## **DEFAMATION**

Defamation requires the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that:

- 1.  $\partial$  communicated something;
  - a. If the  $\pi$  is a private figure and the communication is on a matter of private concern, we presume the communication is false, and the  $\partial$  must prove it is true as an affirmative defense. No fault required on the part of the  $\partial$ , unless the  $\partial$  is a media entity, in which case,  $\pi$  must prove  $\partial$  should have known (*i.e.*, was negligent) the communication was false.
  - a. If the  $\pi$  is a private figure and the communication is on a matter of public concern,  $\pi$  must prove that (i) the communication is false and (ii) that the  $\partial$  should have known (*i.e.*, was negligent) it was false.
  - b. If the  $\pi$  is a public official or public figure and the communication is on a matter of public concern,  $\pi$  must prove by <u>clear and convincing</u> <u>evidence</u> that (i) the communication is false and (ii) actual malice, *i.e.*, that  $\partial$  knew the communication was false or had serious doubts (i.e., was reckless) about the truthfulness of it.
- 2. that was a statement of fact or opinion, depending on the type of case;
  - a. Statement of fact=required when case involves a matter of public concern or a media defendant. Something that can be objectively proven true or false.
  - b. Opinion=actionable at common law, with "name calling" excluded. Probably still actionable when case involves a private plaintiff, a matter of private concern, and a non-media defendant.
- 3. that was defamatory, *i.e.*, has a tendency to expose  $\pi$  to public hatred, contempt, ridicule, or disgrace;
- 4. that actually injured the  $\pi$ 's reputation;
  - a. libel on face: written or broadcast communications whose meaning is clear without resort to extrinsic information are deemed to injure per se;

- i. unless the  $\pi$  is a private figure and the communication is a matter of public concern, and the  $\pi$  has failed to prove actual malice. In other words, in this scenario,  $\pi$  must prove actual malice (see above) or actual injury to reputation.
- b. slander per se: spoken communications are deemed to injure per se if:
  - i. they call into question  $\pi$ 's competence to perform in their trade or profession;
  - ii. indicate  $\pi$  has a "loathsome" disease;
  - iii. indicate  $\pi$  has committed a serious crime; or
  - iv. indicate  $\pi$  has engaged in serious sexual misconduct,

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- 5.  $\partial$ 's communication was to a third person, *i.e.*, someone other than the  $\pi$ ;
- 6. The third person would understand, considering reasonable inferences from the circumstances, that the communication was about or concerning the  $\pi$ .