COURT REFORM AND THE PROMISE OF JUSTICE: LESSONS FROM RECONSTRUCTION

by

David H. Gans*

The Supreme Court is broken. How should we fix it? This Article argues that Reconstruction, a period in American history when the role of the Supreme Court in American life was hotly debated and Congress repeatedly took steps to reform the courts, provides important and underappreciated lessons. Reconstruction’s model makes clear that when the Supreme Court runs roughshod over constitutional rights, Congress need not sit on the sidelines. Rather, the Constitution gives it powerful tools of reform. Congress can (1) change the composition of the Court, (2) alter its jurisdiction and regulate its proceedings, and (3) use its express enforcement powers to protect basic rights and equal citizenship. During Reconstruction, Congress employed all three of these strategies. It enacted structural reforms to expand the size of the Court, disempowering reforms to strip the Court of its jurisdiction over highly charged cases, and justice reforms that sought to make the federal courts partners in Reconstruction’s project of ensuring true freedom and equal justice, opening the federal courthouse doors wide open to rein in state abuse of power.

Of these, Reconstruction’s justice reforms have proved to be the most enduring, and they provide a model for court reform today. When the Court’s conservative supermajority eviscerates fundamental rights, Congress can pass statutes to do what the Supreme Court will not: uphold our core constitutional commitments.

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* Director of the Human Rights, Civil Rights & Citizenship Program, Constitutional Accountability Center. For helpful comments and suggestions, I thank Praveen Fernandes, Brianne Gorod, Doug Pennington, Daphna Renan, and Elizabeth Wydra. Thanks to the editors of Lewis & Clark Law Review for excellent editorial assistance.
INTRODUCTION

Calls for court expansion are in the air. On the floor of Congress, speakers insist that the Supreme Court has disgraced itself and that if the Court will not respect the rights of the American people, Congress must intervene. The year is 1868, not 2023, but the parallels to today are hard to miss.

As the Supreme Court’s last two terms show, this 6–3 conservative Court is no friend to our whole Constitution’s promises of freedom, equal citizenship, and a multiracial democracy open to all. Conservatives have cemented their supermajority on the Court by manipulating the confirmation process—announcing and then disavowing their own supposed rules regarding nominations in a presidential election year—in order to pack the Court and roll back decades of constitutional law that helped ensure a freer, more equal, and more democratic America.¹

The Roberts Court’s new 6–3 supermajority has moved aggressively to remake the law on multiple fronts, bringing the Supreme Court to a breaking point. In Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Center, conservatives voted to give states carte blanche to impose the most draconian bans on abortion, stripping away from millions of Americans the right to control their bodies and their lives.² The decision allows states to criminalize a constitutional right essential to bodily control and equal citizenship and provides a roadmap for taking away other fundamental rights the Supreme Court has protected for nearly a century.

In other sweeping rulings of the last two years, the Roberts Court effectively ended affirmative action in university admissions;³ conferred on certain commercial businesses a First Amendment right to discriminate against same-sex couples;⁴ supercharged gun rights;⁵ and rights to free exercise of religion, while whittling down

⁴ 303 Creative, LLC v. Elenis, 143 S. Ct. 2298, 2322 (2023) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) ("Today, the Court, for the first time in its history, grants a business open to the public a constitutional right to refuse to serve members of a protected class.").
⁵ New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022).
the Establishment Clause, and aggressively employed the so-called major questions doctrine to veto agency action taken under broad congressional delegations of power. This pattern cannot be explained by adherence to text and history or any other jurisprudential methodology; rather, it reflects a result-oriented brand of judging that manipulates case law and cherry-picks history to produce conservative results and expand judicial power. Not every major case ended with a conservative power grab—in a host of cases, conservative litigants made claims that were too radical even for this Court—but the overall pattern of the last two years is stark: the conservative supermajority is remaking huge swathes of constitutional law, putting its imprimatur on item after item on the conservative legal wishlist, and repeatedly jolting the legal system.

Precedent-shattering rulings like Dobbs deservedly get the lion’s share of attention. But they are only part of the story. The Roberts Court has also transformed how the Supreme Court decides cases: it has weaponized the emergency application process—traditionally a tiny part of the Court’s work—to move the law to the right as fast as possible, often without the transparency and deliberation that is essential to the judicial process. The term that ended with Dobbs began with the shadow docket order in Whole Women’s Health v. Jackson, in which five conservative Justices, without full briefing or oral argument, nullified the right to abortion for Texans by permitting the State of Texas to ban all abortions at six weeks of pregnancy. Time and again, the Court has used the shadow docket to find a way to rule for a favored set of repeat players, cutting the judicial process short in a manner that repeatedly shortchanges the most marginalized members of the populace.

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6 See Carson v. Makin, 142 S. Ct. 1987, 2014 (2022) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Today, the Court leads us to a place where separation of church and state becomes a constitutional violation.”); Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 142 S. Ct. 2407, 2453 (2022) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority “elevates one individual’s interest in personal religious exercise, in the exact time and place of that individual’s choosing, over society’s interest in protecting the separation between church and state, eroding the protections for religious liberty for all”).

7 West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. 2587 (2022); Biden v. Nebraska, 143 S. Ct. 2355 (2023); id. at 2397–98 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“The policy judgments, under our separation of powers, are supposed to come from Congress and the President. But they don’t when the Court refuses to respect the full scope of the delegations that Congress makes to the Executive Branch. When that happens, the Court becomes the arbiter—indeed, the maker—of national policy. . . . That is no proper role for a court.”).


Must the Court be left to its own devices as it moves to reverse rights, put accountability further out of reach, and cut short basic aspects of the judicial process? Certainly not. Our Constitution gives Congress the power to reform the federal courts and ensure that we have a system of justice worthy of the name. Article III provides the broad outlines of our federal judicial system: it creates the Supreme Court, provides that the Justices, as well as judges serving on lower federal courts established by Congress, “shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour,” and provides the federal courts with the power to hear nine categories of “Cases” and “Controversies,” including “all Cases, in Law or Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties.” But other aspects of the federal judiciary are left to Congress. The Constitution leaves the size of the Supreme Court to be established by Congress and gives Congress broad power to control the jurisdiction and proceedings of the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts—an understanding acknowledged by constitutional scholars across the ideological spectrum.

Within narrow limits, Congress’s authority to “make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution . . . all other Powers vested by this Constitution . . . in any Department,” empowers it to reform the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts.

There is a robust debate today over court reform—even as the prospects for passage appear dim. But despite the political reality that major legislation stands little chance of being enacted in the current Congress, calls to fix a broken Supreme Court are growing more insistent than at any time in recent history. How should we fix an ailing Supreme Court bent on abandoning some of our most cherished constitutional rights?

Structural reformers urge that "structural redesign must be central to the conversation about how to reform the Supreme Court—and, indeed, how to save it." For some, court expansion is the tried and true solution: increasing the number of

11 U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1, 2.
12 Ryan D. Doerfler & Samuel Moyn, Democratizing the Supreme Court, 109 CALIF. L. REV. 1703, 1753 (2021) (“While Article III assumes the existence of a Supreme Court and Article I, section 3 that there will be a Chief Justice, nothing else in the text seems to bear on how large or small the Court must be.”); Daniel Epps & Ganesh Sitaraman, How to Save the Supreme Court, 129 YALE L.J. 148, 175 (2019) (“[T]he size of the Supreme Court is not specified in the Constitution and has always been set by statute.”); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Checking the Court, 10 N.Y.U. J.L. & Liberty, n.1, 2016 at 18, 64 (“Nothing in the Constitution specifies the size of the membership of the Supreme Court . . . . The size and details of the Supreme Court’s membership are up to Congress, pursuant to its powers under the Necessary and Proper Clause.”); id. at 55 (“The text says that Congress has the power to legislate exceptions to the Court’s appellate jurisdiction. The structure of the Constitution makes such control over jurisdiction a powerful limit on the powers of the Supreme Court . . . .”).
13 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
14 Daniel Epps & Ganesh Sitaraman, Supreme Court Reform and American Democracy, 130 YALE L.J.F. 821, 827 (2021).
Justices on the Court, these advocates say, has been used in the past and is "the most direct way to address the structural imbalance brought about by Republican manipulation of the nomination process." Others fear that adding seats to the Court appears too nakedly political, risks undermining the rule of law, and invites a spiraling tit-for-tat. They prefer reforms to lower the political stakes of the appointment process such as term limits, the use of rotating panels, or requirements to ensure an ideologically balanced Supreme Court bench. A third view, represented by the work of Ryan Doerfler and Samuel Moyn, argues that the goal of court reform should be to truncate the Supreme Court’s power, not enhance its legitimacy. On this view, court reform should aim to clip the Supreme Court’s wings through “disempowering reforms,” such as jurisdiction-stripping or supermajority voting requirements, that limit “the Supreme Court’s ability to make policy” and “effectively reassign power away from the judiciary to the political branches.”

This Article examines the question of court reform through the lens of Reconstruction, one of the most salient periods of court reform in American history. Reconstruction not only produced transformative changes to the Constitution; it also changed the federal judicial system in hugely important ways. During Reconstruction, Congress repeatedly changed the size of the Supreme Court, produced one of the most notable examples of jurisdiction-stripping in American history, and enacted landmark civil rights statutes that greatly expanded the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Indeed, almost all of the court reforms being debated today have historical antecedents in the Reconstruction period. For this reason, Reconstruction
provides an illuminating lens through which to examine court reform and has important lessons for current debates.

Despite its relevance, this story remains obscure. While there is a mountain of scholarship on President Franklin Roosevelt’s court-packing plan that portrays “Roosevelt’s 1937 plan” as “the paradigmatic example of an illegitimate threat to the judiciary,” the story of how the Reconstruction Congress utilized the powers given to Congress to reform the federal judiciary remains underappreciated. The history of Reconstruction provides an important reminder that Congress has many tools available to it to ensure the Supreme Court and the federal judiciary uphold our whole Constitution’s bedrock promises of liberty and equal justice.

Reconstruction’s model of legislative constitutionalism has three core components relevant to today’s court reform debate. Faced with a Supreme Court hostile to our deepest constitutional values, Congress can (1) change the composition of the Court; (2) alter its jurisdiction and regulate its proceedings; and (3) use its express enforcement powers to protect basic rights and equal citizenship—including by enforcing constitutional commitments that the Supreme Court will not. The last of these is the handiwork of the Reconstruction Framers, who insisted that “the remedy for the violation of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments was expressly not left to the courts. The remedy was legislative, because in each the amendment itself provided that it shall be enforced by legislation on the part of Congress.”

Fearful that the Supreme Court would be unwilling to respect new constitutional

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19 See, e.g., Tara Leigh Grove, The Origins (and Fragility) of Judicial Independence, 71 VAND. L. REV. 465, 512 (2018); see id. at 506 (arguing that there is a “norm against court packing” that is “likely due in part to the ultimate defeat of Roosevelt’s effort”); Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Historical Gloss, Constitutional Conventions, and the Judicial Separation of Powers, 105 GEO. L.J. 255, 259 (2017) (arguing based on “the Senate hearings and other materials from 1937” that “many criticisms of the Court-packing plan involved claims about historical gloss, which were often tied to claims about constitutional structure”); Siegel, supra note 16, at 98–104 (arguing that court-packing is likely prohibited by a constitutional convention, principally arising from the rejection of FDR’s plan).


21 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 525 (1872); RANDY E. BARNETT & EVAN D. BERNICK, THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: ITS LETTER AND SPIRIT 252 (2021) (arguing that “the Court’s claim that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to leave the judiciary with ‘primary authority to interpret’ the meaning of Section 1 . . . is not sustainable”); Balkin, supra note 20, at 1805 (“[The Reconstruction] amendments were designed to give Congress broad powers to protect civil rights and civil liberties: Together they form Congress’s Reconstruction Power. Congress gave itself these powers because it believed it could not trust the Supreme Court to protect the rights of the freedmen.”); Michael McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153, 182 (1997) (“Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment was born of the fear that the judiciary would frustrate Reconstruction by a narrow interpretation of congressional power.”).
guarantees that sought to broadly safeguard fundamental rights and equal citizenship, the Reconstruction Amendments gave Congress broad powers to legislate to realize the full promise of liberty and equality for all. The enforcement power “was born of the conviction that Congress—no less than the courts—has the duty and the authority to interpret the Constitution.”

The Reconstruction Congress employed each of these devices to reform the federal judiciary: it enacted (1) structural reforms to change the size of the Supreme Court—first expanding the Court to ten Justices, then shrinking it to seven Justices to prevent President Andrew Johnson from filling any vacancies, and then finally expanding it to nine Justices during the presidency of Ulysses Grant; (2) “disempowering” reforms to strip the Supreme Court of jurisdiction over some of the most charged cases of the day which sought to challenge the very foundation of Reconstruction; and (3) “justice” reforms that expanded the jurisdiction of the federal courts to vindicate constitutionally guaranteed rights and enforce the promise of freedom, justice, and equality at the core of the Reconstruction Amendments. Despite some caustic attacks on the Supreme Court, Reconstruction witnessed the greatest expansion in the power of the federal courts in American history. Congress reformed our federal judicial system, often to enforce the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, to ensure that federal courts could hold states and localities accountable for violating constitutionally guaranteed rights.

Of these, the Reconstruction Congress’s access to justice reforms—which included measures to broaden the writ of habeas corpus to protect persons held in state custody in violation of the Constitution, to establish a federal cause of action to permit suits in federal court against state and local officers who violated constitutional rights, and to give federal courts jurisdiction over all cases raising questions under federal law—have proved to be the most enduring. These jurisdictional innovations were not always immediately embraced by the Supreme Court, but over the long run, they transformed the federal judiciary. Despite a history of the Court

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22 McConnell, supra note 21, at 183.
23 See discussion infra Sections I.A, I.B, I.C.
25 See Wiecek, supra note 24, at 334 (observing that “the jurisdictional statutes of the Reconstruction era laid the groundwork for the judicial self-assertiveness of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries”).
taking a far too narrow view of these landmark statutes, our constitutional system has been forever changed by the efforts of the Reconstruction Congress to open broadly the federal courthouse doors to individuals aggrieved by abuse of state power.

The history of efforts to expand the Court and regulate Supreme Court jurisdiction during Reconstruction, is more mixed—both proved important in the short run, but neither changed the institution in a lasting way. Still, Reconstruction’s reforms are a reminder that changes to the composition and jurisdiction of the Court provide a powerful weapon to rein in a Supreme Court that has gone off the rails. While court expansion and jurisdiction-stripping provided the greatest short-term bang for the buck, the landmark pieces of legislation enacted by the Reconstruction Congress that opened the doors of federal courts to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments and allowed individuals victimized by state abuse of power to seek justice in a federal court of law proved more lasting.

The takeaway here is that reforms that open courthouse doors and make our courts into true institutions of justice should be just as much a part of the court reform conversation as court expansion, term limits, or reforms that seek to disempower the Supreme Court. A central goal of court reform should be to help realize our Constitution’s promise of equal justice under law, safeguard bedrock rights, and ensure that our courts work for all Americans—particularly as the Supreme Court declares open season on fundamental rights and strikes one blow after another to accountability. Whether the Supreme Court grows in size or remains at nine, progressives today should take a page from the Reconstruction reformers that overhauled the federal courts and broadly opened the courthouse doors to vindicate constitutionally guaranteed rights and hold wrongdoers accountable in a court of law. With a 6–3 conservative Supreme Court systematically bent on rolling back fundamental freedoms and closing the courthouse doors on the most marginalized of Americans, the goal of court reform must include ensuring the promise of liberty and justice for all.

Should progressives fear that the conservative supermajority will look for ways to gut any new legislation enacted by Congress? Of course they should. Any new measures must be drafted using the clearest language possible to prevent a conservative Court from exploiting ambiguities to hollow out Congress’s handiwork (and the likelihood that a Court like the current one could simply ignore these legislative endeavors suggests they should probably be part of a comprehensive reform package that includes other reforms such as court expansion). But Congress should not shy away from acting on its constitutional obligation to enforce constitutional rights because it will provoke a major clash with the conservative supermajority on the

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Supreme Court. As Reconstruction reminds us, the Constitution does not leave our rights solely to the Supreme Court. The Constitution gives Congress key tools that are vitally important in this moment.

This Article unfolds as follows. Part I tells the story of how the Reconstruction Congress reformed the federal judicial system, discussing their efforts to repeatedly change the size of the Supreme Court; to rein in a Court they feared would undo Reconstruction; and finally, to fundamentally alter federal jurisdiction to make the federal courts partners in Reconstruction’s project of securing true freedom and equal citizenship. Part II examines the lessons we should take away from the history of court reform during Reconstruction. While court expansion and jurisdiction-stripping proved most important in the short run, the most enduring reforms were those that provided a federal forum to vindicate constitutionally guaranteed rights. Reconstruction offers a reminder that there is more to court reform than the composition of the Supreme Court. Whether the Court stays at nine members or not, reforms that protect bedrock rights and ensure accountability are critical. A brief conclusion follows.

I. RECONSTRUCTION AND COURT REFORM

During Reconstruction, the Supreme Court was under fire, the bitter memory of the Court’s horrendous decision in *Dred Scott v. Sandford* still fresh in the public mind. It proved difficult to forget that less than a decade earlier:

> [t]he Supreme Court . . . not only [disgraced] itself as a tribunal of justice, but it disgraced our common humanity, when it mouthed from that high seat sacred to justice the horrid blasphemy that there were human beings either in this land or in any land who had no rights which white men were bound to respect.

There were calls to radically restructure the Court, entirely revise its appellate jurisdiction, and even to abolish the Supreme Court. These drastic proposals did not come to pass. Indeed, by the end of Reconstruction, the Supreme Court and the federal courts as a whole emerged more powerful than ever. This Section examines the court reforms of the Reconstruction era. Section I.A examines the

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27 *Dred Scott v. Sandford*, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), *superseded by constitutional amendment*, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; *see also* *The New Dred Scott*, HARPER'S WKLY., Jan. 19, 1867.

28 CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 483 (1868).

29 Barry Friedman, *The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part II: Reconstruction's Political Court*, 91 GEO. L.J. 1, 3 (2002) (observing that during Reconstruction, “there were threats to abolish, reform, or reconstruct the Supreme Court”).

30 FRIEDMAN, *supra* note 24, at 137.
changes made to the size of the Supreme Court. Section I.B turns to efforts to discipline the Court, including by curtailing its jurisdiction. Section I.C discusses the landmark Reconstruction legislation that revolutionized the jurisdiction of the federal courts to vindicate the Constitution and the supremacy of federal law, and to rein in state abuses of power.

A. Court Expansion During Reconstruction: Changing the Court

During the Civil War and continuing into Reconstruction, Congress restructured a Supreme Court that was systemically biased in favor of slavery. It is well known that in *Dred Scott* and other cases the Supreme Court of the antebellum era mangled the Constitution in service of slavery. What is less well known is that a pro-slavery bias was built into the very structure of the antebellum Supreme Court. Under 1837 federal legislation that increased the size of the Supreme Court to nine Justices, the federal judicial system was gerrymandered in favor of slavery: the federal judiciary was made up of nine circuits, and a whopping five out of the nine circuits were composed of slave states. And because Supreme Court Justices had the responsibility of circuit-riding, one Justice was appointed from each of the nine circuits. Thus, slave states had a permanent majority on the Supreme Court. The nation’s high court, one newspaper charged, was “scandalously sectional, grossly partial, a mockery of the Constitution, a serf of the slave power, and a disgrace to the country.”

During Reconstruction, Republicans in Congress repeatedly sought to manipulate the size of the Supreme Court to produce a high Court that would protect freedom and equality rather than perpetuate the legacy of slavery. Calls to change the composition of the Court were commonplace: those who sought to change the Court observed that “by increasing or diminishing the number of the judges, the

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31 PAUL FINKELMAN, SUPREME INJUSTICE: SLAVERY IN THE NATION’S HIGHEST COURT 25 (2018) (describing the pre-Civil War Supreme Court as “a constant friend of slavery and almost never a friend of liberty”).

32 STANLEY I. KUTLER, JUDICIAL POWER AND RECONSTRUCTION POLITICS 14 (1968) (“Five [circuits] consisted exclusively of slave states, with a population of a little over eleven million, while the remaining four contained over sixteen and a half million. . . . Eight of the newer states, six of them free states, were not assigned to any circuit.”).

33 Mark Graber, “No Better Than They Deserve:” Dred Scott and Constitutional Democracy, 34 N. Ky. L. REV. 589, 604 (2007) (“Federal law . . . structured the federal judicial system in ways that guaranteed that a majority of the justices on the Supreme Court would be citizens from slave states.”).

34 *The Supreme Court*, N.Y. TRIB., Mar. 26, 1859, at 4, quoted in KUTLER, supra note 32, at 16.

35 FRIEDMAN, supra note 24, at 133 (“No fewer than three times, Congress altered the size of the Court to ensure a sound majority in important cases.”).
Court may be reconstructed in conformity with the supreme decisions of the war.\textsuperscript{36} That is indeed what happened.

In 1863, Congress approved legislation increasing the size of the Supreme Court to ten Justices; the legislation also created a tenth circuit, composed of the districts of California and Oregon.\textsuperscript{37} This expansion of the high Court—enacted into law as the Supreme Court was hearing a challenge to Lincoln’s naval blockade of Confederate ports—strengthened President Lincoln’s hands at the Court.\textsuperscript{38} While some had urged Lincoln to add four new Justices to the Court to give Lincoln a one-seat majority,\textsuperscript{39} Congress took the more measured step, as the \textit{New York Times} observed, of “add[ing] one to the number which [would] speedily remove the control of the Supreme Court from the Taney school.”\textsuperscript{40}

The Supreme Court would not remain at ten Justices for long. In 1866, the Reconstruction Congress reduced the size of the Supreme Court to seven Justices—a change that effectively prevented President Andrew Johnson, Lincoln’s successor, from appointing Justices hostile to Reconstruction.\textsuperscript{41} The legislation was a response to the nomination of Henry Stanbery, who had helped draft Johnson’s veto of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and would go on to represent Johnson in his impeachment trial. Rather than block Stanbery’s nomination, Congress reduced the Court’s size to seven by attrition, denying Johnson the opportunity to appoint new Justices to the Supreme Court.\textsuperscript{42} This move prevented President Johnson from replacing two members of the \textit{Dred Scott} majority, who passed away during Johnson’s presidency, and left the Court short-staffed.\textsuperscript{43} As one Democratic Senator lamented several years later, it was “remarkable” that the Court’s size was reduced at a time “when the business of the Supreme Court had increased very greatly . . . . The explanation is

\textsuperscript{36} The Late Decision of the Supreme Court on Military Trials During the War, N.Y. HERALD, Dec. 20, 1866, at 4, quoted in FRIEDMAN, supra note 24, at 134–35.

\textsuperscript{37} Tenth Circuit Act, ch. 100, § 1, 12 Stat. 794 (1863).

\textsuperscript{38} See DAVID M. SILVER, LINCOLN’S SUPREME COURT 84–85 (1956).

\textsuperscript{39} Joshua Braver, Court-Packing: An America Tradition?, 61 B.C. L. REV. 2747, 2770 (2020).

\textsuperscript{40} Reorganization of the Judiciary of the District of Columbia, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1863, at 1; SILVER, supra note 38, at 84 (“It was prudence that dictated a packed Court, and President Lincoln was willing to increase the size of the Court to strengthen the position of those Justices who would view with favor the acts that the administration deemed necessary.”).

\textsuperscript{41} Act of July 23, 1866, ch. 210, 14 Stat. 209; FRIEDMAN, supra note 24, at 134 (explaining that the change aimed “to deprive Andrew Johnson of appointments”).

\textsuperscript{42} Braver, supra note 39, at 2782–83 (“In effect, this was a blanket refusal to confirm any nominee to the vacant tenth seat. What’s more, by reducing the size of the Court by three seats, the Senate also sent the message that it would not entertain any nominees, not only for this newly opened seat, but also for the next vacancies as well.”).

\textsuperscript{43} Id. at 2785 (“Reducing the number of Supreme Court Justices meant that the circuit courts would not be adequately staffed. Before, ten Justices had not been a sufficient number to ride circuit, but now there would be only seven.”).
political. It was not desired that the President, who at that time was entering upon the existing chronic difference with Congress, should fill a vacancy upon that bench by nomination . . . ." 

Seven, like ten, proved not to be a magic number. The Judiciary Act of 1869, signed by President Ulysses Grant, one month into his presidency, increased the size of the Supreme Court to nine Justices. Republicans who had shrunk the Court when Andrew Johnson was President now insisted that "the Supreme Court of the United States is overloaded with business" and should be expanded. With the retirement of Justice Robert Grier, another member of the Dred Scott majority, President Grant quickly added two new Justices to the Supreme Court, consolidating a Republican majority on the Supreme Court.

This series of Reconstruction-era measures changing the size of the Court were couched in neutral language and, by and large, received little debate in Congress. The addition of a tenth Justice in 1863 occurred simultaneously with the creation of a tenth circuit court for the states of California and Oregon. The creation of a new circuit dictated a new Justice, who would be responsible for circuit riding in the newly-created circuit. The 1866 reduction of the Supreme Court’s size to seven Justices apparently met with approval from the Supreme Court and was supported by Chief Justice Chase as a means of increasing judicial salaries. Democratic newspapers attacked the reduction as a simple act of hostility to President Johnson, but the reduction sailed through Congress with almost no debate. The 1869 legislation—the exception that proves the rule—featured extensive debate, but what is notable is that virtually everyone agreed that the Supreme Court should be expanded

44 CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 2127 (1868).
45 Act of April 10, 1869, ch. 22, 16 Stat. 44.
46 CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 1st Sess. 208 (1869).
47 Sidney Ratner, Was the Supreme Court Packed by President Grant?, 50 POL. SCI. Q. 343, 346–47 (1935).
48 KUTLER, supra note 32, at 19 (noting "total absence of debate" over 1863 plan to add a tenth Justice); Charles G. Geyh, Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability, and the Role of Constitutional Norms in Congressional Regulation of the Courts, 78 IND. L.J. 153, 181 (2003) (arguing that "deliberation preceding adoption of the 1866 amendment to reduce the size of the Court from ten to seven was so truncated that no conclusive inferences can be drawn as to Congress’s underlying motivations").
49 Braver, supra note 39, at 2768 (describing the 1863 "expansion, from nine to ten seats," as "the last example of the circuit-riding system at work").
50 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3909 (1866) ([A] number of the members of the Supreme Court think it will be a vast improvement.); KUTLER, supra note 32, at 53 (observing that "Chase was no stranger to the notion of reduction"); Friedman, supra note 29, at 39 ("Chase felt strongly that an increase in salaries was appropriate and the easiest way to accomplish this was to reduce the number of Justices while dividing up a similar-sized pie.").
51 Braver, supra note 39, at 2784 (observing that Democratic newspapers "roundly condemned the reduction").
to relieve a "very much crowded" docket and remedy the fact that “[i]t is now two and sometimes three years before a cause taken to the Supreme Court can be heard,” amounting to what Senator Lyman Trumbull called “a denial of justice in many cases.” Senator Trumbull’s bill increased the Supreme Court to nine Justices. Others urged a “complete reorganization of the Supreme Court,” which would involve increasing the high Court to fifteen or eighteen Justices and instituting the use of a lottery system in which some of the Justices would remain in Washington D.C. to hear appeals, while the others would preside over cases in the nation’s circuit courts. Senator Trumbull’s proposal, which matched the number of Justices to the number of circuits, won out.

The members of the Reconstruction Congress never were so forthright as to announce that their goal was to change the Supreme Court, but it is difficult to view these repeated changes to the size of the Supreme Court as anything but efforts to achieve that goal. The best explanation for increasing and decreasing the Court’s size is the most obvious one: Republicans in Congress were aiming to create a Supreme Court more to their liking, using the powers entrusted to them by the Constitution. Reconstruction reformers understood that Article III empowered Congress to decide the size of the Supreme Court. In their view, the Constitution “does not fix the number of judges which shall constitute the Supreme Court; hence the number has at times been increased by Congress and again diminished at its pleasure. This has been done several times, as we all know.” Republicans, who possessed huge majorities in Congress, were not shy about using these powers to remake the Court—even if that left the Court understaffed at times. Indeed, to Democratic Senator Charles Buckalew, what these repeated changes to the size of the Court showed is that Congress had effectively meddled with the Supreme Court: “[h]ave

52 Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1366 (1869); id. at 1483 (“The docket is overloaded.”); id. at 1484 (“[T]he business of the Supreme Court is so large that under the present system it cannot be transacted within a reasonable time.”); Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 1st Sess. 208 (1869) (“[I]t is necessary that the Supreme Court should have some relief or that the country should have relief in some way by a law that will expedite the transaction of business before that tribunal.”).


54 Id. at 1484; Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 1st Sess. 209 (1869) (urging adoption of a plan that "would double the number of supreme judges of the United States, making them eighteen" and would "provide that the Supreme Court of the United States should be held by nine of those judges, and that the nine others should be engaged in the performance of circuit duty").

55 Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 1st Sess. 210 (1869) (urging that "the Supreme Court shall consist of nine judges, the same number of judges that we have circuits").

56 Braver, supra note 39, at 2784 (observing that “Republican congressmen did not openly admit their partisan intentions because it would have aroused more opposition”).

57 Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 482 (1868); id. at 487 (“The Constitution declares . . . there shall be a Supreme Court. But it leaves entirely to Congress to determine the number of judges which shall constitute the court.”).
we not sought to mold and to conform it, to some extent at least, to our own will?" 58

Did court expansion succeed? The answer is both yes and no. Court expansion had an important effect on some areas of law, but not others.

The new majority flexed its muscles almost immediately, voting to overturn a decision from the year before that had denied Congress the power to make paper money legal tender, one of the biggest issues of the day because of the role of legal tender in funding government operations during the Civil War. 59 In 1871, in the Legal Tender Cases, the re-constituted Supreme Court overturned the 4–3 ruling in Hepburn v. Griswold that had denied this power to Congress, boldly insisting on a sweeping understanding of Congress’s power to solve national problems. 60 The majority’s ruling—delivered by Justice William Strong, one of President Grant’s new appointees—argued that, because the 1870 ruling had been decided “by a court having a less number of judges than the law then in existence provided this court shall have,” it was the prerogative of the “full court” to correct the error and ensure that Congress has the authority to “employ freely every means . . . necessary for its preservation, and for the fulfilment of its acknowledged duties” under the Constitution. 61 Manipulating the size of the Court had, in short order, succeeded in changing the law on one of the most important constitutional questions of the day—to the condemnation of many who insisted that the Court had degraded itself in the eyes of the American people by overruling a very recent decision based solely on the fact that the membership of the Court had changed. 62 Abrupt judicial flip-flops, like the reversal of Hepburn one year after it was decided, seemed to put at risk public respect for the Court. Overruling precedent was unusual in itself; never before had a precedent been discarded so quickly. 63

The Legal Tender Cases proved to be the highwater mark for court expansion. Those who hoped the newly constituted Supreme Court would vindicate the Constitution’s new guarantees of liberty and equality would be bitterly disappointed. In the years to come, the Supreme Court would repeatedly gut the Fourteenth Amendment and hamstring Congress’s enforcement power, squelching the promise of one of Reconstruction’s greatest achievements. In 1873, in the Slaughter-House Cases,

58 Id. at 2127.
59 Ratner, supra note 47, at 346.
60 The Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 553 (1871), overruling Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1870).
61 Id. at 534, 553–54.
62 See Friedman, supra note 24, at 135 (“A[fter the deed was done, the press called the decision a ‘judicial comedy,’ ‘humiliating,’ ‘contempt’-provoking, and ‘a terrible blow at the independence and dignity of the profession.’”).
the Supreme Court all but excised the Privileges or Immunities Clause—the centerpiece of the Fourteenth Amendment written to broadly protect fundamental rights—from our Constitution, leading Lincoln-appointee Justice Noah Swayne to accuse the majority of turning “what was meant for bread into stone. By the Constitution, as it stood before the war, ample protection was given against oppression by the Union, but little was given against wrong and oppression by the States. That want was intended to be supplied by this amendment.” Later cases continued to break faith with the Fourteenth Amendment. In 1876, in *United States v. Cruikshank*, the Court overturned the convictions of three members of a white mob that had slaughtered scores of Black people, and it held that the federal government lacked the power to protect Black people from white terrorists. “*Cruikshank* gutted one of the key promises of the Fourteenth Amendment—the states’ constitutional obligation to protect individuals from private violence—and gave the Klan and other white terror groups the greenlight to use terror and violence to bring down Reconstruction.”

In short, court expansion did not produce a Court willing to honor the text and history of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Decisions like the *Slaughter-House Cases* and *Cruikshank* confirmed Republican skepticism that the Supreme Court would faithfully honor the transformative changes made by the Reconstruction Amendments. It also partially reflected what Lincoln and Grant aimed to achieve through enlarging the Court: ensuring that the Court respected the Fourteenth Amendment did not figure at all in the Supreme Court appointments of the Reconstruction era, many of which predated the Amendment by many years. Instead, issues relating to President Lincoln’s wartime measures loomed large. When Lincoln was considering whom to name as Chief Justice following the death of Chief Justice Roger Taney, Lincoln reportedly said that “we wish for a Chief Justice who will sustain what has been done in regard to emancipation and the legal tenders.” Some of Lincoln’s appointees turned out to take a very dim view of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Samuel Miller, an 1862 Lincoln appointee who wrote the majority opinion in the *Slaughter-House Cases*, disliked the Fourteenth Amendment and supported an alternative version of the Amendment proposed by President Andrew Johnson that omitted the Privileges or

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64 The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
65 Id. at 129 (Swayne, J., dissenting).
68 See Barnett & Bernick, supra note 21, at 252.
Immunities Clause. In the *Slaughter-House Cases*, he effectively rewrote the Fourteenth Amendment to make it more like the version he preferred.

In short, President Lincoln’s and Grant’s appointments produced a Court disposed to uphold Lincoln’s war-time measures, which it generally did, particularly after Grant’s two appointments in 1870. It did not produce a Court willing to honor the Fourteenth Amendment. To be sure, not all the blame can be heaped on the appointments process. By the mid-1870s, as the national mood soured on Reconstruction, even Justices who had written full-throated dissents in *Slaughter-House* would join in burying the Amendment’s promises and castigate efforts to ensure equal citizenship for Black Americans as “running the slavery argument into the ground.” Indeed, the nineteenth-century Justice with the greatest legacy of defending the Fourteenth Amendment was Justice John Marshall Harlan who was not appointed until after the end of Reconstruction.

Even before the *Slaughter-House Cases*, the Reconstruction Congress remained deeply fearful that the Supreme Court would deal a fatal blow to Reconstruction and arrogate to themselves powers that Republicans insisted belonged to the legislative branch. In sum, changing the Court was not enough, so Congress also took steps to rein in the Supreme Court. The next Section examines these efforts.

B. Disempowering Reforms During Reconstruction: Reining in the Supreme Court

Reconstruction presented immense and unprecedented legal and political questions in the aftermath of the Civil War. What terms and conditions would have to be fulfilled before the states of the former Confederacy would be readmitted to the

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70 See Richard L. Aynes, *Constricting the Law of Freedom: Justice Miller, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Slaughter-House Cases*, 70 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 627, 660 (1994) (“When Bingham was working for the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, Miller was willing to accept a conservative counter-proposal by certain Southern Governors and endorsed by President Johnson.”).

71 Id. at 660 n.228 (“[T]he rejected proposal would have produced the very result Miller reached in *Slaughter-House*.”).

72 See Braver, supra note 39, at 2783 (observing that “it seems likely that President Grant chose his two nominees based on the belief that they would overrule *Hepburn*”).

73 Compare *The Slaughter-House Cases*, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 112–13 (1873) (Bradley, J., dissenting) (“A citizen of the United States has a perfect constitutional right to go to and reside in any State he chooses, and to claim citizenship therein, and an equality of rights with every other citizen; and the whole power of the nation is pledged to sustain him in that right.”), with *The Civil Rights Cases*, 109 U.S. 3, 24–25 (1883) (opinion of Bradley, J.) (“It would be running the slavery argument into the ground to make it apply to every act of discrimination which a person may see fit to make as to the guests he will entertain, or as to the people he will take into his coach or cab or car, or admit to his concert or theatre, or deal with in other matters of intercourse or business.”).

Union and their citizens restored to the political rights they previously enjoyed? How would Southern states be governed in the interim? What measures were necessary to ensure the protection of fundamental rights and equal citizenship stature in the former Confederacy? And, more fundamentally, who would decide these questions—Congress, the executive, or the courts? Republican members of Congress insisted that it was up to Congress to set the terms and conditions of Reconstruction and that it would be a flagrant violation of the judicial role for courts to intrude.\(^75\) In other words, if the Supreme Court refused to stay in its lane, Congress stood ready to respond. John Bingham—a respected moderate Republican Congressman who played a key role during Reconstruction—made clear the stakes were sky high:

If . . . the [C]ourt usurps power to decide political questions and def[ies] a free people’s will it will only remain for a people thus insulted and defied to demonstrate that the servant is not above his lord by procuring a further constitutional amendment and ratifying the same, which will defy judicial usurpation by annihilating the usurpers in the abolition of the tribunal itself.\(^76\)

If members of Congress doubted the Supreme Court’s fidelity to the Constitution, Congress could “sweep away at once their appellate jurisdiction in all cases, and leave the tribunal without even color or appearance of authority for their wrongful intervention.”\(^77\) Republicans repeatedly insisted that the Supreme Court would be in peril if it claimed power to dictate the terms of Reconstruction.

These matters came to a head beginning in the 39th Congress, which first met in late 1865 after the assassination of President Abraham Lincoln and at a time when President Andrew Johnson had begun the process of bringing Southern states back into the Union, to disastrous results. State after state enacted Black Codes, which sought to subjugate Black Americans, strip them of the promise of freedom, and force those freed from bondage to continue to work for their former owners, a state of enslavement in all but name.\(^78\) Congress responded by passing the nation’s first federal civil rights legislation and a new constitutional amendment that would secure “the civil rights and privileges of all citizens in all parts of the republic.”\(^79\) In June 1866, Congress proposed the Fourteenth Amendment and submitted it to the states for ratification.\(^80\) Tennessee swiftly ratified the Amendment and was readmitted to the Union, but other states remained under military rule.\(^81\)

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\(^75\) See, e.g., Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 502 (1867).
\(^76\) Id.
\(^77\) Id.
\(^79\) Joint Comm. on Reconstruction, 39th Cong., Rep. xxi (1866).
\(^80\) Foner, supra note 78, at 254.
\(^81\) Id. at 261.
Eventually, in March 1867, Congress passed the First Reconstruction Act, which split the former Confederacy into five military districts and established a process for Southern states to be readmitted to the Union, requiring them to establish new state constitutions granting the right to vote to all adult men regardless of race and to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment.\(^\text{82}\) President Johnson, in his veto message, denounced the Act in the most strident of terms, insisting that Congress had no right to impose military authority on the South "solely as a means of coercing the people into the adoption of principles and measures to which it is known that they are opposed, and upon which they have an undeniable right to exercise their own judgment."\(^\text{83}\) This was, Johnson claimed, "in palpable conflict with the plainest provisions of the Constitution."\(^\text{84}\) The passage of the Reconstruction Act over Johnson’s claim that Congress had transgressed the Constitution set off what Barry Friedman called a “footrace to the finish” as Southern litigants sought to invalidate the Reconstruction Act before the Fourteenth Amendment could be ratified by reconstructed Southern legislatures that, for the first time in history, would be elected with the votes of Black men.\(^\text{85}\)

Even before final passage of the Reconstruction Act, congressional Republicans had tremendous fears that the Supreme Court would strike down military rule in the South and upend Reconstruction.\(^\text{86}\) In *Ex parte Milligan*, the Supreme Court considered a habeas petition brought by Lambdin Milligan, a Confederate supporter, who, while living in Indiana, was part of a conspiracy to free Confederates held in prison camps and was sentenced to death for treason by a military tribunal.\(^\text{87}\) The Court unanimously ruled for Milligan; the majority’s reasoning was significant. A five-Justice majority held that military proceedings could not constitutionally be “applied to citizens in states which have upheld the authority of the government, and where the courts are open and their process unobstructed.”\(^\text{88}\) Four Justices rejected this constitutional argument,\(^\text{89}\) but to many, it seemed that the majority’s

\(^{82}\) *Id.* at 273–80.


\(^{84}\) *Id.*

\(^{85}\) Friedman, *supra* note 29, at 15 (noting that “southern politicians and legal advocates organized a deliberate campaign of litigation to coax the Supreme Court into ruling on the constitutionality of the Reconstruction legislation before the Southern ratification votes on the Fourteenth Amendment were cast”).

\(^{86}\) See generally *id.*

\(^{87}\) *Ex parte Milligan*, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 6–7 (1866).

\(^{88}\) *Id.* at 121.

\(^{89}\) *Id.* at 140 (Chase, C.J., concurring) (arguing that “when the nation is involved in war, and some portions of the country are invaded, and all are exposed to invasion, it is within the power of Congress to determine in what states or districts such great and imminent public danger
insistence that “[m]artial rule can never exist where the courts are open, and in the
proper and unobstructed exercise of their jurisdiction” might mean the death knell
for military rule in the states of the former Confederacy.\footnote{Id. at 127.}

The published \textit{Milligan} ruling, released on January 1, 1867, provoked a storm
of controversy. Republicans denounced \textit{Milligan} as “[t]he [n]ew \textit{Dred Scott}.”\footnote{The New Dred Scott, \textit{supra} note 27, at 34.} A
day after the ruling, Rep. Thaddeus Stevens argued that \textit{Milligan}, “although in
terms perhaps not as infamous as the \textit{Dred Scott} decision, is yet far more dangerous
in its operation upon the lives and liberties of the loyal men of this country. \textit{[T]}he
decision has taken away every protection in every one of these rebel States from
every loyal man . . . who resides there.”\footnote{CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 251 (1867).} \textit{Harper’s Weekly} offered a similar compar-
ison a few weeks later. “The \textit{Dred Scott} decision was meant to deprive slaves taken
into a Territory of the chance of liberty under the United States Constitution. The
Indiana decision operates to deprive the freedmen in the late rebel States, whose
laws grievously outrage them, of the protection of freedmen’s courts.”\footnote{The New Dred Scott, \textit{supra} note 27, at 34.} To \textit{Harper’s Weekly}, the remedy for a Supreme Court bent on perverting the law was plain: “let
the Supreme Court be swamped by a thorough reorganization and increased num-
ber of Judges.”\footnote{Id.; see also Friedman, \textit{supra} note 29, at 24–25 (collecting commentary on \textit{Milligan}).}

\textit{Milligan} led to a wave of suits brought by Southern litigants urging the Su-
preme Court to strike down the Reconstruction Act. A pair of suits brought as original
actions in the Supreme Court by Mississippi and Georgia were dismissed,\footnote{Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U. S. (4 Wall.) 475, 501 (1867); Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50, 77 (1868).} but
a habeas action brought by Mississippi newspaper editor William McCardle ap-
peared to have legs.\footnote{FRIEDMAN, \textit{supra} note 24, at 130.} McCardle used his editorial perch to undermine Reconstruc-
tion in Mississippi; he was charged with inciting insurrection and impeding recon-
struction efforts and held in military custody.\footnote{Id. at 247.} By the end of 1867, McCardle’s
habeas petition, which urged that the Reconstruction Act was unconstitutional, was
in front of the Supreme Court.\footnote{Id.} Although McCardle was out on bail, his counsel
moved to advance his case on the Court’s docket so that it could be decided on an
expedited basis.\footnote{Id.} In January 1868, the Justices agreed to give McCardle’s case

\textcolor{red}{exists as justifies the authorization of military tribunals for the trial of crimes and offences against the discipline or security of the army or against the public safety”).}

\footnote{Id. at 127.}
\footnote{Id.}
\footnote{Id.}
\footnote{Id.}
\footnote{Id.}
\footnote{Id.}
\footnote{Id. at 130.}
\footnote{Id.}
\footnote{Id.}
\footnote{Id.}
\footnote{Id. at 210.}
\footnote{Id. at 247.}
expedited review, stoking fears that the Supreme Court would strike down the Reconstruction Act and wreak havoc with Reconstruction. These actions galvanized Congress into action.  

Congressional Republicans first moved to amend an uncontroversial bill to add the requirement that the Supreme Court could not strike down an act of Congress without the concurrence of two-thirds of the Justices. Republicans pointed out that, at the Founding, the Supreme Court was composed of six Justices, effectively requiring two-thirds of the Court to decide a case. "Washington and the first Congress," John Bingham pointed out, "had so organized that court that if all the judges were present no judgment could be pronounced whatever without the assent of two thirds of all the members of the court." Others drew an analogy to the constitutional rule for overriding a presidential veto, insisting that the requirement of a two-thirds majority was "the rational rule, the one which is in unison with the rule that obtains in Congress under the Constitution." The measure requiring a vote by a two-thirds supermajority to strike down an Act of Congress passed the House of Representatives, but died in the Senate.

Where structural reform failed, jurisdiction-stripping succeeded. In March 1868, after the Supreme Court heard four days of oral argument in *McCardle*, a bill quickly passed Congress taking away the Supreme Court’s power to hear *McCardle*’s appeal. Ironically, in 1867 habeas legislation designed to protect Black people from racist southern criminal justice systems, Congress had for the first time conferred on the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction to review habeas decisions by lower federal courts. As a result, "[t]he Military Reconstruction Act, intended principally to protect Blacks and loyal whites against harassment by southern state authority . . . had become a federal sword in the hands of an unreconstructed Mississippi editor." Faced with the possibility that the Court might use *McCardle* as a vehicle to strike down the Reconstruction Act, Congress repealed the grant of appellate jurisdiction it had provided just one year earlier. To this day, *McCardle* represents one of the most famous (or infamous) examples of jurisdiction-stripping in Supreme Court history.

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100 *Id.* at 131.
101 *CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 478* (1868).
102 *Id.* at 484.
103 *Id.* at 482.
104 *Id.* at 489.
105 *KUTLER, supra* note 32, at 102; *Friedman, supra* note 29, at 28 (noting that "each side had[d] three times the usual time for oral argument").
106 *KUTLER, supra* note 32, at 102–03.
108 See *KUTLER, supra* note 32, at 100 (calling *McCardle* "one of those rare Supreme Court cases” that has "persistent relevance to the nature of judicial power in the American system of
The jurisdiction-stripping measure was snuck into an uncontroversial bill that, ironically enough, expanded the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in revenue collection cases and passed without debate.\(^{109}\) When Democratic opponents of Reconstruction discovered what had happened, they were livid. This was a deceptive act, they argued, that “must proceed . . . from a consciousness on the part of the majority that their acts are illegal and outside of the Constitution.”\(^ {110}\) Republicans insisted that it was their duty to “clip the wings” of the Supreme Court to prevent the justices from “arrogating to themselves the pretension to settle not merely judicial but political questions” and “declare the laws for the government of the rebel States in every respect unconstitutional.”\(^ {111}\) The raison d’être of the amendment, as Representative Henry Wilson insisted, was “to take away the jurisdiction given by the act of 1867 reaching the McCardle case” for the purpose of “sweeping the case from the docket.”\(^ {112}\)

President Johnson vetoed the Act, insisting that it would “affect most injuriously the just equipoise of our system of Government; for it establishes a precedent which, if followed, may eventually sweep away every check on arbitrary and unconstitutional legislation.”\(^ {113}\) In the debate that followed, Democratic Congressmen argued the legislation was a base attack on the role of the courts in safeguarding liberty: “It closes the doors of the Supreme Court—just opened for the tax-payer—upon every citizen who has been despoiled of his liberty in violation of the Constitution and laws of the Republic, and hands him over to his oppressor, to wear the chain or rot in his dungeon.”\(^ {114}\) Republicans, oddly enough, insisted the measure was “a bill of very little importance” and nothing of great significance would be lost by the repeal of the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction given that “the liberties of this people had been pretty well preserved for three quarters of a century without the act of February 5, 1867.”\(^ {115}\) Senator Lyman Trumbull, who represented the government in McCardle while serving in the Senate, even went so far as to suggest the repeal

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\(^{109}\) Friedman, supra note 29, at 4–5 (“McCardle is commonly taught as a law case, as the precedent sanctioning Congress’s power over the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. But it is difficult when reading McCardle in context not to treat the case as a highly dubious precedent from a Court under pressure—from politics as much as law.”); Grove, supra note 19, at 533 (tracing McCardle’s evolution from “an ‘abhorrent’ precedent to ‘black-letter’ law”) (quoting 100 Cong. Rec. 6258 (1954) (statement of Sen. John Butler) and 152 Cong. Rec. 15,067 (2006) (statements of Rep. Steve King and Rep. Mike Pence)).


\(^{111}\) Id. at 1883, 2062.

\(^{112}\) Id. at 2061–62.

\(^{113}\) Id. at 2094.

\(^{114}\) Id. at 2168.

\(^{115}\) Id. at 2096.
would have no practical effect: “[t]here is no such case as that pending in the Supreme Court.” This led Wisconsin Senator James Doolittle to respond that “[w]e all know, the whole world knows, that this case of McCardle is pending in the Supreme Court” and the law’s proponents “know that these acts will be decided to be unconstitutional. That is the reason why they decide to take away from the court the consideration of the question.” Republican proponents of jurisdiction-stripping did not meaningfully grapple with their opponents’ arguments because they did not have to. On March 27, huge majorities voted to override Johnson’s veto.

Congress successfully checked the Court, preventing it from reaching the merits of McCardle’s case. The Supreme Court could have decided the case after its marathon oral argument, but voted to postpone consideration of the case while the legislation was under consideration by Congress. In a public protest, Justice Robert Grier, joined by Justice Stephen Field, denounced the majority for refusing to decide a case that “involves the liberty and rights not only of the appellant, but of millions of our fellow-citizens.” “By the postponement of the case,” Grier charged, “we shall subject ourselves, whether justly or unjustly, to the imputation that we have evaded the performance of a duty imposed on us by the Constitution, and waited for legislation to interpose to supersede our action and relieve us from our responsibility.” The postponement of the case quashed Southern hopes that the Supreme Court would strike down the Reconstruction Act before the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, which became part of the Constitution on July 9, 1868.

Ultimately, the Supreme Court issued its decision in *Ex parte McCardle* in April 1869, more than a year after Congress pushed through the jurisdiction-stripping measure. The Court’s unanimous opinion, written by Chief Justice Chase, dismissed the case with a sweeping affirmation of congressional power to deprive the Court of jurisdiction, even over a pending case. “Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the

116 *Id.*
117 *Id.* at 2096–97.
118 *Id.* at 2170.
119 See Friedman, *supra* note 29, at 36 (quoting Robert Grier, Public Protest, in *Stephen J. Field, Personal Reminiscences of Early Days in California, with Other Sketches* 210 (1893)).
120 *Id.*
121 Friedman, *supra* note 29, at 31.
122 *Ex parte* McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869).
123 See *id.*
fact and dismissing the cause.”124 According to Chief Justice Chase’s opinion, it did not matter that Congress had taken away the Court’s jurisdiction for the purpose of preventing the Court from deciding McCardle’s constitutional challenge. The Supreme Court insisted that it was not “at liberty to inquire into the motives of the legislature. We can only examine into its power under the Constitution; and the power to make exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction of this court is given by express words.”125

Notably, the Court made clear that Congress had not ousted all appellate habeas jurisdiction; it had simply restricted one avenue for appealing to the Supreme Court, while leaving intact the right to file an original habeas writ in the Supreme Court. In its concluding paragraph, the McCardle Court rejected the view that “if effect be given to repealing act in question . . . the whole appellate power of the court, in cases of habeas corpus, is denied.”126 This, the Court said, was wrong. “The act of 1868 does not except from that jurisdiction any cases but appeals from Circuit Courts under the act of 1867. It does not affect the jurisdiction which was previously exercised.”127 In other words, McCardle was out of luck,128 but other habeas petitioners could still seek Supreme Court review by an original habeas writ—a fact confirmed later in 1869 when the Court held it had jurisdiction over a habeas action filed by Edward Yerger, who had been brought before a military commission for stabbing to death the army officer serving as the Mayor of Jackson, Mississippi.129 But by then, the “storm had passed”: the Fourteenth Amendment had been ratified and all but three states of the former Confederacy had been readmitted to the Union.130

Chase’s opinion deftly ended McCardle’s case and avoided a political clash that could have wreaked havoc on Reconstruction and badly damaged the Court, while also reading the jurisdiction-stripping measure narrowly to preserve judicial review in other cases.131 Going forward, habeas litigants would still have their day in the

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124 Id. at 514.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 515.
127 Id.
128 This alternative basis of jurisdiction might have provided a way for the Court to hear McCardle’s case, but none of the Justices explored this avenue. See Van Alstyne, supra note 107, at 247 (“[S]hould not the Court have proceeded to the merits, acknowledging that the technical basis on which appeal had been perfected from the circuit court had been withdrawn by Congress, but declining to reject the case in view of the existing alternative basis for retaining jurisdiction as confirmed by section 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789?”).
129 Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 105–06 (1869).
130 Friedman, supra note 29, at 37–38 n.217.
131 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 242 (1998) (“On the one hand . . . the Court did acquiesce to Congress at a critical moment of constitutional transformation; on the other, the Court’s opinion did not recognize Congress’s unconditional and
highest court. In a later case that made it easier for pardoned Confederate sympathizers to recover confiscated property, United States v. Klein, Chief Justice Chase's opinion for the Court rejected a broad reading of McCardle and struck down a federal statute that stripped jurisdiction over certain pardon cases because it "prescribe[d] rules of decision to the Judicial Department . . . in cases pending before it" and "with[ed] appellate jurisdiction" simply "as a means to an end."\textsuperscript{132} Klein is a messy, confusing opinion that still befuddles,\textsuperscript{133} but it sent the clear message that the Court took seriously the "vital importance" that legislative and judicial powers "be kept distinct."\textsuperscript{134}

Ultimately, the balance struck by Chief Justice Chase's opinion in McCardle held. In the wake of the Yerger decision, additional bills were introduced that would have stripped the Court's jurisdiction over habeas cases, but they quickly died.\textsuperscript{135} Ultimately, Yerger's case was settled; once Mississippi was readmitted to the Union, the Attorney General announced an agreement transferring his murder case to the state authorities in Mississippi.\textsuperscript{136} By the summer of 1870, "there were no longer any more whites who could bring concrete cases challenging Army administration of Reconstruction."\textsuperscript{137} Jurisdiction-stripping did not rein in the Supreme Court in a lasting way—as the failed bill requiring a supermajority to invalidate an Act of Congress might have—but it succeeded in preventing the Supreme Court from ever considering the constitutionality of the Reconstruction Act. Congress had boxed the Court out of one of the biggest cases of Reconstruction. Eventually, in 1885, Congress would restore the Supreme Court's jurisdiction over appeals from circuit court habeas decisions.\textsuperscript{138}

McCardle illustrates the lengths to which the Reconstruction Congress was willing to go to control the Supreme Court when congressional measures essential

\textsuperscript{133} Friedman, supra note 29, at 34 ("Klein is sufficiently impenetrable that calling it opaque is a compliment.").
\textsuperscript{134} Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 147. For a critique, see Helen Hershkoff & Fred Smith, Jr., Reconstructing Klein, 90 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2023) (manuscript at 11), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4180792 ("Far from glorifying Klein as a case about judicial independence . . . the Court’s assertion of constitutional supremacy should be reconsidered as facilitating political efforts to defeat Reconstruction in ways that suppressed racial equality.").
\textsuperscript{135} Friedman, supra note 29, at 59–60.
\textsuperscript{136} ACKERMAN, supra note 131, at 243–44.
\textsuperscript{137} Id. at 244.
to Reconstruction were in the crosshairs. At the same time, the Reconstruction Congress understood that courts were essential for enforcing the Constitution’s new guarantees of liberty and equality. Despite some occasional talk of annihilating the Supreme Court or eliminating judicial review, members of the Reconstruction Congress ultimately appreciated that “the greatest safeguard of liberty and of private rights” is to be found in the “fundamental law that secures those private rights, administered by an independent and fearless judiciary[.]”

Even as they acted to rein in the Supreme Court, they enacted into law the greatest expansion of federal court jurisdiction in American history. These measures transformed the federal judicial system. The next Section turns to examine the landmark legislation enacted by Congress to hold states and localities accountable for constitutional violations and to remedy abuse of government power.

### C. Justice Reforms During Reconstruction: Opening the Federal Courthouse Doors

The most enduring legacy of court reform during the Reconstruction era lies not in the changes to the size of the Supreme Court and its jurisdiction, but in how the Reconstruction Congress reconfigured the federal judiciary and empowered it to check state abuse of power and enforce the supremacy of the Constitution and federal law. In the span of less than a decade, using the enforcement powers conferred by the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, Congress revolutionized the jurisdiction of the federal courts: (1) it expanded habeas corpus review to provide a remedy for persons held in state custody; (2) it created a cause of action to permit individuals to sue persons acting under color of state law for violating federal rights; (3) it broadened the removal jurisdiction of the federal courts, reflecting members’ concern that state courts would not fairly apply the law to protect Black people and their allies; and (4) it conferred federal question jurisdiction on the federal courts. The Reconstruction Amendments changed the Constitution; Congress’s court reforms changed the tools available to enforce the Constitution.

One of *McCardle’s* deep ironies was the lengths to which the members of the Republican majority went to downplay one of their singular achievements: a seismic expansion of habeas corpus that made the Great Writ available to those held in custody by state governments. At the Founding, the Judiciary Act of 1789 limited habeas corpus to those held in federal custody. Section 14 of the Act provided that “writs of habeas corpus shall in no case extend to prisoners in gaol, unless where they are in custody, under or by colour of the authority of the United States.” No matter how egregious the case, federal courts could not intervene to free a prisoner held in state custody. The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 removed this limitation, empowering federal judges and justices to “grant writs of habeas corpus in all cases

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139 CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 94 (1869).
140 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 82.
where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the Constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United States.”\textsuperscript{141} The first section of the Habeas Corpus Act gave federal courts the power to correct systemic abuses in state criminal justice systems, including the power to hear testimony and find the facts anew; upon finding that “the petitioner is deprived of his or her liberty in contravention of the constitution and laws of the United States,” the Act commanded that “he or she shall forthwith be discharged and set at liberty.”\textsuperscript{142} The 1867 legislation’s second section expanded the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, enabling criminal defendants and others to contest state court decisions upholding state action challenged as inconsistent with the Constitution, treaties, and laws of the United States.\textsuperscript{143}

The debate on the Act stressed that this was “a bill of the largest liberty” that enlarged the scope of the Great Writ, principally to prevent the re-enslavement of Black people under southern Black Codes.\textsuperscript{144} Against the backdrop of horrific criminal justice abuses in the states, the Founding-era limitation of habeas corpus to federal custody proved anomalous. As Senator Lyman Trumbull observed during the debates in the Senate:

\begin{quote}
[A] person might be held under a State law in violation of the Constitution and laws of the United States, and he ought to have in such a case the benefit of the writ, and we agree that he ought to have recourse to United States courts to show that he was illegally imprisoned in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States.\textsuperscript{145}
\end{quote}

Expanding the Great Writ would “secure to the people of the United States their constitutional rights and liberties.”\textsuperscript{146} While Congress had previously provided habeas corpus review of persons held in state custody in certain specific settings in 1833 and 1842 legislation—such as preventing states from using their criminal justice systems to go after federal officials doing their jobs\textsuperscript{147}—the Habeas Corpus Act

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{141} Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385, 385 (amending the Habeas Corpus Act, ch. 81, 12 Stat. 755 (1863)).
\textsuperscript{142} \textit{Id.} at 386.
\textsuperscript{143} \textit{Id.} at 386–87.
\textsuperscript{144} \textit{CONG. GLOBE}, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 4151 (1866); Michael P. O’Connor, \textit{Time Out of Mind: Our Collective Amnesia About the History of the Privileges or Immunities Clause}, 93 Ky. L.J. 659, 712 (2005) (“Only by extending habeas corpus to permit review of state criminal convictions could Congress ameliorate the egregious harm perpetuated under the state Black Codes.”).
\textsuperscript{145} \textit{CONG. GLOBE}, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 4229 (1866).
\textsuperscript{146} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{147} Lee Kovarsky, \textit{Prisoners and Habeas Privileges Under the Fourteenth Amendment}, 67 VAND. L. REV. 609, 658 (2014) (“Neither statute embodied a general habeas power to review state custody, but the 1833 and 1842 Acts established that the habeas privilege could rely on federal judicial power to discharge prisoners from state custody.”).
\end{footnotes}
provided, in sweeping terms, for federal court review of all state deprivations of liberty, reflecting the Reconstruction Congress’s deep distrust of state criminal justice systems.\footnote{David McCord, Visions of Habeas, 1994 BYU L. REV. 735, 739 (1994) ("[T]he Reconstruction Congress . . . authorized federal courts to issue writs of habeas corpus on behalf of state prisoners because of distrust of state criminal justice systems."); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Criminal Prosecutions Affecting Federally Guaranteed Civil Rights: Federal Removal and Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction to Abort State Court Trial, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 793, 818 (1965) (observing that the "Thirty-Ninth Congress thoroughly distrusted the State courts and expected nothing from them but resistance and harassment").} As Chief Justice Chase observed not long after the Act’s passage, "[t]his legislation is of the most comprehensive character. It brings within the \textit{habeas corpus} jurisdiction of every court and of every judge every possible case of privation of liberty contrary to the National Constitution, treaties, or laws. It is impossible to widen this jurisdiction."\footnote{Ex parte McCardle, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 318, 325–26 (1868).} The Constitution’s promise of freedom would be illusory without the right to go to a federal forum to seek release from wrongful imprisonment.\footnote{Kovarsky, supra note 147, at 659 (observing that the "text and legislative history" of the Habeas Corpus Act "sound in the same register of federal supremacy as do the other pieces of Reconstruction legislation—specifically, legislation clearing the path to a federal courthouse"); Jordan Steiker, Incorporating the Suspension Clause: Is There a Constitutional Right to Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners?, 92 MICH. L. REV. 862, 886 (1994) ("The writ known to the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment was not simply a writ of the 'largest liberty' but also a writ essential to federal supremacy.").}

The Act was used almost immediately to strike down apprenticeship laws used to force young Black children to continue to work for their former owners. In the case of \textit{In re Turner}, Chief Justice Chase, riding circuit, ordered Elizabeth Turner “discharged from restraint,” finding the apprenticeship was nothing less than “involuntary servitude.”\footnote{In re Turner, 24 F. Cas. 337, 339–40 (D. Md. 1867) (No. 14, 247).} During the debate over \textit{McCardle}, Senator Lyman Trumbull suggested that the habeas legislation was designed with cases such as these in mind: "it was to meet a class of cases which was arising in the rebel States, where, under pretense of certain State laws, men made free by the Constitution of the United States were virtually being enslaved."\footnote{CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 2096 (1868); see also id. at 2120, 2168.} But nothing in the Act’s sweeping text was limited to these cases, as Democrats regularly pointed out during the 1868 debates.\footnote{See, e.g., id. at 2096.} Maryland Senator Reverdy Johnson conceded Trumbull’s point, but observed that "it was necessary to make the law comprehensive, and it therefore covers all cases in which any man entitled to any right under the Constitution and laws of the United States” challenges his imprisonment as unlawful.\footnote{Id. at 2120; see also id. at 2116 (observing that "the writ of \textit{habeas corpus} is given to protect a man’s liberty").}
breadth, once the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, the Habeas Corpus Act provided a critical means of freeing from confinement persons held in custody in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s commands and redressing systemic abuses in state criminal justice systems.\(^{155}\)

The Habeas Corpus Act fundamentally altered the scope of the Great Writ, interposing the federal courts to protect individuals from unlawful confinement by the states. In other legislation, Congress ensured that individuals could go to federal court to vindicate their basic rights to be free and equal citizens.

The process began at the outset of Reconstruction in the wake of the passage of the Black Codes. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 sought to vindicate the freedom promised by the abolition of chattel slavery by establishing birthright citizenship and guaranteeing citizens of “every race and color . . . the same right to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens.”\(^{156}\) At a time when *Dred Scott* had not yet been formally overruled, Republicans insisted that the Thirteenth Amendment empowered Congress to protect basic civil rights, arguing that the Enforcement Clause was an express grant of power “to secure freedom to all people in the United States.”\(^{157}\) The 39th Congress demonstrated its broad understanding of the enforcement power conferred by the Thirteenth Amendment by passing the Civil Rights Act of 1866 over President Andrew Johnson’s veto, but this fight crystallized the need for more constitutional change. The Fourteenth Amendment, which also included a similar grant of enforcement power, ended any doubts over the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. In no uncertain terms, “Section 5 explicitly delegates to Congress a power to implement the Fourteenth Amendment” and secure fundamental rights and equal citizenship stature.\(^{158}\)

The Civil Rights Act of 1866, the first federal civil rights law in American history, gave the federal courts responsibility for enforcing the rights set forth in the Act, providing the federal district courts with exclusive jurisdiction over “all crimes and offences committed against the provisions of this act.”\(^{159}\) Congress consciously chose not to provide any governmental immunities, refusing to “place[ ] officials

\(^{155}\) Kovarsky, *supra* note 147, at 665 (arguing that “[t]he 1867 Habeas Act and the Fourteenth Amendment were mutually reinforcing features of the federal supremacy established through Reconstruction”); Eve Brensike Primus, *A Structural Vision of Habeas Corpus*, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 14 (2010) ("Federal habeas review . . . was not only about emancipating wrongly convicted individuals; it was about coercing reluctant states to enforce federal rights.").

\(^{156}\) Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27.

\(^{157}\) CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 475 (1866).

\(^{158}\) BARNETT & BERNICK, *supra* note 21, at 253.

\(^{159}\) Civil Rights Act of 1866, § 3.
above the law.” Congress opened the doors of the federal courts to safeguard rights and ensure accountability. Congress did not trust state courts to protect federal rights.

Section 1983, “[e]nacted in 1871 against the backdrop of horrific state and Ku Klux Klan violence aimed at undoing Reconstruction,” used the same template in creating a federal cause of action to permit individuals to enforce constitutional rights in federal court. Prior to the enactment of Section 1983, suits to vindicate constitutional rights often had to be brought in state courts under common law causes of action. Section 1983 changed that by opening the door of the federal courts to suits against “[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws[.]” Going forward, individuals could go directly to federal court to safeguard their rights from infringement by persons acting under color of state law.

The impetus for this seismic shift in the federal-state balance was a reign of terror by the Ku Klux Klan that was winked at or abetted by state and local governments. State courts could not be trusted to vindicate basic rights; indeed, they were part of the problem. The testimony before Congress showed that “the courts are in many instances under the control of those who are wholly inimical to the impartial administration of law and equity. What benefit would result from appeal to tribunals whose officers are secretly in sympathy with the very evil against which we are striving?” Congress refused to leave matters “with the States,” where “large classes of people” were “without legal remedy in the courts.” Section 1983 gave federal

160 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1758 (1866).
161 Id. at 602 (“[W]hy do we legislate upon this subject now? Simply because we fear and have reason to fear that the emancipated slaves would not have their rights in the courts of the slave States.”).
162 David H. Gans, Repairing Our System of Constitutional Accountability, Reflections on the 150th Anniversary of Section 1983, 2022 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 90, 91; see also id. at 95–100.
163 Ann Woolhandler, Patterns of Official Immunity and Accountability, 37 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 396, 399 (1987) (“The predominant method of suing officers in the early nineteenth century was an allegation of common law harm, particularly a physical trespass. The issue of whether the action was authorized by existing statutory or constitutional law was introduced by way of defense and reply when the officer pleaded justification.”).
165 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 394 (1871); id. at 459 (“The arresting power is fettered, the witnesses are silenced, the courts are impotent, the laws are annulled, the criminal goes free, the persecuted citizen looks in vain for redress.”).
166 Id. at app. 252; id. at 653 (“We are driven by existing facts to provide for the several States in the South what they have been unable fully to provide for themselves, i.e., the full and complete administration of justice in the courts.”).
courts the responsibility to “carry into execution the guarantees of the Constitution in favor of personal security and personal rights” by affording an “injured party re-
dress in the United States courts against any person violating his rights as a citizen under claim or color of State authority.” Congress once again interposed the fed-
crational rights because Congress “thoroughly dis-

Like other Reconstruction legislation, Section 1983 was written in the
broader possible language to empower the federal courts to protect the Fourteenth
Amendment’s guarantees and to ensure accountability. Congress insisted that “who-
ever interferes with the rights and immunities granted to the citizen by the Constit-
tution of the United States, though it may be done under State law or State regula-

As in 1866, Congress refused to create
governmental immunities that placed state officials above the law.

During Reconstruction, Congress not only passed landmark statutes that ex-
panded the jurisdiction of the federal courts, it also passed a number of statutes that
allowed defendants sued or criminally prosecuted in state court to remove those
cases to federal court. These enactments reflected congressional concerns that lo-

called criminal processes, giving defendants the right
to stop state court proceedings that all too often were aimed to oppress federal of-

Removal provisions were commonplace during Reconstruction. First during
the Civil War and then during Reconstruction, Congress repeatedly enacted legis-
lation to protect government officers from malicious prosecutions and suits filed
against them. Congress enacted measures permitting federal officers to remove to
federal court cases arising out of the Civil War, and arising out of acts taken to

167 Id. at 374, app. 313.
168 Amsterdam, supra note 148, at 818.
170 See Kutler, supra note 32, at 146–47; Wiecek, supra note 24, at 336–42; Michael G.
171 Amsterdam, supra note 148, at 808–09 (discussing “congressional concern” that litigants
“could not receive a fair trial in hostile state courts, and that the appellate supervision of the
Supreme Court . . . would be inadequate to rectify the decisions of lower state tribunals having
the power to find the facts”).
172 Habeas Corpus Suspension Act, ch. 81, § 5, 12 Stat. 755, 756 (1863) (amended 1866, 1867) (providing for removal of all suits and prosecutions “against any officer, civil or military, or
against any other person, for any arrest or imprisonment made, or other trespasses or wrongs
done” during the course of the Civil War “by virtue or under color of” of presidential or
congressional authority); see also Act of May 11, 1866, ch. 80, § 4, 14 Stat. 46, 46 (amending the
enforce federal revenue laws,\(^{173}\) to enforce the rights protected by the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Freedmen’s Bureau Act,\(^{174}\) and to enforce federal voting rights legislation.\(^{175}\) Removal legislation did not merely protect federal officers doing their job. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 took the momentous step of authorizing removal to federal court of “any suit or prosecution, civil or criminal” brought in state court where the proceedings affected “persons who are denied or cannot enforce” the Act’s protections “in the courts or tribunals of the State or locality where they may be.”\(^{176}\) Faced with the reality that state courts would flout the protections of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, Congress employed removal as a device to bypass state courts unwilling to respect the promise of freedom. For Black people and their white allies, the Reconstruction Congress repeatedly recognized, the federal courthouse “is where they are most likely to have their rights protected” and “where local prejudices are frowned down.”\(^{177}\)

Finally, in 1875, Congress gave federal courts jurisdiction over “all suits . . . arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States,” subject only to a $500 amount-in-controversy requirement.\(^{178}\) In expanding federal court jurisdiction, Congress acted to “confer a jurisdiction just as it is conferred in the Constitution,” ensuring that federal courts would be open to hear all claims under federal law consistent with Article III.\(^{179}\) “This bill,” Senator Matthew Carpenter argued, “gives precisely the power which the Constitution confers—nothing more, nothing

\(^{173}\) Act of July 13, 1866, ch. 184, § 67, 14 Stat. 98, 171 (authorizing removal “in any case, civil or criminal, . . . against any officer of the United States, appointed under or acting by authority” of federal revenue laws “or against any person acting under or by authority of any such officer on account of any act done under color of his office”).

\(^{174}\) Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 3, 14 Stat. 27.

\(^{175}\) Second Force Act, ch. 99, § 16, 16 Stat. 433, 438–39 (1871) (providing for removal in any “suit or prosecution, civil or criminal,” brought in state court “against any officer of the United States, or other person, for or on account, of any act done under the provisions of this act”); see also Wiecek, supra note 24, at 339 (noting the 1871 legislation took steps that “made it yet easier to bypass the state courts”).

\(^{176}\) Civil Rights Act of 1866, § 3 (authorizing removal in “any suit or prosecution, civil or criminal,” brought in state court “against any officer, civil or military, or other person, for any arrest or imprisonment, trespasses, or wrongs done or committed by virtue or under color of authority derived from this act or the act establishing [the Freedmen’s] Bureau” or “for refusing to do any act on the ground that it would be inconsistent with this act”).

\(^{177}\) CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1526 (1866).


\(^{179}\) 2 CONG. REC. 4986 (1874).
The 1875 legislation completed Reconstruction’s great transformation in our judicial system: federal courts, not state courts, were tasked with safeguarding federal rights and maintaining the supremacy of federal law. Federal courts were to be the frontline protection against state infringement of fundamental rights and acts of state oppression and subordination.

These jurisdictional innovations did not produce the kind of immediate changes that court expansion and jurisdiction-stripping wrought, but they transformed our federal judicial system in enduring ways. The expansion of habeas, as the Supreme Court confirmed as early as 1886, empowered a "single judge on habeas" to free “a prisoner, after conviction in a State court[,]”181 “[T]here was no escape” from the fact that “the act of 1867 . . . invested such judge with power to discharge when the prisoner was restrained of his liberty in violation of a law of the United States.”

In the late 19th and early 20th century, the Supreme Court employed habeas review to grant relief to state prisoners in a broad array of circumstances,183 recognizing that “[w]hen a prisoner is in jail he may be released upon habeas corpus when held in violation of his constitutional rights.”184 Other reforms emerged more slowly. It took almost a century before the Supreme Court delivered a major ruling on the scope and meaning of Section 1983, finally recognizing in a 1961 landmark ruling that the statute intended “to give a remedy to parties deprived of constitutional rights, privileges and immunities by an official’s abuse of his position.”185 The Court’s long overdue recognition that Congress created Section 1983 to “interpose the federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians of the people’s federal rights”186 helped revolutionize constitutional litigation.

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180 Id. at 4987.
181 Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 253 (1886).
182 Id.
183 See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (granting habeas relief after determining that the unequal application of the local ordinance violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause); Ex parte Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176 (1889) (approving habeas relief where defendant was denied his fundamental right to be free of double jeopardy); In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160 (1890) (granting habeas relief after determining that the Colorado law justifying petitioner’s solitary confinement was an unconstitutional ex post facto law); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923) (granting habeas relief after determining that petitioners’ state court conviction was obtained through the pressure and domination of a racist mob, which denied the due process of law required by the Fourteenth Amendment); Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672 (1948) (approving habeas relief after determining that the refusal to appoint counsel for an inexperienced eighteen-year-old was a denial of the due process of law required by the Fourteenth amendment).
185 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961); see also id. at 171 (“Section [1983] came onto the books as § 1 of the Ku Klux Klan Act of April 20, 1871.”).
The Court has not always given these statutes their due. Conservative majorities have invented a number of judge-created doctrines that have undermined federal habeas review and Section 1983’s promise of accountability. But it is undeniable that our constitutional system has been fundamentally altered by the efforts of the Reconstruction Congress to open broadly the federal courthouse doors to individuals aggrieved by abuse of state power. More than the efforts to expand or rein in the Supreme Court, the legacy of Reconstruction’s impact on the courts lies in its transformative jurisdictional enactments.

II. LESSONS FOR COURT REFORM FROM RECONSTRUCTION

The story of how the Reconstruction Congress reformed the federal judicial system is undoubtedly a fascinating one. But does it have any modern relevance for today’s battles over the Supreme Court? What can it teach us about court reform more than 150 years later? This Section sketches two payoffs to paying attention to debates over court reform during Reconstruction.

First, at a time when the Supreme Court seems untouchable and unaccountable and calls to reform the Supreme Court are often met by claims that the Court must be left to manage its own affairs,187 Reconstruction provides a critical reminder that the Constitution entrusts to Congress broad powers to reform the Supreme Court and the federal judiciary. During Reconstruction, Republicans who pressed for court reform repeatedly pointed out that the Constitution’s text created the Supreme Court and gave its members life tenure, but left to Congress broad power to decide its size, establish a quorum and voting rules, and set its jurisdiction. Thus, while the Article III judiciary, headed by the Supreme Court, is a separate and coequal branch of government, the Constitution does not leave it to manage its own affairs. Congress can alter the composition of the Supreme Court and has extremely

broad leeway to regulate the jurisdiction or proceedings of the Supreme Court.\textsuperscript{188} Reconstruction offers a valuable reminder of a period in American history when Congress repeatedly exercised these powers.

Added to these powers are those created by the Reconstruction Amendments: the power to enforce constitutional rights. Bitterly aware from \textit{Dred Scott} and other cases that the Supreme Court might fail to honor the promise of liberty, equality, and democracy at the heart of the Reconstruction Amendments, the Framers of those Amendments took pains to ensure that “the remedy for the violation of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments was expressly not left to the courts. The remedy was legislative, because in each the amendment itself provided that it shall be enforced by legislation on the part of Congress.”\textsuperscript{189} Congress produced some of the greatest achievements of Reconstruction using the enforcement power.

Second, Reconstruction provides a lens to evaluate the reforms pursued by Congress. Discussion of court reform often takes place on a highly theoretical level; Reconstruction gives us the opportunity to gauge the successes and failures of the court reforms enacted into law during that era. This is particularly valuable because the Reconstruction Congress employed multiple, overlapping reforms to achieve its aims. Studying the advantages and disadvantages of Reconstruction’s reforms can provide important insights that can inform modern debates over court reform.

Expanding the size of the Supreme Court is often viewed as a nuclear option that will radically transform the institution. Reconstruction complicates this standard account of court expansion.

On the one hand, Reconstruction demonstrates that court expansion can be incredibly strong medicine. Expanding the size of the Supreme Court helped produce the 1871 decision in the \textit{Legal Tender Cases}, which sustained the constitutionality of a federal law that made paper money legal and overruled an 1870 precedent.

\textsuperscript{188} There is a long-running and voluminous debate over the scope of Congress’s power to strip the Supreme Court of jurisdiction. Compare Martin H. Redish, \textit{Text, Structure, and Common Sense in the Interpretation of Article III}, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1633, 1637 (1990) ("[T]he inescapable implication of the text is that Congress possesses broad power to curb the jurisdiction of both the lower courts and the Supreme Court.") (emphasis omitted); Paulsen, \textit{supra} note 12, at 59 (arguing that the “Exceptions Clause power” is “a constitutionally permissible check Congress may employ against a runaway or renegade Supreme Court’s misuse of its case-deciding power”), \textit{with} Henry M. Hart, Jr., \textit{The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic}, 66 H HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1365 (1953) (arguing that “the exceptions [to the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction] must not be such as will destroy the essential role of the Supreme Court in the constitutional plan”); Henry P. Monaghan, \textit{Jurisdiction Stripping Circa 2020: What The Dialogue (Still) Has To Teach Us}, 69 DUKE L.J. 1, 17–18 (2019) ("[T]he Exceptions Clause, which as a textual matter seems to connote something of relatively minor importance, is a strikingly oblique way to endow legislators with the expansive authority to eviscerate completely a central responsibility of another constitutionally ordained branch of government!"). For an overview of the literature, see Sprigman, \textit{supra} note 18, at 1791–1801.

\textsuperscript{189} CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 525 (1872).
to the contrary—one of the quickest reversals in Supreme Court history.\textsuperscript{190} Court expansion led to overruling a prior precedent on a hotly disputed constitutional question. The Justices appointed by President Grant provided the critical votes to overrule the earlier precedent. The \textit{Legal Tender Cases} illustrate that court expansion is an incredibly powerful tool to change a Court that has lost its way.

On the other hand, it is striking that the \textit{Legal Tender Cases} stand alone among cases of the era in which court expansion made a critical difference. A Supreme Court dominated by Lincoln and Grant appointees was responsible for a string of awful rulings that gutted the Fourteenth Amendment. Reconstruction, thus, reminds us that appointments matter: Many of the justices appointed by Republican presidents during Reconstruction, tragically, played a role in burying the promise of the Fourteenth Amendment’s safeguards for liberty and equality.

Court expansion did not harm the Supreme Court’s legitimacy or lead to a death-spiral of retaliation,\textsuperscript{191} but perhaps that reflects that the change to the composition of the Court had less of an effect on the Court’s decision-making than might be expected. Overall, despite multiple changes to the size of the Court, the story of the Supreme Court of the Reconstruction era is more about continuity than change. The hopes of those that, in the Chase Court, “the Constitution . . . may now be interpreted surely for Liberty” were repeatedly dashed.\textsuperscript{192}

Reconstruction, thus, offers a reminder both about the power of court expansion as well as its potential limits. This remains an important lesson—even in today’s radically different circumstances. Does this mean that court expansion is a counter-productive strategy? Certainly not. History—including our own—provides many examples that show that appointments to the Court provide a crucial mechanism of constitutional change.\textsuperscript{193} Court expansion, if enacted, could reverse the packing of the Court by conservatives and halt the 6–3 conservative supermajority’s effort to rewrite huge swathes of constitutional law and imperil basic freedoms long enjoyed by Americans. While court expansion during Reconstruction did not achieve all that Republicans hoped, much of that had to do with the appointments made by Re-

\textsuperscript{190} The \textit{Legal Tender Cases}, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 593 (1871).

\textsuperscript{191} See Braver, supra note 39, at 2785–88 (offering explanations for why such results failed to materialize).

\textsuperscript{192} Letter from Charles Sumner to President Abraham Lincoln (Oct. 12, 1864) (on file with the United States Library of Congress).

\textsuperscript{193} See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, \textit{Understanding the Constitutional Revolution}, 87 Va. L. Rev. 1045, 1067–68 (2001) (“Partisan entrenchment is an especially important engine of constitutional change. When enough members of a particular party are appointed to the federal judiciary, they start to change the understandings of the Constitution that appear in positive law. If more people are appointed in a relatively short period of time, the changes will occur more quickly.”); id. at 1067 (noting that “partisan entrenchment” is “a familiar feature of American constitutional history”).
publican presidents. With the right appointments, court expansion can be a powerful tool to change a Supreme Court that, in case after case, turns its back on our whole Constitution’s core constitutional commitments to safeguard the full promise of liberty, equal citizenship, and an inclusive multiracial democracy. As Reconstruction reminds us, court expansion remains a tool in the congressional arsenal to redress the hardball tactics conservatives used to pack the Supreme Court.\(^{194}\) Indeed, as the Reconstruction debates make clear, the size of the Supreme Court has always been set by Congress and can be changed.

As important as it is, however, court expansion should not be the sole aim of the court reform agenda. Other reforms will continue to be essential, even with an expanded Supreme Court, for two basic reasons. First, the Supreme Court is often reluctant to overrule its precedents construing federal statutes, but Congress is free to override Supreme Court statutory precedents it disagrees with.\(^{195}\) Second, and perhaps even more importantly, only Congress can alter the jurisdiction of the federal courts and create new statutory safeguards for rights now at risk. As Reconstruction teaches us, progressives should not put their eggs in any one basket. A comprehensive, multi-pronged court reform strategy is likely to offer the best chance for success.

Some argue that progressives should scale back the Supreme Court’s powers using jurisdiction-stripping, which the Reconstruction Congress used to great effect to prevent the Supreme Court from hearing *Ex parte McCardle*, a case that threatened to deal a mortal blow to the entire Reconstruction project. Proponents of disempowering reforms argue that it is not enough to simply change the composition of the Supreme Court; instead, they urge “stripping the [C]ourt of its authority and returning our society’s most pressing and important questions to the democratic arena—where progressive causes, backed by popular movements, stand the best chance.”\(^{196}\)

What is the status of *McCardle* today? In *Patchak v. Zinke*, the Supreme Court’s most recent case concerning the constitutionality of jurisdiction-stripping, Justice Thomas and Chief Justice Roberts debated *McCardle*’s legacy.\(^{197}\) Justice Thomas’s plurality opinion invoked *McCardle* to demonstrate that “Congress generally does not violate Article III when it strips federal jurisdiction over a class of cases.”\(^{198}\)

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198 Id. at 906–07.
“[T]he core holding of McCardle,” Thomas insisted, “has never been questioned” and “has been repeatedly reaffirmed.” In dissent, Chief Justice Roberts suggested that McCardle was a dubious precedent from a Court that had been cowed into submission by Congress and should not be read to permit Congress to completely oust Supreme Court jurisdiction. To Roberts, key to McCardle’s holding was the fact that habeas review was not wholly foreclosed. Chief Justice Roberts would have invalidated the jurisdiction-stripping provision in that case on the grounds that it “surpasses even McCardle as the highwater mark of legislative encroachment on Article III.” Congress plainly has the power to control the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction under the Exceptions Clause, but the scope of that power remains a highly-debated question. A bill stripping the Supreme Court of jurisdiction and broadly foreclosing judicial review over constitutional challenges to a law would likely provoke a major constitutional fight. Because of the largely unsettled nature of the question, a Court that sees itself as under attack would likely have doctrinal room to invalidate a congressional jurisdiction strip.

Even if that fight is winnable, progressives should think long and hard before employing jurisdiction-stripping as a tool to prevent the Supreme Court from exercising the power of judicial review. Courts play a fundamentally important role in our system of government in enforcing constitutional limits and checking abuse of power. Even if jurisdiction-stripping might produce short term gains, in the long run, congressional action closing courthouse doors on litigants has the potential to harm the most marginalized in society, who turn to the courts because their rights will not be protected in the political process. Historically, jurisdiction-stripping has been wielded by conservative activists as a way to reverse progressive legal victories.

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199 Id. at 907 n.4.
200 Id. at 921 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that “[t]he facts of McCardle, however, can support a more limited understanding of Congress’s power to divest the courts of jurisdiction” because “the Court’s decision did not foreclose all avenues for judicial review of McCardle’s complaint”).
201 Id.
202 Id.
203 See Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 12, at 178 (noting that “the constitutionality of jurisdiction-stripping proposals remains one of the most significant unanswered questions in the field of federal courts”).
204 See Daniel Epps & Alan M. Trammell, The False Promise of Jurisdiction Stripping, COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2024) (manuscript at 3), https://ssrn.com/abstract=4382211 (“[T]he Court in practice has sufficient doctrinal tools at its disposal to overcome the strip if it saw Congress as subverting judicial authority. Indeed, case law stretching over more than a century strongly suggests that the Court would find a way around a jurisdiction strip that sought to eliminate any possibility of Supreme Court review.”).
in the courts and prevent courts from safeguarding established constitutional rights. \(^{205}\) There are particular risks in progressives taking up this strategy. \(^{206}\)

Jurisdiction-stripping is particularly fraught in today’s legal climate. There are critical differences between Reconstruction and today. At the time of Reconstruction, Congress worried that the Supreme Court would use its habeas jurisdiction to undo Reconstruction. Lower federal courts could be counted on to stay in their lane, but the Supreme Court, Republicans feared, might issue a sweeping ruling that would wreak havoc with Reconstruction. Jurisdiction-stripping solved Congress’s \textit{McCardle} problem, but it is less likely to be a successful strategy in the present moment.

Part of the problem is that the federal judiciary is stocked with conservative jurists, the results of efforts of the Trump administration, together with Senator Mitch McConnell leading a Republican majority in the Senate, to pack the lower courts with conservative ideologues handpicked to move the law far to the right. \(^{207}\) While President Joseph Biden has made it a priority to appoint a cadre of brilliant federal jurists from a wide array of personal and professional backgrounds, with a commitment to uphold the whole Constitution’s text and history, \(^{208}\) the lower federal courts still remain incredibly conservative. Stripping the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction would only empower the lower courts President Trump packed. This makes stripping the Supreme Court of jurisdiction over certain cases less likely to be a successful avenue for reform.

Assume that, in the wake of \textit{Dobbs}, Congress enacted a statute taking away the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to hear cases concerning marriage equality as a way to prevent the Supreme Court from overruling \textit{Obergefell v. Hodges}, which held that state laws that prohibited same-sex couples from marrying violated the fundamental right to marry guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. \(^{209}\) Would that necessarily

\(^{205}\) See \textit{Grove, supra} note 19, at 523 (noting that, in recent decades, “social conservatives sought to eliminate both Supreme Court and inferior federal court jurisdiction over a range of constitutional issues, including abortion, religion, criminal procedure, desegregation, and same-sex marriage”).


leave Obergefell safe? Hardly. Conservative judges in the federal courts of appeal—particularly without the possibility of Supreme Court review—might say that Dobbs had undercut Obergefell and vote to permit states to ban same-sex marriage. In Texas, the Fifth Circuit would have the last word on whether Obergefell remains good law. That is a very scary scenario. A reform that empowers the Fifth Circuit and other deeply conservative federal courts of appeal to declare that Obergefell is no longer binding law would not be progress.210

What if Congress went even further and stripped all federal courts of jurisdiction? The cure might be worse than the disease: states would have the green light to pass the most draconian restrictions imaginable without any federal court review. Some state courts might abide by Obergefell, but others would not. Constitutional rights would be left to the state courts, without any further review. We would have no mechanism for ensuring the protection of fundamental rights and the supremacy of federal law.

Lastly, jurisdiction-stripping puts defenders of constitutional rights in the position of attacking the institution of judicial review. Recall the debates that led to the passage of the statute that stripped jurisdiction over McCardle’s case. Republicans had the votes to pass the bill, but the debates were an embarrassment for them. As Democrats repeatedly pointed out, Republicans were seeking to repeal part of a landmark habeas statute they just enacted in order to deprive McCardle of liberty and prevent the Supreme Court from passing on the constitutionality of a federal statute. Republicans—who throughout Reconstruction often were passionate defenders of the Constitution—had no convincing response. This is not merely a one-off: taking away the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction over constitutional challenges puts congressional proponents in the unenviable position of explaining why the Supreme Court should not be permitted to perform its basic role in our constitutional system.211

Other options to regulate the jurisdiction and proceedings of the Supreme Court might be more attractive. Today, the Supreme Court has virtually complete control of its docket; four justices—less than a majority—can vote to accept review

210 Perhaps Congress could legislate around this problem by enacting jurisdiction-channeling measures, such as directing that certain cases only be heard by the D.C. Circuit, one of the few federal courts of appeal not packed by former President Trump. Directing that cases only be heard in the D.C. Circuit might be feasible for legislation stripping jurisdiction over challenges to a federal statute—say a post-Dobbs federal law protecting access to abortion—but would be more difficult to justify in the context of challenges to state law.

211 See Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Safeguards of Federal Jurisdiction, 124 HARV. L. REV. 869 (2011) (arguing that Article I’s structural safeguards make it incredibly difficult to enact jurisdiction-stripping legislation); Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 12, at 178–79 (“Given the Supreme Court’s perceived role as a protector of rights in American society, many Americans might feel uneasy about a law that sought to shut the courthouse doors entirely for an important class of cases.”).
of a case. As a result, the Supreme Court has the unfettered freedom to take cases purely to pursue its ideological projects. The 2021–2022 term is a case in point: Dobbs and many other landmark cases decided that term were cases in which the Court granted review to move the law to the right, not resolve a split between lower courts. Indeed, as recent empirical work has shown, “the Roberts Court, more than any other Court in history, uses its docket-setting discretion to select cases that allow it to revisit and overrule precedent.”

It is easy to take for granted the idea that the Court chooses its own docket, but it was not always so. For most of American history, in fact, the Supreme Court did not pick its cases, but had mandatory, congressionally-prescribed jurisdiction. The decisive shift came in 1925, when the Justices, led by Chief Justice William Howard Taft, convinced Congress to enact the Judges’ Bill, giving the Court wide-ranging discretion to decide whether or not to hear appeals from the federal courts of appeal. Still, for much of the 20th century, the Supreme Court had significant mandatory jurisdiction. By 1988, Congress, once again at the Justices’ urging, gave the Court virtually complete discretion over its docket. Justice Taft’s vision—that the Justices would exercise “absolute and arbitrary discretion” over the cases it decides—won out.


213 Johnson, supra note 212, at 801 (“The modern Court has effectively abandoned the traditional judicial role of deciding cases in favor of targeting preselected questions. . . . [T]he Supreme Court now uses certiorari to directly engage with the most contentious underlying issues.”); Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years After the Judges’ Bill, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 1643, 1717 (2000) (“The Supreme Court not only chooses which cases to decide, but which questions to answer. Its Justices can no longer say they had to decide the case; even within a case, they cannot even say that they had to decide any particular question.”).

214 Tejas N. Narechania, Certiorari in the Roberts Court, 67 St. Louis Univ. L.J. 587, 592 (2023); see also Tejas N. Narechania, Certiorari in Important Cases, 122 Colum. L. Rev. 923, 966–68 (2022).

215 The story of the enactment of the Judges’ Bill is superbly told in Hartnett, supra note 213.


Central features of the Court’s decision-making processes represent choices made by the Justices which Congress has never formally sanctioned. The rule of four, for example, traces back to Supreme Court practice at the time of the Judges’ Bill, as described by Justice Van Devanter, who told Congress in 1924 that “we proceed on the theory that when as many as four members of the court, and even three in some instances, are impressed with the propriety of taking a case the petition should be granted.”

Is the rule of four sensible? In theory, it “gives each member of the Court a stronger voice in determining the makeup of the Court’s docket.” But, as the current Court illustrates, it also gives the justices leeway to select cases with an eye to changing the law, providing abundant opportunities for ideological judging. On today’s 6–3 conservative Court, the rule of four gives the conservative supermajority unfettered power to load the docket with cases designed to overrule precedent they dislike and move the law to the right, while the Court’s liberals have virtually no opportunity to shape the docket. And, like so many other aspects of the Court’s decision-making process, it is shrouded in secrecy. The Court keeps secret the votes cast whether to hear a case or not.

Others major facets of Supreme Court decision-making are similar. It is undeniable that “the Supreme Court does not so much grant certiorari to particular cases, but rather to particular questions.” How did this come about? The Justices claimed this discretionary power. In the wake of the enactment of the Judges’ Bill, the Court asserted that it need not decide the entire case on appeal, but could select the questions it wanted to answer. The power over question selection—the power to decide what to decide—allows the Court to control its agenda and to reshape the

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220 See Stevens, supra note 212, at 21.

221 See Jeffrey L. Fisher, Opinion, The Supreme Court’s Conservatives Control Even More Than You Realize, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2023), https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/12/opinion/supreme-court-conservative-control.html (“But for the court to reverse a lower court decision refusing to honor a civil liberty, the case first has to be put on its docket. And that seems no longer to be happening in cases involving established rights favored by the liberal wing of the court.”).

222 Hartnett, supra note 213, at 1707.

223 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 455 (1928); Md. Cas. Co. v. Jones, 278 U.S. 596, 596 (1928); see Hartnett, supra note 213, at 1733 (noting that this aspect of the Supreme Court decision-making “appears to have contributed to a mindset that thinks of the Supreme Court more as sitting to resolve controversial questions than to decide cases”).
There is no better example of this than *Citizens United v. FEC*, where the Roberts Court changed the stakes of the case by changing the question at issue to give the Court the opportunity to overrule precedent the conservative majority disliked.\(^{225}\) As Justice Stevens put it, “five Justices were unhappy with the limited nature of the case before us, so they changed the case to give themselves an opportunity to change the law.”\(^{226}\)

For a long time, Congress has given the Court virtually complete control over its proceedings, letting the Court choose what cases to hear and what legal questions to decide. But with the Roberts Court radically remaking the law and crafting judge-made rules that arrogate new powers to itself,\(^{227}\) perhaps the time has come for Congress to use its power to control the Court’s docket. Congress has a number of options to take a more active role over the cases the Court decides. Congress might consider restoring mandatory appellate jurisdiction over certain cases,\(^{228}\) which could bring the Supreme Court in line with constitutional courts around the world that prescribe mandatory jurisdiction to reduce “the opportunities . . . for perceived partisanship and judicial strategizing.”\(^{229}\) Alternatively, Congress can impose new rules regarding the Court’s certiorari jurisdiction, such as increasing the number of votes needed to hear a case, requiring a conflict in the lower courts as a prerequisite to review, or giving the federal courts of appeal a power to certify cases in which judges were divided.\(^{230}\) In addition to reforms directed at the Court’s merits docket, Congress can enact stringent requirements for emergency relief to prevent the conservative supermajority from using the shadow docket to make new law without briefing, oral argument, or publicly available legal reasoning.\(^{231}\) Congress need not give the conservative supermajority unfettered control over its docket.

\(^{224}\) Johnson, *supra* note 212, at 864 (describing the power to select the questions to be answered as “an awesome power that gives the Court the ability to choose what law to declare on its own timetable”).


\(^{226}\) *Id.* at 398 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).


\(^{228}\) Paulsen, *supra* note 12, at 62 (suggesting that prescribing mandatory Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction might “be an effective way to keep the justices out of trouble by keeping them busy with routine case-deciding work”).


A third path forward—one that often is slighted in today’s debates over court reform—builds directly off the greatest achievements of the Reconstruction Congress. When six Justices insist on rolling back fundamental rights and putting accountability further out of reach, Congress should do what it did during Reconstruction: employ its enforcement powers to pass landmark civil rights legislation that opens the courthouse doors and ensures the promise of justice for all Americans. These reforms represent the most enduring legacy of court reform during Reconstruction, and thus are an essential part of court reform. This approach will be vital in the wake of Dobbs. Congress should use its enforcement powers to pass federal legislation protecting the rights the Court has abandoned. Whether the Court grows in size or remains at nine, legislation of this kind will be essential—indeed, it is also necessary to combat how the conservative majority of the Roberts Court has gutted the Voting Rights Act.232 This, too, can draw on precedents set by the Reconstruction Congress, which passed our nation’s first federal civil rights laws to protect fundamental rights that were under attack.

This will not be easy. Any congressional effort to safeguard the right to abortion, the right to vote, and other fundamental rights under attack today will inevitably produce a major constitutional clash between Congress and the conservative wing of the Supreme Court, who have repeatedly jettisoned their supposed fealty to text and history when it comes to the grant of powers given by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment to enforce constitutional freedoms and safeguard equal citizenship stature.233 But if there is a clash between the 6–3 conservative majority and Congress, the fight should be about the fact that the 6–3 Court is rolling back deeply rooted fundamental rights, not about the institution of judicial review, which is a bedrock and widely beloved feature of our constitutional system. A fight over judicial review is one progressives cannot hope to win, as Reconstruction reminds us. Ultimately, rather than attack the courts wholesale, the Reconstruction Congress


233 See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 20, at 1805 (arguing that “modern doctrine has not been faithful to the text, history, and structure of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments”); McConnell, supra note 21, at 194 (arguing that the Court has “erred in assuming that congressional interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment is illegitimate” because “the framers of the Amendment expected Congress, not the Court, to be the primary agent of its enforcement, and that Congress would not necessarily consider itself bound by Court precedents in executing that function”); William Baude, The Real Enemies of Democracy, 109 CALIF. L. REV. 2407, 2414 (2021) (arguing that “Shelby County is vulnerable as a matter of first principles, since the Reconstruction Amendments explicitly grant Congress an enforcement power and were ratified against the background of dramatic federal enforcement against a group of recalcitrant states”).
revitalized the federal judicial system, seeking to make the federal courts bulwarks for freedom and equality. That, too, should be our aim today.

Along these lines, Congress might consider enacting a Congressional Review Act for the Supreme Court, which would establish a fast-track, filibuster-free process to overrule Supreme Court decisions misconstruing federal statutes. The Congressional Review Act, enacted in 1996, allows Congress to review major agency rules and establishes a fast-track process for Congress to overturn the agency rule in question by joint resolution.\(^{234}\) As scholars have argued, the CRA provides a model that would allow Congress to expeditiously respond to Supreme Court rulings that weaken federal statutory rights and powers.\(^{235}\) The Supreme Court Review Act, introduced in 2022 by Senators Sheldon Whitehouse and Catherine Cortez Masto, operates largely along these lines.\(^{236}\) This is an important court reform idea that deserves more consideration.

Some will insist that there is no point passing new enforcement legislation because any new legislation will be worthless so long as the Supreme Court is in the hands of a radical 6–3 majority.\(^{237}\) This is a real concern that Congress must take into account in the drafting process, and likely counsels a multi-pronged approach that includes other reforms, including court expansion. But Congress should not shy away from fulfilling its duty to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments simply because the current conservative majority will look for ways to undermine Congress’s handiwork. If the 6–3 conservative majority guts new enforcement legislation, that will surely signal that more radical reforms are necessary.

What would a court reform statutory agenda look like? Beyond *Dobbs*, at least three other areas cry out for congressional intervention.

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235 Ganesh Sitaraman, *How to Rein In an All-Too-Powerful Supreme Court*, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 16, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/11/congressional-review-act-court/601924; *see also* Christopher J. Walker, *A Congressional Review Act for the Major Questions Doctrine*, 45 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 773, 776 (2022) (urging a CRA-like mechanism that would allow Congress to respond to invalidation of agency rules on major questions grounds by "amend[ing] the agency’s governing statute to authorize expressly the regulatory power that the agency had claimed in the judicially invalidated rule").
236 The Supreme Court Review Act, S. 4681, 117th Cong. 2d Sess. (introduced July 28, 2022); Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, *The Supreme Court Review Act: Fast-Tracking the Dialogue and Destabilizing the Filibuster*, 25 U. PA. J. CON. L. 1, 3 (2023) (arguing that the SCRA is a "good concept").
237 Doerfler & Mystyl, *supra* note 196 ("Right now, the law is whatever five Supreme Court justices say it is. The way to fix this is not to pass new laws, as those five people will just ignore laws they don’t like anyway.").
First, the conservative majority of the Supreme Court continues to decimate our system of constitutional accountability, making it nearly impossible to hold government actors accountable for abuses of the immense power they wield. When state and local government officers are sued for violating constitutionally guaranteed rights, the Supreme Court almost always gives them immunity—even when Congress has expressly provided individuals a right to sue to redress constitutional wrongs.\(^{238}\) It is virtually impossible to sue a federal officer for violating your constitutional rights no matter how egregious the officer’s conduct; the 1971 decision in *Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents*\(^{239}\) is basically a dead letter. Ignoring that the Constitution was framed and ratified against the backdrop of officer accountability, the Supreme Court has conferred on federal officials a form of absolute immunity.\(^{240}\) In its recent decisions, the six-Justice conservative supermajority has continued to ratchet up the protections of the judge-made doctrine of qualified immunity,\(^{241}\) while insisting that they had no authority to permit suits against federal officers without the say-so of Congress.\(^{242}\) In each area, conservative Justices are moving the law far to the right to put accountability out of reach. Congress can reverse these rulings by amending Section 1983 to allow suit against persons acting under color of federal law, which would codify *Bivens*, and by adding language to Section 1983 that would eliminate qualified immunity.\(^{243}\)

Second, habeas corpus review is badly broken. The Supreme Court’s conservative majority has interpreted AEDPA—a 1996 law that has been called “the worst criminal justice law of the past 30 years”\(^{244}\) —to make it nearly impossible to vindicate constitutional rights. AEDPA requires federal courts to defer to state courts

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\(^{238}\) *See Gans, supra* note 162, at 101 (“The text of Section 1983 is as clear as can be: it makes state officials acting under color of state law liable for constitutional violations and provides no immunities from suit. Rather than heeding this text, the Supreme Court has held that all state officials, in fact, must be accorded a broad immunity from suit.”).


\(^{241}\) *Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna*, 142 S. Ct. 4, 8 (2021) (per curiam); *City of Tahlequah v. Bond*, 142 S. Ct. 9, 12 (2021) (per curiam).

\(^{242}\) *Egbert*, 142 S. Ct. at 1800.

\(^{243}\) *See Brandon Hasbrouck, Who Can Protect Black Protest?*, 170 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 39, 47–52 (2022) (discussing *Bivens*); *Gans, supra* note 162, at 117 (“The only way to fix the long line of immunity doctrines devised by the Court is to end them, and to ensure that those wronged by the government can seek justice in the courts.”).

unless they disobey clearly established law, but in the hands of a conservative Supreme Court, this means that federal habeas review will not lie except in cases so egregious that no fair-minded jurist would deny relief.\textsuperscript{245} In a pair of 2022 habeas rulings, the six-Justice conservative majority insisted that AEDPA must be read as restrictively as possible because federal habeas review “intrudes on state sovereignty to a degree matched by few exercises of federal judicial authority”\textsuperscript{246} and is not intended for “[f]ull-blown constitutional error correction.”\textsuperscript{247} The habeas statute—once called a “bill of the largest liberty”\textsuperscript{248}—now rubber-stamps injustices perpetuated by state criminal justice systems.\textsuperscript{249} Even innocence apparently is irrelevant; in the 2022 ruling in \textit{Shinn v. Ramirez}, the Court’s conservative supermajority held that a habeas petitioner who did not present newly gathered evidence of his innocence in the state courts because of his counsel’s incompetence could not present that evidence to a federal court.\textsuperscript{250} In 2023, in \textit{Jones v. Hendrix},\textsuperscript{251} the Court, by a 6–3 vote, held that an incarcerated person cannot file a second habeas petition to claim that they are in jail for engaging in an act that is not a crime or for a longer period of time than the law allows. This crabbed view of the habeas statute, Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson explained in a stinging dissent, “is stunning in a country where liberty is a constitutional guarantee and the courts are supposed to be dispensing justice.”\textsuperscript{252}

Justice Jackson’s dissent in \textit{Jones} laid bare how the Court’s recent case law has squelched the promise of liberty habeas was meant to secure: “these opinions have

\begin{footnotes}
\item[248] CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 4151 (1866).
\item[249] See Brandon L. Garrett & Kaitlin Phillips, \textit{AEDPA Repeal}, 107 CORNELL L. REV. 1739, 1763–64 (2022) (“The barriers to federal habeas corpus introduced by AEDPA—in combination with the ever-more restrictive ways the Supreme Court has interpreted such barriers—have left countless petitioners without an opportunity to bring a federal petition, let alone the ability to access a remedy, even for seemingly clear constitutional violations.”); Diane P. Wood, \textit{The Enduring Challenges for Habeas Corpus}, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1809, 1828 (2020) (discussing how AEDPA “shuts the door on potentially meritorious petitions, whether based on actual innocence, or on one of the other grounds indicating a breakdown in the criminal system or a fundamental failure of justice”).
\item[250] Shinn, 142 S. Ct. 1718 at 1737–39; Radley Balko, Opinion, \textit{In Death Row Case, the Supreme Court Says Guilt Is Now Beside the Point}, WASH. POST (June 1, 2022, 7:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/06/01/arizona-death-row-supreme-court-shinn-innocence.
\item[252] Id. at 1897 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
\end{footnotes}
now collectively managed to transform a statute designed to provide for a rational and orderly process of federal postconviction judicial review into an aimless and chaotic exercise in futility . . . replete with imagined artificial barriers, arbitrary dead ends, and traps for the unwary.”

To undo what Justice Jackson called the “systematic neutering” of habeas, Congress can restore an Article III forum to vindicate constitutional claims by state prisoners by repealing AEDPA.

Third, the conservative majority of the Supreme Court has rewritten federal arbitration laws, ostensibly designed to afford businesses a speedy way to resolve commercial disputes, to give corporations the power to force consumers and employees to have their legal claims resolved through arbitration—in which claims against the company will be decided by a decision-maker chosen by the company—rather than in a court of law. As a result, cases in which corporations violate federal rights are shunted out of court into an arbitral forum slanted in favor of defendants. Even worse, the conservative Court has sanctioned forced arbitration even if the injured individuals cannot effectively vindicate their federal rights in arbitration. The upshot is that “[t]hrough the procedural device of private arbitration,” corporations “have the quasi-lawmaking power to write substantive law largely off the books by precluding or severely impeding the assertion of various civil claims.” Congress could change that by forbidding arbitration agreements that force arbitration of employment, consumer, antitrust, or civil rights disputes. The idea would be to ensure that workers, consumers, and others could go to a federal court of law to vindicate their federally protected rights.

Reforms in these three areas are urgently needed to redress how the Court’s conservative majority has shuttered courthouse doors on those victimized by abuse of power and obstructed accountability. A court reform agenda should include strengthening Section 1983, scrapping AEDPA, codifying Bivens, and ensuring that Americans have a right to go to a court of law to hold corporations accountable for

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253 Id. at 1898 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
254 Id. at 1899 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
255 Garrett & Phillips, supra note 249, at 1764–78 (offering suggestions for fixing AEDPA).
257 See American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 570 U.S. 228 (2013); cf. id. at 253 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“The FAA conceived of arbitration as a ‘method of resolving disputes’—a way of using tailored and streamlined procedures to facilitate redress of injuries. In the hands of today’s majority, arbitration threatens to become more nearly the opposite—a mechanism easily made to block the vindication of meritorious federal claims and insulate wrongdoers from liability.”) (citations omitted).
legal wrongs. Regardless of whether there is court expansion, these are all actions Congress could take to make our federal courts more just.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court is broken. How do we fix it? In wrestling with these questions, we should not forget the lessons of Reconstruction, a moment in American history when the role of the Supreme Court in American life was hotly debated and Congress took many steps to reform both the Supreme Court and our federal judicial system. Employing enforcement powers contained in the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, the Reconstruction Congress enacted a long list of landmark federal civil rights laws that sought to make the federal courts partners in Reconstruction’s project of ensuring true freedom and equal citizenship, opening the federal courthouse doors wide open to rein in state abuse of power and hold states and localities accountable. To this day, these statutes provide a model for court reform that remains critically important in this moment. In the wake of Dobbs, we should not forget the idea at the core of Reconstruction’s legislative constitutionalism: the Supreme Court is not infallible, and Congress has its own express and independent power to protect our most cherished constitutional rights. Progressives should use every chance they get to make the case that court reform is vital to redress how the Supreme Court has betrayed the whole Constitution’s bedrock promises of liberty and equality.

When the Supreme Court runs roughshod over our national charter of liberation, Congress need not sit on the sidelines. The Constitution gives it powerful tools to reform our federal judicial system and ensure that our federal courts—including the Supreme Court—uphold the ideals of liberty and equal justice under law at the core of our Constitution. When the 6–3 conservative majority eviscerates fundamental rights and puts accountability out of reach, Congress can pass statutes to do what the Supreme Court will not: uphold our core constitutional commitments. The story of Reconstruction provides a vital reminder of a period in American history in which Congress repeatedly utilized its powers to make the federal courts instruments of liberty and equality.