobile applications (apps) in order to comply with California’s Online Privacy Protection Act (CalOPPA).\footnote{Press Release, Cal. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Kamala D. Harris Secures Global Agreement to Strengthen Privacy Protections for Users of Mobile Applications (Feb. 22, 2012), https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-kamala-d-harris-secures-global-agreement-strengthen-privacy. The CalOPPA requires operators of commercial websites that collect data from Californian residents to detail the kinds of information gathered by the website, how the information may be shared with other parties, and, if such a process exists, describe the process that the user can use to review and make changes to their stored information. In order for the act to have teeth, it has been designed to have a broad scope going well beyond California’s borders: neither the web server nor the company that created the web site has to be in California to fall under the scope of the law. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 22575–22579 (2015).} Privacy policy adoption in mobile applications leapt from 19% in 2011 to 72% in 2013,\footnote{Ganka Hadjipetrova & Hannah G. Poteat, States are Coming to the Fore of Privacy in the Digital Era, LANDSLIDE, July–Aug. 2014, at 14.} while Harris, interpreting CalOPPA broadly, made sure to commence enforcement actions against those companies that had not yet put such policies in place. Further, next to initiating the changes in California’s minors’ privacy protection law, the California Attorney General’s office has also sponsored the “Do Not Track” amendment to CalOPPA requiring that companies collecting “personally identifiable information about an individual consumer’s
online activities over time and across third-party Web sites or online services” must disclose how they respond to browser “do not track” signals or “other mechanisms that provide consumers the ability to exercise choice regarding the collection.”

In addition to becoming agenda-setters on their own accord, it should be noted that the attorneys general are given statutory enforcement powers under both federal and state law—powers that they have exercised individually, for the sake of their own states, but also collectively in cross-border actions in conjunction with other attorneys general. In 2013, the attorneys general of 37 states and the District of Columbia signed a $17 million settlement with Google after allegations that it circumvented Safari’s default privacy settings and allowed third parties to track the browsers of users without their knowledge or consent. Moreover, in another multistate settlement, Google agreed to pay $7 million for improper collection of personal information through its Street View project. As a part of the settlements, Google committed to educating its employees on privacy protection and to proactive monitoring of employees’ actions. In 2013, Doug Gansler, the president of the National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG)—an established forum for attorneys general in the United States—declared protecting online privacy a central issue through the NAAG’s Presidential Initiative, called “Data Privacy in the Digital Age.”

Professor Judith Resnik has emphasized the significance of such “translocal organizations of government officials,” which she explained are “generally organized not by an interest (such as climate control or women’s rights) but by a promise” that “if you do this, you will receive that.”

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117 See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 22575, supra note 80. One of my interviewees shared that: “California’s new . . . ‘Do Not Track’ [requirement] and the so-called ‘right to be forgotten’ [for minors] will influence nationwide businesses notwithstanding the [current] lack of any comparable federal law or regulation in the U.S.” Telephone interview, supra note 81. Another example of potential state impact on federal-wide standards the interviewee gave was the detailed guidance that California and other states provided on privacy disclosures in mobile devices and mobile apps. Id. Another interviewee largely agreed, adding that legislation focusing on transparency such as the Californian “Do Not Track” rule or the requirement to include privacy policies on mobile apps are “not too costly, a fact facilitating [nationwide] compliance for their company.” Telephone interview, supra note 82.

118 On the federal level, state attorneys general have enforcement powers under the CAN-SPAM Act, COPPA, FCRA, HIPAA, and the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. See Bernard Nash, Ann Marie Luciano & Bryan Mosca, Recent Developments in State Attorneys General Enforcement, 46 Urb. Law. 901, 906–07, 906 n.31 (2014) (listing seventeen states with data-breach-notification statutes that require notice to the AG and pointing to examples of successful actions brought by individual AGs under state statutes); Schwartz, supra note 21, at 332).


120 Id.; see also Nash, Luciano & Mosca, supra note 118, at 908.

but by the political units of this federation—by the level of jurisdiction (federal, state, county, city) or the kind of office (governor, attorney general, legislator, mayor)." According to Resnik, voluntary organizations like NAAG or the National Conference of State Legislatures contribute to interweave the strings of the U.S. (privacy) federalism grid. State attorneys general are also synchronizing their submissions to federal lawmakers, as in a recent letter 47 NAAG members sent to Congress in order to express their views on the previously discussed federal data-security and breach-notification proposals. Such input could be valuable, and perhaps appreciated, to an even greater extent if attorneys general are invited to testify before Congress on tabled legislative data-privacy bills.

Importantly, the state attorneys general have not only coordinated their actions horizontally but have also joined efforts with the FTC. Gansler noted: “We pay close attention to [the FTC’s] efforts to inform privacy policy through reports and testimony, and we keep in contact with them on enforcement matters as well.” He pointed out the Maryland Workgroup on Children’s Online Privacy Protection as an example of collaboration between the FTC and his office. In enforcement actions, however, state attorneys general are able to draw on what are sometimes stronger statutory protections than those at the federal level. As one state regulator from California shared:

The California Confidentiality of Medical Information Act (CMIA) was not preempted by HIPAA. Other states have similar health statutes although the protections might vary. When a state official [in California] considers bringing an enforcement action, they usually choose whether to bring the action under HIPAA in a federal court or under the Californian statute in a state court. In my experience, bringing a HIPAA action in a federal court is usually not the preferred option because the penalties available [under HIPAA] would be limited. Further, there are state versions of FTC’s

123 Id. at 93–94.
125 Id. at 16.
126 Id.
128 The way HIPAA was designed allows for some state health laws to be exempt from preemption, in some cases even when the state provisions contradict federal law. See Does the HIPAA Rule Preempt State Laws?, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (Mar. 12, 2003), http://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/faq/399/does-hipaa-preempt-state-laws/index.html.
Act Section 5; these are the states’ unfair competition laws. The wording of the [California law] is broader than that of the federal Section 5, so for example any violation of HIPAA, CMIA or another state or federal statute can serve as a hook to trigger California’s “baby FTC act.” The advantage of this is that unlike the FTC that can only obtain injunctive relief under Section 5, our state law gives us the possibility to claim civil penalties of up to $2,500 for each violation (per consumer) . . . . We collaborate with the FTC or other consumer protection agencies like the CFPB, of course, but finally, we try to do what is best for the consumer . . . .

With the immediate disclaimer that unlike the European privacy-enforcement authorities, both the FTC and the state attorneys general in the United States are not exclusively devoted to privacy protection, the work of the state attorneys general has started to resemble to a certain extent that of the national data-protection authorities (DPAs) in EU countries and that of the FTC—in part, the planned European Supervisory Data Protection Board. In the EU, the national data-protection authorities are primarily entrusted with enforcing data protection issues, with the newly established European Supervisory Data Protection Board composed of representatives from the national DPAs and primarily entrusted with the exercise of coordination functions. In turn, in the United States, the FTC is the primary enforcer of privacy policies, but the lack of resources for regional oversight might currently be hampering its enforcement capacity. However, with the dynamic involvement of state attorneys general, there might be a subtle change resulting in enhanced local oversight mechanisms for the FTC. Granted, the energy of state attorneys general on privacy matters may vary across the states, whereas “windows of opportunity” for policy action remain ephemeral, with public attention on a single issue lasting only so long. On the one hand, the credibility of the comparison depends on the future coordination effort and overall involvement of the FTC, which has been urged to become more assertive in new areas of privacy concern such as Big Data. On the other hand, the comparison can only hold true if the attorneys general also become active in enforcing data

129 Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2012) (“The Commission is hereby empowered and directed to prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations, except banks, savings and loan institutions . . . from using unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”).


131 Telephone interview with a state regulator from California (Jul. 15, 2015).

132 See infra notes 203–207, and accompanying text.

133 See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 14, at 666.
privacy in the bank and insurance sectors, since the FTC lacks statutory powers in these areas.\footnote{134}

Finally, the involvement of U.S. state courts can be beneficial for consumer privacy in the United States as well. In that regard, Maryland’s Attorney General Doug Gansler appealed to state legislators to make violations of COPPA enforceable in the state courts.\footnote{135} The enforcement of federal law by the state courts would reinforce the vindication of federal rights in cases where there are issues of underenforcement by the federal courts, e.g., due to lack of standing.\footnote{136}

\section*{C. Law Enforcement and the Role of State Courts in the United States}

The role of state courts is even more palpable in the context of U.S. law enforcement. Some states have enacted analogues to the Fourth Amendment,\footnote{137} and it might well have been that the language, logic, and structure of the first such analogue—Article XIV of the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780—foreshadowed the federal Fourth Amendment.\footnote{138} From

\footnote{134} Under Section 5 of the FTC Act, banks and savings and loan institutions, as well as federal credit unions and air carriers, are excluded from FTC jurisdiction. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2)(2012).

\footnote{135} Hadjipetrova & Poteat, supra note 116, at 16.

\footnote{136} See generally Robert A. Schapiro, Polyphonic Federalism: Toward the Protection of Fundamental Rights 151–63 (2009) (making a general argument for federal rights to be claimed at state courts also in other areas).

\footnote{137} For example, Article XIV of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights states: “Every subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches, and seizures, of his person, his houses, his papers, and all his possessions. All warrants, therefore, are contrary to this right, if the cause or foundation of them be not previously supported by oath or affirmation; and if the order in the warrant to a civil officer, to make search in suspected places, or to arrest one or more suspected persons, or to seize their property, be not accompanied with a special designation of the persons or objects of search, arrest, or seizure: and no warrant ought to be issued but in cases, and with the formalities prescribed by the laws.” The Florida Constitution states: “Every natural person has the right to be let alone and free from government intrusions into the person’s private life except as otherwise provided herein.” Fla. Const. art. I, § 23. The California Constitution holds that: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable seizures and searches may not be violated.” Cal. Const. art. I, § 13. It is by no means the case that once there is a state constitutional analog, it would be interpreted differently than the Fourth Amendment: for instance, the protection granted by the Florida Constitution has been leveled to the federal one. For an overview, see Stephen E. Henderson, Learning from All Fifty States: How to Apply the Fourth Amendment and its State Analogs to Protect Third Party Information from Unreasonable Search, 55 Cath. U. L. Rev. 373 (2006).

\footnote{138} Akhil R. Amar, The Law of the Land: A Grand Tour of Our Constitutional Republic 241 (2015). In Amar’s originalist interpretation, both the Massachusetts Constitution and the Federal Fourth Amendment meant that: “warrants are heavies here, not heroes.” However, warrants can be “heavies” mainly when they are general, and the Massachusetts Supreme Court in recent cases has
"Peeping Tom" laws and bans on two-way mirrors, to prohibitions on the interception of telegraph communications and on telephone wiretapping, the states were privacy frontrunners in the area of law enforcement long before the dawn of the digital era.

The aftermath of United States v. Jones and Riley v. California is now giving privacy advocates reason for measured optimism regarding a possible reinterpretation of the Fourth Amendment. Before these two cases, the third party doctrine of the Supreme Court meant that under the status quo, the Amendment placed no judicial restriction on information shared with a telephone provider, a bank, a search engine, or any other third party to which information was made available, even for different purposes. The so-called “third party doctrine” has been criticized for not being up to speed with new technologies, given that the Supreme Court cases that address it are all dated. The two recent decisions mentioned have inspired a lively debate: some scholars favor the gradual fall into obsolescence of the doctrine, while others have focused on the workability of “mosaic theory” under which access to information held by a third party would be limited in time and scope to avoid comprehensive profiling (while allowing law enforcement to reconcile security with privacy interests).

certainly chosen to rely on specific warrants triggered by probable cause. See infra notes 147–152, and accompanying text.

139 South Carolina, for example, criminalizes “peep[ing] through windows, doors, or other like places, on or about the premises of another, for the purpose of spying upon or invading the privacy of the persons spied upon and any other conduct of a similar nature, that tends to invade the privacy of others.” S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-470(A) (2015); see also GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-61 (2015); Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PENN. L. REV. 477, 491–92 (2006) (providing examples of such state laws).


143 Stephen E. Henderson, After United States v. Jones, After the Fourth Amendment Third Party Doctrine, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 431, 438–42 (2013) (showing, moreover, that the Supreme Court did not apply a strong version of the third party doctrine even before Jones).

tions have also joined forces in specifically attacking location tracking, drug-prescription disclosures, and drone surveillance, as these are applications of the Fourth Amendment perceived as important not only in their own right but also because of their potential to pierce the third party doctrine in key contexts, and perhaps lead to its gradual demise.  

State courts have an important role to play in developing this area of the law. On the one hand, the interpretation of a reasonable expectation of privacy in the digital era by state court judges may generate a snowball effect that would lead to horizontal adaptation between state jurisdictions and the private sector, and thus could then influence federal court judges’ and legislators’ interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. On the other hand, state court decisions also offer substantively compelling reasoning that prepares the ground for a possible constitutional reinterpretation or legislation. In other words, state court decisions matter on a federal scale, both quantitatively and qualitatively.

In the former sense, state court interpretations of state analogues of the Fourth Amendment not only potentially add constitutional rights to the Fourth Amendment floor, but also are themselves relevant in defining that floor. Horizontal adaptation through state court spillovers can be discerned pre-Jones if one compares the Oregon Supreme Court with the highest courts of Washington, New York, and Massachusetts: all four courts quoted each other and eventually coincided in requiring law enforcement officers to obtain warrants before installing radio transmitters or GPS tracking devices in cars. Moreover, in requiring a warrant, state courts

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145 See Interview with an ACLU attorney, in N.Y., N.Y. (May 20, 2015) (“The ACLU and other groups have certainly argued that state rejection of the third party doctrine in particular areas (both through legislation and through court decisions) should be a factor in evaluation of whether the third party doctrine should apply to those areas under the Fourth Amendment.”); Amicus Curiae Brief of Electronic Privacy Information Center in Support of Defendant-Respondent at 25–27, State v. Davis, 360 P.3d 1161 (N.M. 2015) (No. 34,548); see also Davis, 360 P.3d at 1172–73 (holding that the warrantless aerial surveillance of the defendant’s greenhouse breached the New Mexico Constitution).

146 Henderson, supra note 137, at 374.

147 State v. Campbell, 759 P.2d 1040, 1049 (Or. 1988).

148 State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 225 (Wash. 2003) (“We find persuasive the analysis of the Oregon Supreme Court in a case involving a radio transmitter attached without a warrant to the exterior of a suspect’s vehicle.”).

149 People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1203 (N.Y. 2009).

both pre- and post-\textit{Jones} specifically denounced the profiling effect of location tracking and the possible dangers it presents for revealing potentially sensitive information.\textsuperscript{151} Quoting the judgments of the Supreme Courts of Oregon and Washington, the New York judges stated: “We find persuasive the conclusions of other state courts that have addressed this issue and have held that the warrantless use of a tracking device is inconsistent with the protections guaranteed by their state constitutions.”\textsuperscript{152}

In the interpretation of constitutional rights,\textsuperscript{153} absolute consensus among state courts and legislatures should not be dispositive insofar as a trend among the states becomes visible. As shown in \textit{Mapp v. Ohio},\textsuperscript{154} which reversed a Supreme Court precedent, it sufficed that at the time, half of the states required suppression of evidence obtained via an unconstitutional search or seizure (that is, had in place an exclusionary rule) for the Supreme Court to recognize such Fourth Amendment protection. When \textit{Jones} was being decided, the four state courts just mentioned favored restrictions on GPS tracking, while 10 others did not.\textsuperscript{155} Although \textit{Jones} was decided on narrower grounds than those raised by the state judges,\textsuperscript{156} this lack of widespread support did not deter the majority from condemning the practice under the U.S. Constitution. Moreover, even if the Supreme Court may be hesitant to depart from the status quo before a more palpa-

\textsuperscript{151} \textit{Connolly}, 913 N.E.2d at 377 (Gants, J., concurring); State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630, 632 (N.J. 2013) (ruling that under the New Jersey Constitution, cell phone real-time location tracking three times in one day requires a warrant subject to a probable cause); \textit{Jackson}, 76 P.3d at 223; \textit{Weaver}, 909 N.E.2d at 1199.

\textsuperscript{152} \textit{Weaver}, 909 N.E.2d at 1203. \textit{Horizontal adaptation} does not mean that all state courts end up deciding on identical grounds. For instance, in location-tracking cases the state courts might be divided on whether there is a search, see \textit{Earls}, 70 A.3d at 632, or a seizure, see \textit{Connolly}, 913 N.E.2d at 361, under their state constitutions.

\textsuperscript{153} Bilyana Petkova, \textit{The Notion of Consensus as a Route to Democratic Adjudication?}, 14 CAMBRIDGE Y.B. EUR. LEGAL STUD. 663, 676–92 (2011–2012) (discussing nuances in the application of the consensus method to fundamental rights by the ECJ, the ECtHR and the U.S. Supreme Court).

\textsuperscript{154} Although in \textit{Mapp v. Ohio} the Supreme Court rejected reliance on state law when defining the scope of the Fourth Amendment, in practice it was influenced by it. See \textit{Mapp v. Ohio}, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961).


\textsuperscript{156} Scalia’s majority opinion in \textit{Jones} decided the case under trespass theory, see United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 953 (2012), whereas the concurring opinions, see \textit{id.} at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); \textit{id.} at 958 (Alito, J., concurring), and most state courts applied the reasonable expectation of privacy test, first announced in \textit{Katz v. United States}, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
ble national consensus emerges,\textsuperscript{157} there can hardly be any similar concern on the side of the federal legislator as the democratically elected lawmaker. Drawing on each other’s decisions, the state courts that have reviewed cell-phone location tracking post-
\textit{jones} have thus far all ruled against giving free reign to the practice.\textsuperscript{158} Congress can capitalize on this trend by amending the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA or the Stored Communications Act), or by introducing the Geolocational Privacy and Surveillance Act (GPS Act), processes already under way.\textsuperscript{159} Certainly, this is not to say that numbers do not matter. Civil rights organizations’ state affiliates have realized the importance of the states and are working to improve the count by lobbying state legislatures to pass statutory bans on location tracking, drug prescription disclosure, and surveillance drones.\textsuperscript{160} To that effect, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has provided draft state legis-

\textsuperscript{157} Roderick M. Hills, Jr. \textit{Counting States}, 32 \textit{Harv. J.L. \\& Pub. Pol’y} 17, 22–23 (2009) (arguing that the Supreme Court should at most pressure outlier states into following the course taken by the rest).

\textsuperscript{158} Commonwealth v. Rousseau, 990 N.E.2d 543, 553 (Mass. 2013) (holding that although defendant had no possessory interest in the vehicle at issue, he had standing to challenge warrants authorizing the State police to install and monitor for a period of thirty days a GPS tracking device on vehicle in which defendant rode as a passenger); Commonwealth v. Pitt, No. 2010-0061, 2012 WL 927095, at *21 (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 23, 2012) (holding that a warrant is necessary for real-time CSLI); see \textit{id.} (“[I]t would be incongruous to decide the constitutionality of a search \textit{post hoc} based on the information it produced.”); State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630, 644 (N.J. 2013); Tracey v. State, 152 So.3d 504, 526 (Fla. 2014) (cell site location information for real time tracking was a search within the purview of the Fourth Amendment for which probable cause was required); Commonwealth v. Augustine, 4 N.E.3d 846, 863, 866 (Mass. 2014) (the third party doctrine does not apply to compelled disclosure of CSLI and a warrant is needed instead); State v. Zahn, 812 N.W.2d 490, 499–500 (S.D. 2012) (warrantless attachment of a GPS to defendant’s vehicle for 26 days was found unlawful).

\textsuperscript{159} Geolocational Privacy and Surveillance Act, H.R. 1312, 113th Cong. (2013). First introduced in 2011 and then reintroduced in 2013, the Act is a bipartisan initiative that requires the government to show probable cause and obtain a warrant before acquiring the geolocational information of a U.S. person for both real-time tracking and the acquisition of records of past movements (except in emergency situations); see also Press Release, Sen. Ron Wyden, Wyden, Chaffetz Stand Up for Privacy with GPS Act (Jan. 22, 2015), http://www.wyden.senate.gov/news/press-releases/wyden-chaffetz-stand-up-for-privacy-with-gps-act. The Online Communications and Geolocation Protection Act, H.R. 983, 113th Cong. (2013), was a similar bipartisan initiative in 2013 to modernize ECIPA by requiring law enforcement to obtain a warrant for disclosure of stored e-mail and other private documents or to track the movements of a person through his or her cell phone.

\textsuperscript{160} See, e.g., Marc Jonathan Blitz et al., \textit{Regulating Drones under the First and Fourth Amendments}, 57 \textit{Wm. \\& Mary L. Rev.} 49, 59 (2015) (stating that, depending on how one counts, bills regulating drone flights have been proposed at the federal level and have been enacted in between 13 and 25 states); \textit{Prescription Drug Monitoring}, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/privacy-technology/medical-and-genetic-privacy/prescription-drug-monitoring-programs.
lative bills on location tracking that by 2014 were adopted or considered for adoption in about a dozen states.\footnote{Allie Bohm, Status of Location Privacy Legislation in the States, ACLU: FREE FUTURE (Apr. 8, 2014), https://www.aclu.org/blog/status-location-privacy-legislation-states?redirect=blog/technology-and-liberty-national-security/status-location-privacy-legislation-states.}

When looking into the qualitative impact of state law, it is worth mentioning the reach it has into the Supreme Court’s separate opinions that can later serve as building blocks for eventual constitutional reinterpretation. State courts decide cases based on the federal Constitution or on their respective Fourth Amendment analogues. In the latter sense, state courts’ reasoning could inform the federal bench in factually similar situations, because the wording of state constitutional provisions does not often diverge significantly from the text of the Fourth Amendment.\footnote{For example, the language of the first part of Article I, § 12 of the New York Constitution closely follows that of the Fourth Amendment: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. The right of the people to be secure against unreasonable interception of telephone and telegraph communications shall not be violated, and ex parte orders or warrants shall issue only upon oath or affirmation that there is reasonable ground to believe that evidence of crime may be thus obtained, and identifying the particular means of communication, and particularly describing the person or persons whose communications are to be intercepted and the purpose thereof.” The provision as a whole was interpreted by New York state courts as identical to the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. People v. Harris, 570 N.E.2d 1051, 1053 (N.Y. 1991). Admittedly, this might not be the case of other state constitutional analogues, e.g., the language of Article I, Section 7 of the Washington State Constitution can be deemed broader than that of the Fourth Amendment: “No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.” However, what matters for the relevance of a state judgment on a federal scale is whether the \textit{ratio dicidendi} of the case is based on the specific wording of a State Constitution or on arguments congruent with the Fourth Amendment.}\footnote{Justice Brennan continued to draw at length on Barrows v. Superior Court, 529 P.2d 590, 593, 596 (Cal. 1974). “A bank customer’s reasonable expectation is that, absent compulsion by legal process, the matters he reveals to the bank will be utilized by the bank only for internal banking purposes . . . . To permit a police officer access to these records merely upon his request, without any judicial control as to relevancy or other traditional requirements of legal process, and to allow the evidence to be used in any subsequent criminal prosecution against a defendant, opens the door to a vast and unlimited range of very real abuses of police power.” United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 449, 451 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Next to the “parade of horribles” argument, Justice Brennan uses the state court decision as a stepping stone for defying the notion that privacy is restricted to the privacy of the home. Finally, he states that:}
have since chosen to reject the majority opinion in *Miller*. Justice Brennan began his dissent by stating that “The California Supreme Court has reached a conclusion under . . . the Californian Constitution in the same factual situation, contrary to that reached by the Court today under the Fourth Amendment. I dissent because in my view the California Supreme Court correctly interpreted the relevant constitutional language.” Similarly, Justice Sotomayor, so far the only Supreme Court Justice to indicate that she would reject the third party doctrine, also quoted a state court when penning her concurring opinion in *Jones*. In order to show the inherent dangers that uncurbed GPS monitoring has of revealing potentially sensitive information, even for short-term tracking, she relied on *People v. Weaver*:

Disclosed in [GPS] data . . . will be trips the indisputably private nature of which takes little imagination to conjure: trips to the psychiatrist, the plastic surgeon, the abortion clinic, the AIDS treatment center, the strip club, the criminal defense attorney, the by-the-hour motel, the union meeting, the mosque, synagogue or church, the gay bar and on and on. 

Importantly, one of the groundbreaking features of *Jones* is that it reinterpreted *Katz*, reintroducing the possibility that the U.S. Constitution could cover surveillance of public spaces, an option already rehearsed by some state supreme courts. Even before *Jones*, the judges of the Washington Supreme Court bolstered their reasoning with a case from Oregon holding that:

[The Oregon Court held that] the question was not whether what the police learned by use of the transmitter was *exposed to public view*, but whether use of the device can be characterized as a search . . . . [The Oregon Court said that] “the question whether an individual’s privacy interests have been infringed by an act of the police cannot

“*Burrows* strikingly illustrates the emerging trend among high state courts of relying upon state constitutional protections of individual liberties—protections pervading counterpart provisions of the United States Constitution, but increasingly being ignored by decisions of this Court.” *Id.* at 454–55.

165 *Miller*, 425 U.S. at 447.
167 Cf. *Weaver*, 909 N.E.2d at 1200; State v. Campbell, 759 P.2d 1040, 1049 (Or. 1988); State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 224 (Wash. 2003). Relying on these preceding state court judgments, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts also stated after *Jones* that: “These courts have rejected the Fourth Amendment emphasis on the location of the vehicle [e.g. whether or not it is on a public roadway] when the device transmits its signal and have focused instead on the privacy interest in being free from electronic surveillance, [and in the case of the Washington and Oregon Courts,] . . . the extent to which secret electronic surveillance by government interferes with that interest.” Commonwealth v. Connolly, 913 N.E.2d 356, 369 (Mass. 2009).
always be resolved by reference to the *area* at which the act is directed."\(^{168}\)

This is especially true in the face of advanced technologies which allow for exponentially cheaper ways of monitoring one’s activities, thereby blurring the line between the public and the private. Along these lines, Justice Alito noted that “In the pre-computer age, the greatest protections of privacy were neither constitutional nor statutory, but practical. . . . Only an investigation of unusual importance could have justified such an expenditure of law enforcement resources.”\(^{169}\) Before him, in *Commonwealth v. Connolly*, judges in Massachusetts noted that citizens can reasonably expect that their "comings and goings will not be continuously and contemporaneously monitored except through physical surveillance, which requires a far greater investment of police resources and generates far less information than GPS monitoring."\(^{170}\)

Furthermore, some of the substantive arguments voiced in state courts might help the Supreme Court recalibrate its case law, and perhaps incline the federal legislature to introduce statutory changes that reflect the consequences of *United States v. Jones* and *Riley v. California*. Whether the third party doctrine stands or falls (and even if there are very good reasons why it should fall),\(^{171}\) the Supreme Court might want to address compelling arguments made by state court judges about why and how the doctrine could be scaled back. The state courts discuss the specificities of detailed location tracking and medical prescription disclosures that isolate a sphere where the third party doctrine might not apply for three different reasons: first, because modern location tracking techniques create unfettered possibilities for profiling citizens, either in greater detail or by supplying more sensitive information than bank records or landline telephone slips do;\(^{172}\) and second, because in these areas of information sharing the degree of affirmative and voluntary disclosure is less compared to other

\(^{168}\) *Jackson*, 76 P.3d at 224 (citing *Campbell*, 759 P.2d at 1047).

\(^{169}\) *Jones*, 132 S. Ct. at 963–64 (Alito, J., concurring).

\(^{170}\) *Connolly*, 913 N.E.2d at 378.

\(^{171}\) *Jones*, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).

\(^{172}\) “Using a [cellular telephone] to determine the location of its owner can be far more revealing than acquiring toll billing, bank, or Internet subscriber records. It is akin to using a tracking device and can function as a substitute for 24/7 surveillance without police having to confront the limits of their resources. It also involves a degree of intrusion that a reasonable person would not anticipate. Location information gleaned from a [cellular telephone] provider can reveal not just where people go—which doctors, religious services, and stores they visit—but also the people and groups they choose to affiliate with and when they actually do so. That information cuts across a broad range of personal ties with family, friends, political groups, health care providers, and others.” *State v. Earls*, 70 A.3d 630, 642 (N.J. 2013) (citation omitted).
contexts in which the third party doctrine has traditionally applied.\footnote{Finally, as one state court held regarding location tracking:}{

[The] distinction between privacy interests in public and private spaces makes \cite{modern location tracking} especially problematic, because \cite{it} give[s] off signals from within both spaces, and . . . the government . . . has no way of knowing in advance whether the [signal] will have originated from a private or public location[,] \cite{thereby possibly encroaching on constitutionally protected areas}.\footnote{The gradual extent of scaling back the third party doctrine ultimately begs the question of whether a revived common law principle of confidentiality, as informed by the practice in the states, could reintroduce the FIPP of purpose limitation into U.S. Fourth Amendment law. For instance, attorney confidentiality is enshrined in U.S. common law, but physician–patient privilege is not. However, 43 states and the District of Columbia have created such protection through legislation, and a number of state courts have held that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in medical records under state constitutional provisions or the Fourth Amendment.\footnote{Moreover, in the context of law enforcement, the ACLU counts 10 states as having enacted legislation prohibiting access to records in those states’ prescription monitoring programs unless the government obtains a warrant or otherwise demonstrates probable cause.}}

173 “[P]atients and doctors are not voluntarily conveying information to \cite[a state substance control database]. \cite[Rather,] the submission of prescription information . . . is required by law. The only way to avoid \cite[providing such information would be] to forgo medical treatment or to leave the state . . . .” \cite[Proposed] Brief for ACLU Foundation & ACLU of Utah in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Suppress at 14, State v. Pyle, No. 131910379 (Utah Dist. Ct. 2015) \cite[quoting Or. Prescription Drug Monitoring Program v. U.S. Drug Enf’t Admin., 998 F. Supp. 2d 957, 967 (D. Or. 2014)]; \cite[see also Earls, 70 A.3d at 643 (“People buy \cite[cellular telephones] to communicate with others, to use the Internet, and for a growing number of other reasons. But no one buys a \cite[cellular telephone] to share detailed information about their whereabouts with the police.”).}{

174 Commonwealth v. Augustine, 4 N.E.3d 846, 864 (Mass. 2014); \cite[see also Earls, 70 A.3d at 642 (“Modern cell phones also blur the historical distinction between public and private areas because cell phones emit signals from both places.”). Riley opened this line of reasoning: “Historic location information is a standard feature on many smart phones and can reconstruct someone’s specific movements down to the minute, not only around town but also within a particular building.” Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2490 (2014).}{


Beyond the traditional context of medical and legal confidentiality, state courts might extend the concept to cover broader contexts.177

As demonstrated, much like in the consumer-privacy context, horizontal adaptation between jurisdictions plays a major role in challenging the Fourth Amendment’s status quo in the law enforcement arena. This is aided by industry’s interest in siding with the more privacy-protective standard whenever discrepancies exist between the state jurisdictions and appellate courts. For example, in 2014, AT&T received 13,629 requests for real-time cell phone location information from the government, and even more requests for historical cell phone location records.178 Similarly, from 2007 to 2012, Sprint/Nextel received nearly 200,000 court orders for real-time and historical cell site location information (CSLI).179 As the industry is grappling with the mounting requests, its preference for uniformity and legal certainty is unsurprising. In a case now pending before the Eleventh Circuit, AT&T submitted an amicus brief in support of neither party to argue in favor of adoption of “a categorical rule,” in other words, a uniform standard that would require the government to be issued a warrant upon the showing of a probable cause for obtaining historical CSLI data under Section 2703(d) of the Stored Communications Act.180 AT&T argued that:

Considerable legal uncertainty surrounds the standards the government must satisfy to compel the production of location information, and achieving legal clarity is essential to protecting consumer privacy, defining the scope of legitimate law enforcement interests, and ensuring the efficient operation of companies operating in various sectors of the digital economy . . . .

. . . . [W]here Section 2703(d) [of the Stored Communications Act] applies, it does not necessarily authorize the government to secure information under the lower, “reasonable grounds” standard, but is instead flexible enough to require the government to meet the Warrant Clause . . . .

177 See Earls, 70 A.3d at 644 (“Users are reasonably entitled to expect confidentiality in the ever-increasing level of detail that cell phones can reveal about their lives.”); [Proposed] Brief for ACLU Foundation & ACLU of Utah in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Suppress at 16, State v. Pyle, No. 131910379 (Utah Dist. Ct. 2015) (“[P]rescription records stored in [a substance database] are much like emails stored in an email provider’s servers. For one, the entity maintaining the digital files may access them only for limited enumerated purposes.”).


180 Brief for AT&T as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 6, 29, United States v. Davis, No. 785 F.3d 498 (11th Cir. 2015) (No. 12-12928).
Whether this Court concludes that a probable cause standard or a ‘reasonable grounds’ standard applies in this particular case [for historical CSLI], another issue of statutory construction is whether Section 2703(d) permits the higher standard to be applied to information within its scope. The better view is that it does.\footnote{Id. at 4, 6, 26.}

Like other major interstate businesses who are confronted with a different interpretation of the applicable legal standard by the courts, AT&T has a compelling interest in “rounding up” privacy protections toward the higher standard. As more state courts come to espouse a higher standard, companies operating nationwide who want to offer the same package of services to their customers across different jurisdictions, but also avoid potential litigation in the face of unclear legal obligations, have begun to coalesce toward the higher standard of probable cause first offered in some of the states.

D. The Role of National Legislatures and Data-Protection Authorities in the European Union

Returning to European institutional developments, national parliaments would lose their power of discretion in the implementation of data protection laws with the new General Data Protection Regulation, but could instead rely on leverage in the European lawmaking process. Meanwhile, the national data-protection authorities would be given significant new joint responsibilities in the implementation of the Regulation.

Article 5(3) of the Treaty of the European Union “currently enshrines the principle of subsidiarity,”\footnote{Federico Fabbrini & Katarzyna Granat, “Yellow Card, but No Foul”: The Role of the National Parliaments Under the Subsidiarity Protocol and the Commission Proposal for an EU Regulation on the Right to Strike, 50 COMMON Mkt. L. REV. 115, 117–18 (2013).} stating that the European Union may act in any areas in which it shares competence with the Member States only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level.\footnote{TEU & TEFU, supra note 45, at 18.}

Since enforcement of the Lisbon Treaty, “the principle of subsidiarity has been complemented by a political [control] mechanism detailed in Protocol No. 2, the so-called ‘Early Warning System.’”\footnote{Fabbrini & Granat, supra note 182, at 118; see TEU & TEFU, supra note 45, at 206.} According to this procedure, draft legislative acts are first forwarded to national parlia-
ments, who verify their compliance with the principle of subsidiarity.\textsuperscript{185} Each Member State parliament is assigned two votes, which can be divided between the parliamentary chambers in cases of bicameral parliaments.\textsuperscript{186} If the number of the negative votes cast does not reach a certain threshold, the Commission may take the parliamentary opinions into account at its own discretion but no further consequences are formally triggered in the legislative process.\textsuperscript{187}

Legislative proposals of the Commission generally provide a detailed justification regarding both subsidiarity (is this a matter for the European Union or the Member States?) and proportionality (is the proposed action the best fit with respect to ends and means?). While Protocol No. 2 addresses the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, the Early Warning System expressly refers to subsidiarity only.\textsuperscript{188} Arguably, when attacking a draft not strictly on subsidiarity grounds, parliaments and parliamentary chambers use the procedure in a somewhat sparing manner—exceeding the actual powers they are given under the Treaty Protocol.\textsuperscript{189} Rather than an exercise in the legal craft of splitting subsidiarity from proportionality or as an unequivocal mechanism\textsuperscript{190} for assigning legislative competence to the European Union and its Member States, the Early Warning Mechanism is best understood as a part of an institutional and political dialogue between the European institutions and the national legislatures.\textsuperscript{191} In this dialogue, input from the national parliaments is not adopted unconditionally by the European legislature, but is filtered through the perspective of European institutions in an iterative and consensus-building fashion: in the case of the General Data Protection Regula-

\textsuperscript{185} Fabbrini & Granat, supra note 182, at 115–16.

\textsuperscript{186} Id. at 118 n.10.

\textsuperscript{187} Conversely, if the number of votes cast exceeds one third, the proposal must then be reviewed and the Commission may decide to maintain, amend, or withdraw it. In the case of a simple majority of reasoned opinions objecting on grounds of subsidiarity, for a legislative draft to still be tabled, the Commission needs the European legislature (usually the European Parliament and the Council) to approve the proposal first. TEU & TEFU, supra note 45, at 19. Based on an analogy with soccer, the procedure is commonly referred to as a “yellow card.” See Fabbrini & Granat, supra note 182, at 118.

\textsuperscript{188} For example, a national parliament is invited to specify “why it considers that the draft in question does not comply with the principle of subsidiarity.” TEU & TEFU, supra note 45, at 207.

\textsuperscript{189} Fabbrini & Granat, supra note 182, at 139–40.

\textsuperscript{190} The precision and objectivity of a test that neatly splits the legislative competences between the federal or quasi-federal center and the constitutive states can be doubted. See Judith Resnik, Federalism(s)'s Forms and Norms: Contesting Rights, De-Essentializing Jurisdictional Divides, and Temporizing Accommodations, in NOMOS LV: FEDERALISM AND SUBSIDIARITY 363, 364 (James E. Fleming & Jacob T. Levy eds., 2014).

\textsuperscript{191} Davor Jancic, The Barroso Initiative: Window Dressing or Democracy Boost?, 8 UTRECHT L. REV. 78, 82 (2012) (Neth.).
tion, several of the demands raised by the national parliaments were taken on board by the European Parliament in subsequent amendments after the first reading of the draft regulation.

During the early-warning mechanism procedure on the proposed General Data Protection Regulation, the German Bundesrat (or higher chamber), the Belgian House of Representatives, the French Senate, the Italian Chamber of Deputies, and the Swedish Parliament submitted reasoned opinions objecting to the Commission’s proposal. In addition, the Czech Senate, the German Bundestag (or lower chamber), the Dutch Senate, as well as the Romanian and the Slovenian Parliaments submitted written statements commenting on the proposal and prompting concrete questions about it. The number of reasoned opinions disputing the proposal on grounds of subsidiarity was insignificant in terms of erecting any legal barriers to the future adoption of the regulation, but a common thread among the opinions and statements was the Commission’s choice of a legal instrument: most of the national parliaments stated a preference for a new or amended directive over a regulation. On a related note, national parliaments were preoccupied with preserving a high level of protection on the national level, which they feared a regulation would undermine (especially in the public sector, where detailed national legislation pre-dated the proposal). In contradiction, the majority of the national parliaments demanded they retain legislative discretion but simultaneously called for the strengthening of common EU guarantees for data protection in international data transfers. Another frequent concern was the empowerment of the European Commission and the over-centralization of data protection, most notably through the proposed exercise of the European Commission’s delegated powers previewed by the regulation in many of the provisions in the Commission’s draft.

192 Responses of national parliaments to the proposed General Data Protection Regulation are available through the IPEX platform, at the following URL: http://www.ipex.eu/IPEXL-WEB/dossier/document/COM20120011.do#dossier-COD20120011.

However, the parliaments that submitted reasoned opinions objected to the means and not the necessity of an EU action on data protection, in other words, debating the “how” and not the “if” of the update to the EU data-protection framework. Notably, many of the national parliaments stated that they agreed with the Commission on the need to take action on the European level. Interestingly, the German Bundestag submitted a statement which, unlike the reasoned opinion of the Bundesrat, did not raise subsidiarity objections. Although the Bundestag emphasized the need to disentangle private from public sector data-privacy matters to preserve the high standards of protection in Germany, it also held that:

The lack of harmonization in the (non-public) sphere of the economy results in distortions to competition in the internal market and allows enterprises to deliberately select their location according to the most favourable regulations and enforcement environment (forum shopping). Greater harmonisation in the non-public sector would therefore not only lead to greater clarity and fairer competition at the European level, it is also a precondition for European data protection standards being more able to assert themselves in competition with providers from third countries. The German Bundestag underscores that German data protection legislation alone will not be able to provide effective protection against companies acting out of third countries and welcomes the proposal’s applicability towards providers in third countries.

Similarly, in its reasoned opinion, the Swedish Parliament (Riksdag) objected to the choice of a regulation on grounds of proportionality, which the Parliament believed to be part of the subsidiarity test. Nonetheless, the Riksdag submitted that the objective of an effective system for the protection of personal data in the European Union was generally better achieved when measures were undertaken at Union level rather than by the Member States, since due to its scope and effects, EU legislation would, in general, be “clearly advantageous” compared to a measure at national level. Importantly, through the legislative process, the European Parlia-

194 For example, the Belgian House of Representatives objected to the proposal on subsidiarity grounds but was of the opinion that some matters (mostly those originating in the private sector, and those concerning the exchange of data with non-EU countries) could be left to regulation, whereas data privacy in the public domain had to be dealt with by a directive, so that strict Belgian standards of data protection in the healthcare and social security sectors could be preserved. Belgian Chambre des Représentants, Reasoned Opinion of Apr. 6, 2012 on COM (2012) 11.
195 German Bundestag, Motion approved on the proposal for a General Data Protection Regulation of Dec. 13, 2012.
197 The Slovenian Parliament, albeit through a statement that did not question compliance with subsidiarity, expressed similar doubts on the choice of a regulation but simultaneously welcomed “the important and useful solutions” offered in the draft. Including, among others, those regarding human-rights protection, data-
ment (EP) tried to put flesh on the bones of what may be called high-level demands voiced by the national legislatures. First, most likely in response to concerns about pre-existing higher national standards in the public sector voiced by the German, Belgian and French legislatures, the EP proposed an amendment that extended the application of general principles of data protection not only to the employment sector, as suggested by the Commission, but also to the social security context. The amended text specified that the regulation purported to establish EU legal floors, not ceilings, in these domains. In addition, the Commission specified in its reply letter to the national parliament that the Proposal did not intend to challenge the decisions of the national-data-protection authorities, for instance on the use of national identification numbers or in the social security sector.

Second, the EP was responsive to demands that a high level of protection be guaranteed in international data transfers, something that both the Belgian House of Representatives and the German Bundestag insisted on. It further elaborated on measures intended to compensate for the lack of protection in a third country pending an adequacy decision, by stipulating that any such measures, like binding corporate rules, standard data protection clauses, or contractual clauses, should respect the data subject rights valid in intra-EU processing. In particular, the principles of purpose limitation, right to access, rectification, erasure and the possibility to claim compensation were defended in the EP amendments. Additionally, Members of European Parliament suggested that in the absence of an adequacy decision, the principles of data protection, by design and by default need to be observed and that guarantees for the existence of data protection officers need to be provided. The aim was to ensure that legally binding guarantees would be in place so that measures intended to replace the adequacy standard would not effectively subvert EU standards.

breach notifications, data protection by default, obligatory impact assessments, and the “right to be forgotten.” Slovenian Committee on EU Affairs, Position on the proposed General Data Protection Regulation of Mar. 20, 2012.


200 The EP amended the Preamble of the Regulation to read: “Any legislation which provides for extra-territorial access to personal data processed in the Union without authorization under Union or Member State law should be considered as an indication of a lack of adequacy.” EP Resolution, supra note 198, at amend. 55.

201 Ultimately, Parliament insisted that financial indemnification be available in cases of loss, unauthorized processing, or access to the data, and that regardless of national legislation, the entity in the third country would have an obligation to
Finally, in accordance with the demands of the majority of national parliaments, the EP proposed amendments that would drastically limit the Commission’s powers to adopt implementing and delegated acts. The Commission explained the provisions as motivated by a desire to provide a general legislative framework on data protection while leaving some of the details to be specified at a later stage to avoid rigidity and ossification. The EP proposed that in the remaining areas of delegation, the Commission consult the European Data Protection Board, for instance, on the right to be forgotten and erasure; on deciding the validity of codes of conduct; when specifying criteria on certification mechanisms; and when deciding on adequacy standards in third countries or territories, processing sectors, or international organizations. Under the EP amendments, the Data Protection Board would be authorized to issue opinions on the lead supervisory authority at the request of any of the national competent authorities. In cases of cross-border EU data exchange that affects individuals in more than one state, the lead supervisory authority (normally defined as the Data Protection Agency (“DPA”) of the country where the provide full details of all access to the data by public authorities. The EP also suggested amendments to the Regulation asking the Commission to ensure that Union law take precedence at all times when controllers or processors are confronted with conflicting compliance requirements under EU law and the jurisdiction of a third country, and that no judgment of a court or tribunal, or decision of an administrative authority of a third country requiring disclosure of personal data, is recognized or enforceable in any manner. 

Under the amendment, the Commission would be stripped of such powers regarding the “lawfulness of processing; specifying the criteria and conditions in relation to the consent of a child; processing of special categories of data; specifying the criteria and conditions for manifestly excessive requests and fees for exercising the rights of the data subject; criteria and requirements for the information to the data subject and in relation to the right of access; . . . measures based on profiling; criteria and requirements in relation to the responsibility of the controller and to data protection by design and by default; criteria and requirements for the documentation and the security of processing; criteria and requirements for establishing a personal data breach and for its notification to the supervisory authority, and on the circumstances where a personal data breach is likely to adversely affect the data subject; the criteria and conditions for processing operations requiring a data protection impact assessment; the criteria and requirements for determining a high degree of specific risks which require prior consultation; designation and tasks of the data protection officer; . . . transfer derogations; . . . and processing for historical, statistical and scientific research purposes.” See id. at amend. 91.


EP Resolution, supra note 198, amend. 158.

Id.; see also Questions about the General Data Protection Regulation and about the specific Personal Data Protection Directive in Criminal Matters by the Dutch Senate of the States General of May 15, 2012 (The EP thus answered a query posed by the Dutch Parliament).
business is established) would collaborate with other concerned national DPAs to reach a final agreement on a consumer’s complaint, with the European Data Protection Board serving as a dispute settlement mechanism.\footnote{206}

By partly outsourcing the specifics to the European Data Protection Board and leaving regulatory details to be clarified later by the coordinated effort of national-data-protection authorities, the EP aimed to accomplish the objective of keeping pace with innovation while avoiding over-centralization. Although it is difficult to establish a direct link between the course of action the EP chose to take and the demands of the national legislatures, it is evident that some of the most prominent concerns of the national legislatures found their way into the European legislative process.\footnote{207}

\subsection*{E. The Role of the Highest National Courts in the European Union}

In no small measure, the national constitutional courts of the EU Member States play the role of watchdogs over EU data-protection centralization in law enforcement. Several of the EU Member States’ constitutional courts have prepared the groundwork for the landmark ECJ judgment invalidating the EU Data Retention Directive.

The influence of the German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht, hereinafter BVerfG) on the European Court of Justice’s reasoning is noteworthy. However, the leading role of German priva-

\footnote{206}{The success of this strategy would likely depend on the viability of the European Data Protection Board to function as an effective venue of horizontal coordination between the data-protection authorities. See European Council Doc. No. 9565/15, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data. Preparation of a general approach ¶¶ 97–106 (June 11, 2015). The Commission version of the Regulation has established a “one-stop shop” (consistency mechanism), based on the EU principle of mutual recognition that permeates many other areas of EU law. The basic idea behind this principle is that goods or services lawfully marketed in one Member State should be allowed in the market of another Member State even if they do not fully comply with the technical rules of the destination Member State. Given possible divergences between the DPAs of the Member States when they interpret EU data-protection law, horizontal coordination between them seems both promising and a necessary supplement to the “one-stop shop” mechanism.}

cy law in the European Union has not remained uncontested. Following 9/11 and the terrorist attacks in the London subway in 2005, several Member States within the European Union unilaterally adopted specific legislation providing for the retention of data by service providers. In 2006, the European Union passed the Data Retention Directive, aimed at facilitating the Member States’ fight against terrorism and serious crime through the retention of telecommunications data (known also as “traffic” or “meta” data as opposed to “content” data). The background of the Directive’s enactment in the aftermath of the Madrid train bombings points to a coalition between the UK, French, Swedish, and Irish governments that originally suggested a legislative act which would have been closer to the subject matter of the Directive, but would have at the time limited the involvement of the EP in the legislative process. In addition, the original text of the proposal provided for retention periods between 12 and 36 months. In the face of multiple criticisms on various counts, the final text of the Data Retention Directive was couched on a market-harmonization legal basis. It provided for storage of no less than six months and no more than two years of all citizens’ and legal entities’ traffic and location data necessary to identify the subscriber or registered user of all types of telecommunications. In order not to stir controversies over whether the European Union had competence to act in the criminal law field, the Directive excluded a uniform definition of what constituted a “serious crime,” but required the retention and prompt exchange of traffic data for law enforcement purposes. Instead, the Directive left it to Member States to decide what was “serious crime” and a trigger for the Directive’s application.

The Commission’s evaluation report on the implementation of the Data Retention Directive showed that at least 10 Member States have taken the opportunity to impose requirements stricter than those espoused in the Directive, for example, by transposing into their national legislation a “serious crime” to mean a minimum prison sentence or even a custodial sentence. Eight Member States have gone further by requiring data to be retained not only for investigation, detection and prosecution in relation to serious crime, as mandated by the Directive, but also for all criminal of-
fences, crime prevention and public security in general. Four Member States left out the definition of a “serious crime” altogether, leaving space for arbitrary interpretation. Generally, the EU Member States have faced difficulties in implementing the Data Retention Directive, which was strongly opposed by civil-society actors. Eventually, various procedures claiming the unconstitutionality of the national transposition acts were introduced before domestic high courts. The Bulgarian Supreme Administrative Court, the Czech Constitutional Court, the Cypriot Supreme Court, the BVerfG, and—on two occasions—the Romanian Constitutional Court all found the respective national implementing acts (or parts thereof) void under the national constitutions. In addition, the Austrian Constitutional Court sent a preliminary reference to the ECJ about the interpretation of the Data Retention Directive while the Slovenian Constitutional Court decided to suspend its decision until the ECJ decided on the validity of the Directive in the Digital Rights Ireland case.

In Digital Rights Ireland, the ECJ eventually invalidated the Directive in its entirety and with immediate effect. The ratio decidendi of the ECJ’s decision resembled that of the national courts, and included much of the reasoning that preceded it, but it is arguably most similar to the BVerfG’s argumentation. The national court’s reasoning bears similarities also horizontally, specifically to the BVerfG’s and Czech Constitutional Court. Both courts invalidated the domestic acts implementing the Directive on proportionality grounds and placed emphasis on transparency, citing as a ma-

212 Id. (Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Latvia, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia).
213 Id. (Cyprus, Malta, Portugal, and United Kingdom).
214 In 2007, two months after the Data Retention law was approved in Germany, a newly formed privacy NGO called “Arbeitskreis Vorratsdatenspeicherung” (Working Group on Data Retention) filed a formal constitutional complaint with the German Federal Constitutional Court signed by an unprecedented 34,000 complainants. From 2006 to 2009, the same group organized 10 peaceful demonstrations in cities across Germany with participation numbering in the several hundred thousands. Partners in such initiatives were also the Brussels-based NGO “European Digital Rights,” the U.S.-based “Electronic Privacy Information Center” (EPIC) and the anti-surveillance Madrid-based “Destapa el Control” (Take the Lid Off). Christian de Simone, Pitting Karlsruhe Against Luxembourg? German Data Protection and the Contested Implementation of the EU Data Retention Directive, 11 Ger. L.J. 291, 307–08 (2010).
217 Boehm & Cole, supra note 215, at 20. Unlike the Romanian Court, however, the ECJ did not declare that the very core of the right to privacy is affected. Id. at 15.
The reasoning of the BVerfG (and in turn, the ECJ) revolved around three main arguments: first, both courts denounced the chilling effect of indiscriminate surveillance on the exercise of fundamental rights; second, both courts emphasized the danger of profiling, which blurs the line between meta and content data; and third, both courts found that the undifferentiated character of long data-retention periods, coupled with insufficiently restrained access to the data (thereby con-
traversing the FIPP of purpose limitation) did not meet the proportionality test. Ultimately, the question remains: Would the ECJ invalidate the Directive even if it were not for the national courts’ decisions? After all, the European legal system, based on shared principles of balancing privacy with other rights and interests, first established under German law, is not all that different from those of its constituent countries. Despite the fact that the ECJ upheld the Directive under an earlier challenge,\(^222\) it likely could have invalidated it when it reached the question of fundamental rights in *Digital Rights Ireland*. However, it should also be borne in mind that the shared proportionality framework allows the national courts and the ECJ to have a common but flexible “toolkit,” one that is not necessarily bound to results. It is indeed that open-ended character of proportionality that has led to its increased uptake in European public law adjudication.\(^223\) As a consequence, with respect to privacy, as well as in other fields, the proportionality test does not exclude future rebalancing of rights and interests. The “nudging” effect that the Member State courts had on the ECJ was therefore significant for the outcome of *Digital Rights Ireland*.\(^224\)

Built around a robust set of the FIPPs on which many EU member states have now converged, the model of data protection defended by the domestic constitutional courts and the ECJ in the data-retention cases is based on providing strong safeguards when infringements to data privacy are deemed strictly necessary for the public interest. However, further challenges to centralizing data protection on the EU level based on such a model are expected to come in the wake of national legislation that per-
mits intelligence services to collect metadata in real time without any judicial oversight, as, for example, in the UK, and the approval of intrusive anti-terrorism measures, as in France in the aftermath of the Charlie Hebdo terrorist attack.

IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS

Data privacy policies and lawmakers in the United States and the European Union function in a federated fashion and form part of the broader tussles surrounding the allocation of powers between the federal and the state tier. However, in both contexts the intersection of privacy and federalism has yet to be sufficiently studied, and the risk of ossification and over-centralization of data-privacy solutions tends to be overstated.

Here, I have argued for the benefits of a degree of autonomy in a web of interconnected federal and EU data-privacy sites. Autonomy needs to be protected, because it gives states and localities the ability to defy the policy status quo by developing specific innovative solutions to balance fundamental rights (or consumer rights) with other rights and interests. When enabled to act in this way, the states become “disaggregated sites of national [or EU] governance,” channeling legislation on issues of major concern to the American people or to EU citizens before the federal or the EU legislature can step in. When hammering out a more manageable judicial approach to the privacy safeguards of federalism both in the United States and in the EU, the preemption doctrine needs further specification across a temporal dimension. States can be given sufficient space to experiment with privacy regimes because state endeavors (such as in the case of German data-protection law, or the emerging Californian model in the United States) provides policy expertise to the federal or the EU legislature. It offers windows of opportunity for centralizing data privacy around a relatively high bar. This is especially significant, given that technology facilitates spillover effects across state jurisdictions, and since private companies tend to adapt to the higher standard of protection, which often be-

225 Triggered by the challenge preceding the Digital Rights Ireland case, see supra note 222, the overhaul of bulk data collection by the UK’s Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) is still under way. As remarked by UK’s Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, in not having any prior judicial authorization mechanism for the interception of communications, the UK is an outlier even amongst the so-called Five-Eyes States (the United States, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the UK) that share intelligence. See David Anderson, A Question of Trust: Report of the Investigatory Powers Review 149 ¶ 8.44 (2015).


227 See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 32, at 1932.
comes engrained into their corporate business models. Finally, as one interviewee shared:

Of course, [in the United States] business entities look mostly at New York, Florida, California and Massachusetts the same way as Germany, Spain, UK and France are setting the tone in Europe. But even if a small state adopted a law, the industries would have to comply instead of risking enforcement costs; no one wants his or her picture in the newspaper when an attorney general starts an investigation. Nobody wants to be prosecuted, even in South Dakota.228

Ultimately, the “presumption against preemption” can be stronger, at least until the baton gets passed to a federal or the EU lawmaker. A more case-by-case approach might be carved out after that.

Taken as a case study, privacy has a lesson or two for federalism theory. Instead of waiting for Godot by hoping to insolate areas of impenetrable state domination—usually by looking for judicial bright lines, or engaging with the idea of channeling precious state power (usually through politics)—the concept of federalism’s safeguards needs to be rethought.229

The safeguards of privacy federalism are both political and judicial. Both judicial and political institutions (including the state institutions) have a role to play in building well-functioning democracies. The national parliaments and the data-protection authorities are able to voice regional concerns in the EU. Similarly, the national legislatures and state attorneys general in coordination with federal agencies in the United States maintain the democratic character of privacy consolidation at the U.S. federal level. Further, in accordance with the European Union and the U.S. dual systems of judicial protection, the highest domestic courts are able to police fundamental rights under their own constitutions and can also offer a springboard for the reinterpretation of EU or U.S. federal law. After a period of horizontal experimentation has passed, it might be to the benefit of individuals, businesses, and law enforcement alike to adopt harmonized measures and reduce complexity—at least until a new cycle of policy change begins.

228 See Telephone interview, supra note 81.

229 Cf. California’s waiver under the Clean Air Act to regulate vehicle emissions beyond the floor set by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). “The EPA began with national uniform standards and moved to the proposal for the more stringent [Californian standard] only after a movement began in the states toward adopting the most stringent Cal LEV standards.” See Engel, supra note 59, at 171–72.