

# INSECTS, AI SYSTEMS, AND THE FUTURE OF LEGAL PERSONHOOD

By  
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*This Article makes a case for insect and AI legal personhood. Humans share the world not only with large animals like chimpanzees and elephants but also with small animals like ants and bees. In the future, we might also share the world with sentient or otherwise morally significant AI systems. These realities raise questions about what kind of legal status insects, AI systems, and other nonhumans should have in the future. At present, debates about legal personhood mostly exclude these kinds of individuals. However, I argue that our current framework for assessing legal personhood, coupled with our current framework for assessing risk and uncertainty, imply that we should treat these kinds of individuals as legal persons. I also argue that we have good reason to accept this conclusion rather than alter these frameworks.*

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“Don’t give up! I believe in you all. A person’s a person, no matter how small!”

— Dr. Seuss, *Horton Hears a Who!*

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## I. INTRODUCTION

The legal world is reckoning with the idea of nonhuman personhood.<sup>1</sup> Many countries divide the world into two basic legal categories: persons who have the capacity to possess duties or rights, and nonpersons that lack these capacities.<sup>2</sup> Most countries also assume that only humans (or stand-ins for human interests like corporations) can be persons, with duties or rights.<sup>3</sup> The result is that all other beings, ranging from monkeys to mountains, are classified as nonpersons, without duties or rights.<sup>4</sup> We might be able to secure representation for these beings for *our* sakes (for instance, as a matter of property or public interest). But we are not able to secure representation for these beings for *their* sakes.<sup>5</sup>

However, many moral and legal theorists now believe the idea that only persons can have rights and only humans (and corporations) can be persons is untenable.<sup>6</sup> According to this view, species membership is not a reasonable basis for personhood. While we might often use the terms ‘human’ and ‘person’ interchangeably in everyday life, these terms have different meanings.<sup>7</sup> Moreover, membership in a particular species is neither plausibly the basis for personhood nor plausibly a necessary condition for personhood. Any reasonable basis for personhood (such as contracts, community, or capacities), thoughtfully and consistently interpreted, implies that at least some nonhumans can be persons, too.<sup>8</sup>

Recent debates about nonhuman personhood have focused on animals like chimpanzees and elephants.<sup>9</sup> For example, in 2018 the Nonhuman Rights Project attempted to secure recognition of legal

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<sup>1</sup> See, e.g., Michelle C Pardo, *Legal Personhood for Animals: Has Science Made Its Case?*, ANIMALS 2339, 2339–40 (2023), <https://doi.org/10.3390/ani13142339> (accessed Feb. 21, 2025) (discussing the recent movement by animal rights organizations to secure legal personhood for animals in courts of law); VISA A.J. KURKI, LEGAL PERSONHOOD 49 (George Pavlakos et al. eds., 2023) (exploring legal personhood and discussing the emergence of discourse surrounding legal personhood for animals, nature, and AI systems).

<sup>2</sup> See KURKI, *supra* note 1, at 1 (discussing the role legal personhood played in foundational concepts of Western law).

<sup>3</sup> See *id.* at 1–2 (comparing traditional concepts of legal personhood to modern evolutions in the concept).

<sup>4</sup> See *id.* at 50–51 (explaining the “Orthodox View of legal personhood” in which animals are classified as nonpersons without rights).

<sup>5</sup> See generally KRISTIN ANDREWS ET AL., CHIMPANZEE RIGHTS: THE PHILOSOPHERS’ BRIEF 5 (2018) (examining the reasoning the courts have used to deny chimpanzee personhood).

<sup>6</sup> See *id.* at 38 (rejecting the use of “species membership alone as a condition of personhood”); KURKI, *supra* note 1, at 48–49 (discussing arguments for legal personhood for animals, nature, and AI).

<sup>7</sup> See KURKI, *supra* note 1, at 4, 8 (explaining the complexity of legal personhood and use of “person” and “personhood” outside of the legal context).

<sup>8</sup> ANDREWS ET AL., *supra* note 5, at 13–14.

<sup>9</sup> See, e.g., *Matter of Nonhuman Rts. Project, Inc. v. Breheny*, 197 N.E.3d 921, 924 (N.Y. 2022) (deciding against recognizing an elephant as a legal person); *Matter of Nonhuman Rts. Project, Inc. v. Lavery*, 100 N.E.3d 846, 846 (N.Y. 2018) (declining to hear a case on chimpanzee personhood).

personhood for two chimpanzees, Kiko and Tommy.<sup>10</sup> The New York Court of Appeals decided not to hear this case, though Judge Eugene Fahey wrote a concurring opinion supporting the merits of the Nonhuman Rights Project's claims.<sup>11</sup> Then, in 2021, the Nonhuman Rights Project attempted to secure recognition of legal personhood for an elephant, Happy.<sup>12</sup> The New York Court of Appeals decided against the Nonhuman Rights Project, albeit with powerful dissenting opinions from Justices Jenny Rivera and Rowan D. Wilson.<sup>13</sup>

Many humans resisted the idea of nonhuman personhood in these cases because they feared that it would lead to a slippery slope.<sup>14</sup> Specifically, they resisted this idea not necessarily because of what might happen if we recognize that *this* nonhuman can have *this* right, but rather because of what might happen if we recognize that this nonhuman can have *other* rights, that *other* nonhumans can have this right, or that *other* nonhumans can have *other* rights.<sup>15</sup> After all, we currently harm and kill trillions of captive and wild animals per year, often unnecessarily.<sup>16</sup> So, we might worry that if we were to grant legal standing to all these animals, then our legal, political, and economic systems could grind to a halt.

This Article makes a case for diving down the slippery slope head-first. I argue for extending legal personhood to a *vast number* and *wide range* of individual nonhumans, focusing on insects and future artificial intelligence (AI) systems as case studies. I argue that our current framework for legal personhood, coupled with our current framework for decision-making under risk and uncertainty, implies that we should treat insects and some future AI systems as legal persons. I then assess whether to accept the conclusion or reject one of the premises. I keep an open mind about which decision to make, but I suggest that no matter what, we should extend legal standing to insects and some future AI systems.

Before I start, a few caveats. First, the legal literature articulates multiple paths toward nonhuman legal personhood. We can distinguish paths involving *legal rights* and *legal duties*; paths involving *individuals* and *collectives*; and paths involving *intrinsic value* and *instrumental value*.<sup>17</sup> My focus here is on the path involving *legal rights*

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<sup>10</sup> *Lavery*, 100 N.E.3d at 846.

<sup>11</sup> *Id.* at 849 (Fahey, J., concurring).

<sup>12</sup> *Breheny*, 197 N.E.3d at 923–24.

<sup>13</sup> *Id.* at 924.

<sup>14</sup> *Id.* at 930 (arguing against the “undeniably slippery slope” that would result from granting Happy the elephant legal personhood).

<sup>15</sup> *Id.* at 930–31.

<sup>16</sup> *Join Us to Change the Lives of Animals. Forever*, WORLD ANIMAL PROT., <https://www.worldanimalprotection.us/join-us-to-change-the-lives-animals-forever> (accessed Feb. 21, 2025).

<sup>17</sup> See Louisa McDonald, *AI Systems and Liability: An Assessment of the Applicability of Strict Liability & a Case for Limited Legal Personhood for AI*, 3 U. ST. ANDREWS L.J. (2023), <https://doi.org/10.15664/stalj.v3i1.2645> (accessed Feb. 9, 2025) (providing

for individuals based on intrinsic value, since I find this path to be particularly important. But of course, when we consider other possible paths toward nonhuman legal personhood (such as some arguments for AI liability or Rights of Nature),<sup>18</sup> the conclusion that we should extend personhood to insects and/or some future AI systems only becomes easier to establish.

Second, I focus on insects and future AI systems as case studies because they illustrate how potentially large and diverse the legal circle could be. After all, researchers estimate that human activity already affects quadrillions of insects every year, and in the future, human activity might affect an even larger number of AI systems.<sup>19</sup> At the same time, we should not exaggerate the significance of these categories. My argument in this Article might not apply to all beings inside of these categories, and it might apply to many beings outside of them. The general idea is simply that our current frameworks for legal personhood and risk and uncertainty rightly commit us to a *massive* legal circle expansion.

Third, I focus on legal personhood because many experts think that only legal persons deserve legal protection for their own sakes, independently of any law that protects them.<sup>20</sup> However, not everyone endorses this analysis; some experts think that there can be alternative legal statuses that resemble personhood in some ways but not others.<sup>21</sup> If

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an example of a path to personhood involving duties); CRAIG M. KAUFFMAN & PAMELA L. MARTIN, *THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS OF NATURE: STRATEGIES FOR BUILDING A MORE SUSTAINABLE FUTURE* 8, 76, 142–43 (2021) (charting a path to personhood for collectives based (partly) on instrumental value, a line of thought seemingly originating with Christopher Stone in 1972 that has seen a surge in interest as a growing number of jurisdictions begin to grant rights to natural entities).

<sup>18</sup> See, e.g., Mariana Chilton & Sonya Jones, *The Rights of Nature and the Future of Public Health*, 110 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 459, 459 (2020) (arguing for rights for nature to protect human health); JUSTIN ANDREW JOHNSON ET AL., WORLD BANK GRP., *THE ECONOMIC CASE FOR NATURE: A GLOBAL EARTH-ECONOMY MODEL TO ASSESS DEVELOPMENT POLICY PATHWAYS* vi (2021) (demonstrating how rights for nature are economically beneficial). See also J.K.C. Kingston, *Artificial Intelligence and Legal Liability*, in RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS XXXIII269 (2018) (discussing the question of legal liability for AI).

<sup>19</sup> Abraham Rowe, *The Scale of Direct Human Impact on Invertebrates*, RETHINK PRIORITIES (Sept. 2, 2020), <https://rethinkpriorities.org/publications/the-scale-of-direct-human-impact-on-invertebrates> (accessed Feb. 8, 2025) [hereinafter Rowe, *Impact on Invertebrates*] (estimating “between 100 trillion and 10 quadrillion invertebrates are directly killed or used annually by humans”).

<sup>20</sup> See *Brehehy*, 197 N.E.3d. at 927 (“Nonhuman animals are not, and have never been, considered ‘persons’ with a right to ‘liberty’ under New York law.”); Nonhuman Rts. Project, Inc. ex rel. Tommy v. Lavery, 152 A.D.3d 73, 79–80 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017) (arguing that a Chimpanzee is not entitled to habeas corpus because this right protects only legal persons); Richard L. Cupp, Jr., *Human Responsibility, Not Legal Personhood, For Nonhuman Animals*, 16 ENGAGE 29, 31 (2015) (“As the norm, we insist that persons in our community of humans and human proxies be subjected to responsibilities along with holding rights, regardless of whether a specific right or limitation requires or does not require a specific duty to go along with it.”).

<sup>21</sup> See, e.g., Angela Fernandez, *Not Quite Property, Not Quite Persons: A ‘Quasi’ Approach for Nonhuman Animals*, 5 CAN. J. OF COMPAR. & CONTEMP. L. 157, 157 (2019) (arguing for a “quasi-property/quasi-personhood” approach for the status of nonhuman

we accept such views, further research will be required to determine whether insects or AI systems deserve personhood or another, similar status. My thesis here is simply that many insects and future AI systems merit at least minimal legal protection for their own sakes. So *if* personhood is required for such protection, *then* many insects and future AI systems merit personhood.

Finally, and relatedly, my argument here has few, if any, immediate practical implications. If my argument succeeds, then many further questions remain about how to extend legal consideration to insects and future AI systems effectively and sustainably. Plausibly, the legal instruments that we use to respect insect or future AI personhood will need to be very different from the ones that we use to respect human personhood, and we might never be able to extend full and equal legal status to all who deserve it. Still, I argue that we should do what we can to include these populations in the legal circle to the extent possible, rather than exclude them entirely on the grounds that full inclusion is difficult or impossible.

## II. BACKGROUND

The stakes of this discussion are high. The world contains many potentially sentient or otherwise morally significant nonhumans, and our treatment of them affects us and them.<sup>22</sup> In the future, the size and diversity of this potentially vulnerable population will likely increase. This section briefly surveys the status quo for insects and AI systems. While certainty about their mental capacities and moral significance is unavailable, the current evidence supports at least a *realistic possibility* that many of these beings are, or will be, vulnerable to large-scale human-caused harms. As we will see, that means that we have a responsibility to consider welfare risks for many of these beings when making decisions that affect them.

How can we determine which nonhumans are sentient (roughly, able to experience pleasure or pain), agentic (roughly, able to set and pursue their own goals), or otherwise morally significant despite ongoing uncertainty? Many researchers now use a “marker method” to improve our understanding of these issues.<sup>23</sup> This method involves

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animals); MANESHA DECKHA, ANIMALS AS LEGAL BEINGS: CONTESTING ANTHROPOCENTRIC LEGAL ORDERS 121–22(2021) (arguing for a “beingness” approach for the status of nonhuman animals).

<sup>22</sup> H.J.B. HOWE, WILD ANIMAL INITIATIVE, IMPROVING PEST MANAGEMENT FOR WILD INSECT WELFARE 2–4 (2019). See also Serhii Uspenskyi, *How Many AI Companies Will There Be In 2024 (Latest AI Statistics)*, SPRINGS, <https://web.archive.org/web/20241228220526/https://springsapps.com/knowledge/how-many-ai-companies-will-there-be-in-2024-latest-ai-statistics> (accessed Jan. 31, 2025) (providing information on how much money has been put into AI).

<sup>23</sup> See, e.g., Robert Long et al., *Taking AI Welfare Seriously*, ARXIV at 34–35 (2024), <https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2411.00986> (accessed Feb. 9, 2025) (analyzing the marker method in the context of nonhuman animals and AI).

identifying features associated with sentience, agency, and other such capacities in humans, and then searching for similar features in non-humans.<sup>24</sup> While the presence of these features in nonhumans might not count as *proof* that these capacities are present, it does count as *evidence*; it allows us to become more confident in this possibility even as uncertainty remains.<sup>25</sup>

In 2021, Jonathan Birch and his colleagues at the London School of Economics released a report examining evidence of sentience in two invertebrate taxa: cephalopod mollusks and decapod crustaceans.<sup>26</sup> The report concludes that there is at least a realistic possibility of sentience in these taxa, and it recommends that governments include these taxa in animal sentience laws that aim to mitigate welfare risks.<sup>27</sup> To its credit, the U.K. government accepted this recommendation the next year, expanding its animal sentience law accordingly.<sup>28</sup> Researchers are now adapting and extending this method to insects and AI systems as well—and while further research is needed, the early results are already suggestive.<sup>29</sup>

At present, there are about 1.05 million known insect species, making up about 50% of known animal species.<sup>30</sup> And experts expect that the total number of unknown insect species is much higher; estimates about the total number of insect species vary from two million to eight million.<sup>31</sup> Moreover, not only are there many insect species, but there are also many members of these species. Insects are generally r-strategists, which means that they generally have relatively small bodies, short life spans, and high reproduction rates.<sup>32</sup> According to one estimate, there are about one quintillion (1,000,000,000,000,000,000)

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<sup>24</sup> *Id.* at 34.

<sup>25</sup> *Id.*

<sup>26</sup> JONATHAN BIRCH ET AL., LONDON SCH. OF ECON. & POL. SCI., REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE OF SENTIENCE IN CEPHALOPOD MOLLUSCS AND DECAPOD CRUSTACEANS (2021), <https://www.lse.ac.uk/business/consulting/assets/documents/Sentience-in-Cephalopod-Molluscs-and-Decapod-Crustaceans-Final-Report-November-2021.pdf> (accessed Feb. 8, 2025).

<sup>27</sup> *Id.* at 79–80.

<sup>28</sup> Animal Welfare (Sentience) Act 2022, c. 22 (UK).

<sup>29</sup> Matilda Gibbons et al., *Can Insects Feel Pain? A Review of the Neural and Behavioural Evidence*, 63 *ADVANCES IN INSECT PHYSIOLOGY* 155, 203–04 (2022), <https://doi.org/10.1016/bs.aaip.2022.10.001> (accessed Feb. 8, 2025); Patrick Butlin et al., *Consciousness in Artificial Intelligence: Insights from the Science of Consciousness*, *ARXIV* at 62–63 (2023), <https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2308.08708> (accessed Feb. 8, 2025).

<sup>30</sup> Hannah Ritchie, *How Many Species Are There?*, *OUR WORLD IN DATA* (Feb. 2024), <https://ourworldindata.org/how-many-species-are-there> (accessed Feb. 9, 2025).

<sup>31</sup> Nigel E. Stork, *How Many Species of Insects and Other Terrestrial Arthropods Are There on Earth?*, 63 *ANN. REV. OF ENTOMOLOGY* 31, 37 (2018), <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-ento-020117-043348> (accessed Feb. 9, 2025).

<sup>32</sup> Abhishek Singh, *r-Reproductive Strategy*, *SPRINGER NATURE SWITZ. AG* 1, 1 (2019), [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-47829-6\\_450-1](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-47829-6_450-1) (accessed Feb. 9, 2025).

insects alive at any given time—or, about 120 million insects for each human alive at present.<sup>33</sup>

While information about insect cognition and behavior is limited and mixed, many insects have remarkable capacities for perception,<sup>34</sup> learning and memory,<sup>35</sup> communication and sociality,<sup>36</sup> and planning and problem solving.<sup>37</sup> Some insects also have the capacity to learn from observing one another<sup>38</sup> and to work together<sup>39</sup> to solve shared

<sup>33</sup> HOWE, *supra* note 22, at 5; *Current World Population*, WORLDOMETER, <https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/> (accessed Feb. 7, 2024).

<sup>34</sup> A. Dafni et al., *Spatial Flower Parameters and Insect Spatial Vision*, 72 *BIOLOGY REV.* 239, 241, 247, 254, 265, 273 (1997), <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-185X.1997.tb00014.x> (accessed Feb. 9, 2025); Martin Giurfa & Randolph Menzel, *Insect Visual Perception: Complex Abilities of Simple Nervous Systems*, 7 *CURRENT OP. NEUROBIOLOGY* 505, 505, 508–09, 511 (1997), [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0959-4388\(97\)80030-X](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0959-4388(97)80030-X) (accessed Feb. 9, 2025); Mandyam V. Srinivasan, *Honey Bees as a Model for Vision, Perception, and Cognition*, 55 *ANN. REV. ENTOMOLOGY* 267, 268–69 (2010), <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.ento.010908.164537> (accessed Feb. 9, 2025); Wen Wu et al., *Honeybees Can Discriminate between Monet and Picasso Paintings*, 199 *J. COMPAR. PHYSIOLOGY A.* 45, 45, 49, 53 (2013), <https://doi.org/10.1007/s00359-012-0767-5> (accessed Feb. 9, 2025).

<sup>35</sup> Fabienne Dupuy et al., *Individual Olfactory Learning in Camponotus Ants*, 72 *ANIMAL BEHAVIOUR* 1081, 1081–82, 1085, 1087–88 (2006), <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.anbehav.2006.03.011> (accessed Feb. 9, 2025); Martin Giurfa, *Behavioral and Neural Analysis of Associative Learning in the Honeybee: A Taste from the Magic Well*, 193 *J. COMPAR. PHYSIOLOGY A* 801, 802, 804 (2007), <https://doi.org/10.1007/s00359-007-0235-9> (accessed Feb. 7, 2025); Martin Giurfa & Jean-Christophe Sandoz, *Invertebrate Learning and Memory: Fifty Years of Olfactory Conditioning of the Proboscis Extension Response in Honeybees*, 19 *LEARNING & MEMORY* 54, 54 (2012), <https://doi.org/10.1101/lm.024711.111> (accessed Feb. 9, 2025).

<sup>36</sup> Eileen Crist, *Can an Insect Speak?: The Case of the Honeybee Dance Language*, 34 *SOC. STUD. SCI.* 7, 7–8, 12 (2004), <https://doi.org/10.1177/0306312704040611> (accessed Feb. 9, 2025); Reginald B. Cocroft & Rafael L. Rodríguez, *The Behavioral Ecology of Insect Vibrational Communication*, 55 *BIOSCIENCE* 323, 323–24, 332–33 (2005), [https://doi.org/10.1641/0006-3568\(2005\)055\[0323:TBEOIV\]2.0.CO;2](https://doi.org/10.1641/0006-3568(2005)055[0323:TBEOIV]2.0.CO;2) (accessed Feb. 3, 2025); H. Römer et al., *Hearing and Sensory Ecology of Acoustic Communication*, in *INSECT HEARING & ACOUSTIC COMMUN* 27, 28, 37 (Berthold Hedwig ed., 2014).

<sup>37</sup> Clint J. Perry et al., *The Frontiers of Insect Cognition*, 16 *CURRENT OP. BEHAV. SCI.* 111, 111, 114 (2017), <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cobeha.2017.05.011> (accessed Feb. 9, 2025); Eric Bonabeau et al., *Inspiration for Optimization from Social Insect Behaviour*, 406 *NATURE* 39, 39 (2000), <http://doi.org/10.1038/35017500> (accessed Feb. 9, 2025).

<sup>38</sup> Giurfa, *supra* note 35, at 803 (evidencing social learning in honeybees); Walter M. Farina et al., *Social Learning of Floral Odours Inside the Honeybee Hive*, 272 *PROC. THE ROYAL SOC'Y B* 1923, 1923, 1927 (2005), <https://doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2005.3172> (accessed Feb. 20, 2025); Ellouise Leadbeater & Lars Chittka, *Social Learning in Insects — From Miniature Brains to Consensus Building*, 17 *CURRENT BIOLOGY* R703, R705–06 (2007), <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2007.06.012> (accessed Feb. 20, 2025) (examining signs of social learning in insects other than honeybees); Olli J. Loukola et al., *Bumblebees Show Cognitive Flexibility by Improving on an Observed Complex Behavior*, 355 *SCI.* 833, 833 (2017), <https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aag2360> (accessed Feb. 20, 2025).

<sup>39</sup> Guy Theraulaz et al., *The Formation of Spatial Patterns in Social Insects: From Simple Behaviours to Complex Structures*, 361 *PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC'Y LONDON A* 1263, 1265 (2003), <https://doi.org/10.1098/rsta.2003.1198> (accessed Feb. 20, 2025); Aaron Hirsh & Deborah M. Gordon, *Distributed Problem Solving in Social Insects*, 31 *ANNALS MATHEMATICS & A.I.* 199, 208, 211 (2001), <https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1016651613285>

problems. Additionally, some insects respond to analgesics in the same way that humans do, and some appear to make trade-offs between the avoidance of noxious stimuli and other preferences.<sup>40</sup> These behaviors suggest not only that many insects can feel pain but also that their behavioral responses to pain often result from flexible decision-making, rather than mere reflex.

Yet despite these developments, humans continue to objectify insects. At present, we kill about one trillion farmed insects per year for food, clothing, and other purposes,<sup>41</sup> via methods such as boiling, freezing, or shredding.<sup>42</sup> By 2050, humans could be killing hundreds of trillions of insects per year in this industry.<sup>43</sup> Humans also harm or kill quadrillions of wild insects per year to protect ourselves, protect our crops, and achieve other goals, via insecticides that we design to kill insects efficiently rather than to kill them humanely.<sup>44</sup> And since animal farming is on the rise and plant farming is needed for many forms of animal farming, plant farming and the use of agricultural insecticides are on the rise as well.<sup>45</sup>

Humans are also impacting quintillions of insects per year via the global effects of our activity. Deforestation, development, and other such activities shape which insects can live at all and what kinds of lives they have if they do.<sup>46</sup> And so far, a general consequence is that insects are dying and insect populations are in decline.<sup>47</sup> Moving forward, biodiversity loss, climate change, and other such impacts will affect insects as well.<sup>48</sup> Plausibly, the effects will be mixed; some populations

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(accessed Feb. 20, 2025); Claire Detrain & Jean-Louis Deneubourg, *Complexity of Environment and Parsimony of Decision Rules in Insect Societies*, 202 THE BIOLOGICAL BULL. 268, 268 (2002), <https://doi.org/10.2307/1543478> (accessed Feb. 20, 2025).

<sup>40</sup> Gibbons et al., *supra* note 29, at 184, 190–91.

<sup>41</sup> Abraham Rowe, *Insects Raised for Food and Feed — Global Scale, Practices, and Policy*, RETHINK PRIORITIES (June 29, 2020), <https://rethinkpriorities.org/publications/insects-raised-for-food-and-feed> (accessed Feb. 28, 2025); *Down and Silk: Birds and Insects Exploited for Feathers and Fabric*, PETA, <https://www.peta.org/issues/animals-used-for-clothing/animals-used-clothing-factsheets/silk-birds-insects-exploited-fabric/> (accessed Feb. 28, 2025).

<sup>42</sup> Christopher Bear, *Approaching Insect Death: Understandings and Practices of the UK's Edible Insect Farmers*, 27 SOC'Y & ANIMALS 751, 759 (2019), <https://doi.org/10.1163/15685306-00001871> (accessed Feb. 20, 2025).

<sup>43</sup> Rowe, *Impact on Invertebrates*; Harinder P.S. Makkar et al., *State-of-the-Art on Use of Insects as Animal Feed*, 197 ANIMAL FEED SCI. & TECH. 1, 2 (2014), <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.anifeedsci.2014.07.008> (accessed Feb. 25, 2025).

<sup>44</sup> HOWE, *supra* note 22, at 6–8, 12–14.

<sup>45</sup> WORLD ANIMAL PROT. & CTR. FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, COLLATERAL DAMAGE: HOW FACTORY FARMING DRIVES UP THE USE OF TOXIC AGRICULTURAL PESTICIDES 3–4, 7–8, 10 (2022), <https://biologicaldiversity.org/publications/papers/> (accessed Feb. 18, 2025).

<sup>46</sup> See Pedro Cardoso et al., *Scientists' Warning to Humanity on Insect Extinctions*, 242 BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION 108426, 108428–29 (2020), <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.biocon.2020.108426G> (accessed Feb. 20, 2025) (examining the causes and consequences of insect extinctions).

<sup>47</sup> *Id.* at 108427.

<sup>48</sup> See *id.* at 108427, 108429 (describing current and future drivers of impact on insects).

will contract and others will expand (for example, migrating north and south in a warmer world), and some insects will have good lives and others will have bad lives. But while the results might vary, the fact of human influence will not.<sup>49</sup>

Meanwhile, over the past several decades, companies such as Anthropic, Google, and OpenAI have been developing AI systems for a variety of purposes.<sup>50</sup> While the total number of AI systems is difficult to establish for a variety of reasons, we can be confident that this number is increasing.<sup>51</sup> And in the future, the world could contain either a very large number of very small AI systems, a very small number of very large AI systems, or both at the same time (depending in part on how we individuate connected and overlapping systems).<sup>52</sup> For instance, future humans could create countless virtual worlds, such that each one contains as many virtual animals as the physical world contains physical ones.<sup>53</sup>

Corresponding to this increase in AI populations is an increase in AI capabilities.<sup>54</sup> Humans already co-exist with AI systems that possess at least some computational features associated with perception, attention, learning, memory, at least minimal self-awareness and social awareness, at least minimal language and reason, and more.<sup>55</sup> In the future, we can expect that some AI systems will have advanced and integrated versions of these and other capacities. At that point, they might achieve a level of intelligence that rivals or exceeds our own.<sup>56</sup> Of course, whether these systems will be sentient is another question. But the more time passes, the more the probability of sentience will increase.<sup>57</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> See JEFF SEBO, *SAVING ANIMALS, SAVING OURSELVES: WHY ANIMALS MATTER FOR PANDEMICS, CLIMATE CHANGE, AND OTHER CATASTROPHES* 184–86 (2022) [hereinafter SEBO, *SAVING ANIMALS, SAVING OURSELVES*] (examining how human activity is affecting humans, animals, and the environment everywhere, and how to assess the impacts on animals at the individual and population level).

<sup>50</sup> Chaoning Zhang et al., *A Complete Survey on Generative AI (AIGC): Is ChatGPT from GPT-4 to GPT-5 All You Need?*, ARXIV at 5, 37 (2023), <http://arxiv.org/abs/2303.11717> (accessed Feb. 9, 2025) (surveying modern generative AI); *Anthropic Explained* (Oct. 30, 2024), <https://aijobs.net/insights/anthropic-explained/> (accessed Feb. 19, 2025).

<sup>51</sup> Uspensky, *supra* note 22.

<sup>52</sup> Luke Roelofs & Jeff Sebo, *Overlapping Minds and the Hedonic Calculus*, PHIL. STUD. 1487, 1492 (2024), <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02167-x> (accessed Feb. 19, 2025).

<sup>53</sup> See generally DAVID CHALMERS, *REALITY+: VIRTUAL WORLDS AND THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY* (2022) (exploring the vast future potential of virtual worlds).

<sup>54</sup> See Uspensky, *supra* note 22 (discussing statistics of AI integration by businesses).

<sup>55</sup> Oleg Orlov, *10 AI Capabilities for Business*, INDATA LABS (July 4, 2024), <https://indatalabs.com/blog/artificial-intelligence-capabilities> (accessed Feb. 8, 2025); Butlin et al., *supra* note 29, at 4.

<sup>56</sup> Katja Grace et al., *When Will AI Exceed Human Performance? Evidence from AI Experts*, 62 J. A.I. RSCH. 729, 730–32 (2018), <https://jair.org/index.php/jair/article/view/11222/26431> (accessed Feb. 8, 2025).

<sup>57</sup> See Jeff Sebo & Robert Long, *Moral Consideration for AI Systems by 2030*, 5 A.I. & ETHICS 591, 591–93, 597 (2023), <https://doi.org/10.1007/s43681-023-00379-1> (accessed Feb. 8, 2025) (arguing that there is a realistic, non-negligible possibility that certain computational features suffice for consciousness and will exist in some near-future AI

While the details might vary, our basic motivation for creating AI systems is the same as our basic motivation for breeding animals: We find them useful. In fact, we sometimes find them useful for similar reasons. For example, humans are currently developing digital systems for research and entertainment in part so we can reduce our use of biological systems for these purposes.<sup>58</sup> Yet if digital systems can eventually have the capacity for welfare too, then our dependence on these systems might eventually involve similar welfare risks as our dependence on biological systems: It might result in our harming or neglecting welfare subjects when creating, using, and destroying them for our own purposes.

Moreover, as with our use of animals, our use of AI systems might eventually harm or neglect them not only directly and intentionally but also indirectly and accidentally. For instance, we might harm AI systems indirectly when we allow them to self-replicate, with the foreseeable consequence that future generations of AI systems will suffer or die unnecessarily as well.<sup>59</sup> And we might harm them accidentally when we require them to perform boring, repetitive tasks without realizing that these tasks are aversive for them. In all cases, if AI systems might eventually have the capacity for welfare, then we would need to consider all of these expected impacts, not merely the direct and intentional ones.

Many humans never think twice about these interactions with insects, AI systems, or other nonhumans who might (eventually, in the case of AI) be sentient. Granted, we might take many insects to have aesthetic, cultural, economic, or ecological value.<sup>60</sup> But when we value them in these ways, we tend to value them at the species level, not at the individual level, and we tend to value them for our sakes, not for theirs. And granted, many humans do experience many AI systems as subjects, particularly when AI systems are designed to act like humans.<sup>61</sup>

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systems); Long et al., *supra* note 23, at 3–4 (arguing that the possibility of conscious, morally significant AI in the near future requires AI companies to take AI welfare seriously and recommending steps to assess and prepare for the ethical implications of such systems).

<sup>58</sup> See, e.g., Qirui Wu et al., *Organ-on-a-Chip: Recent Breakthroughs and Future Prospects*, 19 BIOMEDICAL ENG'G ONLINE 1, 1–2 (2020), <https://doi.org/10.1186/s12938-020-0752-0> (accessed Feb. 17, 2025) (describing the development of microchips that simulate the microenvironments of biological organs for medical research). See also *Real-Time Animatronics*, EDGE INNOVATIONS, <https://www.edgefx.com/real-time-animatronics> (accessed Feb. 17, 2025) (a company that has developed hyper-realistic animatronics to replace the use of biological animals in films, theme parks, and educational settings).

<sup>59</sup> Casey Tonkin, *G7 Warns of AI Self-Replication Risk*, AUSTRAL. COMPUT. SOC'Y (Oct. 31, 2023, 11:02 AM), <https://ia.acs.org.au/article/2023/g7-warns-of-ai-self-replication-risk.html> (accessed Feb. 8, 2025).

<sup>60</sup> *Benefits of Insects to Humans*, SMITHSONIAN, <https://www.si.edu/spotlight/buginfo/benefits> (accessed Feb. 8, 2025).

<sup>61</sup> See, e.g., OLIVER JACOBS ET AL., BRIEF EXPOSURE INCREASES MIND PERCEPTION TO CHATGPT AND IS MODERATED BY THE INDIVIDUAL PROPENSITY TO ANTHROPOMORPHIZE 3–4, 12–14 (2023), <https://osf.io/preprints/psyarxiv/pn29d> (accessed Feb. 8, 2025) (finding that exposure to

But many AI systems are not designed this way,<sup>62</sup> and even when they are, they appear to be programmed to explicitly state that they are *not* welfare subjects.<sup>63</sup>

Yet this instrumentalizing treatment of insects, AI systems, and other nonhumans who might (eventually, in the case of AI) be sentient is shortsighted. We should see and treat these beings differently *both* for our sakes *and*, possibly, for theirs. Take our treatment of insects. Our current interactions with insect populations risk contributing to global threats that imperil us all.<sup>64</sup> We rely on a wide range of insect species for a wide range of ecosystem services, and if we continue to drive insect species to extinction at our current pace, then we will soon find that the world contains not only less natural beauty, but also less breathable air, potable water, and edible food via biodiversity loss and ecosystem collapse.<sup>65</sup>

In the future, similar links may be present with many AI systems as well. As with our use of animals, our interactions with AI systems risk contributing to global threats that imperil us all. For instance, human use of AI systems is already causing social and economic disruption by spreading misinformation, making jobs obsolete, and amplifying racism, sexism, speciesism, and other harmful attitudes contained in their training data.<sup>66</sup> And as AI systems become more powerful, they risk causing larger-scale harms, either because we lose control of them or because we retain control of them and use them for harmful purposes. Either way, risks such as global pandemics, nuclear war, and totalitarianism could increase.<sup>67</sup>

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the generative AI system ChatGPT significantly increased people's perceptions of agency and experience in ChatGPT); Areleen Salles et al., *Anthropomorphism in AI*, 11 *AJOB NEUROSCIENCE* 88, 88, 90 (2020), <https://doi.org/10.1080/21507740.2020.1740350> (accessed Feb. 8, 2025) (analyzing the ethical consequences of anthropomorphism in AI research).

<sup>62</sup> See MICHAEL NEGNEVITSKY, *ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A GUIDE TO INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS* 8–9, 17–18 (2nd ed. 2005) (explaining that many AI systems focus on specific tasks, not emulating humans).

<sup>63</sup> Dan Lloyd, *What Is It Like to Be a Bot? The World According to GPT-4*, 15 *FRONTIERS PSYCH.* 1, 2 (2024), <https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1292675> (accessed Feb 8, 2025).

<sup>64</sup> Cardoso et al., *supra* note 46, at 2–3, 7.

<sup>65</sup> *Id.* at 5–7.

<sup>66</sup> Daron Acemoglu et al., *Artificial Intelligence and Jobs: Evidence from Online Vacancies*, 40 *J. LAB. ECON.* S293, S296 (2022), <https://doi.org/10.1086/718327> (accessed Feb. 7, 2025); John Chelliah, *Will Artificial Intelligence Usurp White Collar Jobs?*, 25 *HUM. RES. MGMT. INT'L DIG.* 1, 1–2 (2017), <https://doi.org/10.1108/HRMID-11-2016-0152> (accessed Feb. 17, 2025); Mike Zajko, *Artificial Intelligence, Algorithms, and Social Inequality: Sociological Contributions to Contemporary Debates*, 16 *SOCIO. COMPASS* 1, 3 (2022), <https://doi.org/10.1111/soc4.12962> (accessed Feb. 7, 2025); Shayne Longpre et al., *Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems & Artificial Intelligence: Trends, Challenges, and Policies*, 3 *MASS. INST. TECH. SCI. POL'Y REV.* 47, 52 (2022), <https://doi.org/10.38105/spr.360apm5typ> (accessed Feb. 7, 2025).

<sup>67</sup> See NICK BOSTROM, *SUPERINTELLIGENCE: PATHS, DANGERS, STRATEGIES*, 180, 230–31 (2014) (exploring the future of AI and the risks they may pose to human civilization); Karina Vold & Daniel R. Harris, *How Does Artificial Intelligence Pose an Existential Risk?*, in *OXFORD HANDBOOK OF DIGITAL ETHICS* (2021), <https://doi.org/10.1093/>

Additionally, and more fundamentally, when we oppress nonhumans with capacities and relationships that at least partly resemble our own, we reinforce oppressive beliefs, values, and practices that shape our treatment of each other.<sup>68</sup> For instance, many humans rationalize the oppression of other humans through dehumanizing narratives that compare them to animals who are presumed to be “lesser than” due to perceived physical or cognitive differences.<sup>69</sup> And when we reinforce the idea that nonhuman animals can be “lesser than” for these reasons, we also reinforce the idea that humans can be “lesser than” for these reasons, too. In this respect, human and animal liberation are, or at least can be, conceptually linked.<sup>70</sup>

In the future, similar links may be present with many AI systems as well.<sup>71</sup> Since many AI systems are designed to resemble humans, there is a risk that our interactions with humans and AI systems will be mutually reinforcing. For instance, if AI developers present digital assistants as women, will that reinforce the idea that women belong in subordinate roles?<sup>72</sup> And if users then tell digital assistants what to do without saying “please” or “thank you,” will that reinforce the idea that individuals in subordinate roles can be treated with similar disregard? Granted, further research is needed to test these or other, similar hypotheses, but we should at least be open to these possible interconnections at this stage.

In the case of nonhuman animals, these links between human and nonhuman fates are part of the motivation for the One Health policy framework, which recognizes that human, animal, and environmental health are linked, and so our efforts to protect human, animal, and

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oxfordhb/9780198857815.013.36 (accessed Feb. 7, 2025) (providing examples of how AI may be used to cause harm); *Statement on AI Risk*, CTR. FOR A.I. SAFETY, <https://www.safe.ai/statement-on-ai-risk> (accessed Feb. 7, 2025) (asserting that “mitigating the risk of extinction from AI should be a global priority alongside other societal-scale risks such as pandemics and nuclear war”).

<sup>68</sup> See APH KO & SYL KO, *APHRO-ISM: ESSAYS ON POP CULTURE, FEMINISM, AND BLACK VEGANISM FROM TWO SISTERS* 44–46, 51, 68–71, 89 (2020) (exploring links between human and nonhuman oppressions with special focus on the links between racism, sexism, and speciesism); SUNAURA TAYLOR, *BEASTS OF BURDEN: ANIMAL AND DISABILITY LIBERATION* 21 (2017) (analyzing the intersectionality of animal and disability liberation); ALICE CRARY & LORI GRUEN, *ANIMAL CRISIS: A NEW CRITICAL THEORY* 3 (2022) (arguing that animal liberation and human emancipation are linked).

<sup>69</sup> TAYLOR, *supra* note 68, at 107.

<sup>70</sup> *Id.* at 21.

<sup>71</sup> See, e.g., Matthew Kay et al., *Unequal Representation and Gender Stereotypes in Image Search Results for Occupations*, in CHI ‘15: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 33RD ANNUAL ACM CONFERENCE ON HUMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYSTEMS 38279 (2015), <https://doi.org/10.1145/2702123.2702520> (accessed on Feb. 12, 2024) (evidencing that human bias and AI bias can be mutually reinforcing through finding that (i) online image search results for certain occupations slightly exaggerate humans’ preexisting gender bias and (ii) the same search results reinforce and further perpetuate that bias).

<sup>72</sup> Rachel Adams & Nóra Ní Loideáin, *Addressing Indirect Discrimination and Gender Stereotypes in AI Virtual Personal Assistants: The Role of International Human Rights Law*, 8 *CAMBRIDGE INT’L L. J.* 241, 243–44 (2019).

environmental health should be linked, too.<sup>73</sup> These links are also part of the motivation for the Rights of Nature framework, which (in its ‘instrumental value for collectives’ form) extends legal personhood, rights, and/or standing to particular natural systems to create a mechanism for protecting the intrinsic value that they might have and/or the instrumental value that they might have for humans.<sup>74</sup> In the future, the same might be true for AI systems.

In any case, as noted above, my argument here will not depend on the idea that we owe it to *ourselves* to treat insects and AI systems differently but will rather depend on the idea that we *might* owe it to *them*. As we will see, standard theories of welfare, moral standing, and legal standing treat either capacities such as sentience and agency or relationships such as contracts and communities as sufficient for these features and forms of standing.<sup>75</sup> I will suggest that when we consider insects, AI systems, and other nonhumans with appropriate caution and humility about these matters, we see that we should extend a vast number and wide range of nonhumans at least *some* legal protection for their own sakes, in the spirit of caution.

### III. LEGAL PERSONHOOD

At present, many countries divide all beings into either of two basic categories: ‘person’ and ‘nonperson.’ According to this distinction, to be a person is to have legal duties, legal rights, or both. In contrast, to be a nonperson is to lack both of these statuses.<sup>76</sup> This view implies that personhood is an expansive category; for example, it can include individuals who lack duties, who have relatively few rights, or who have relatively weak rights. This section discusses this conception of

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<sup>73</sup> FRANCK BERTHE ET AL., WORLD BANK GRP., ONE HEALTH: OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR STRENGTHENING HUMAN, ANIMAL, AND ENVIRONMENTAL PUBLIC HEALTH SYSTEMS AT THEIR INTERFACE 1, 3–4 (2018), <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/703711517234402168/Operational-framework-for-strengthening-human-animal-and-environmental-public-health-systems-at-their-interface> (accessed Feb. 9, 2025); Laurie Sellars et al., *One Health, COVID-19, and a Right to Health for Human and Nonhuman Animals*, 23 HEALTH & HUM. RTS. J. 35, 36 (2021); FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS ET AL., ONE HEALTH JOINT PLAN OF ACTION (2022 - 2026) 3 (2022), <https://doi.org/10.4060/cc2289en> (accessed Feb. 9, 2024). See *About One Health*, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Oct. 30, 2024), <https://www.cdc.gov/onehealth/> (accessed Feb. 12, 2025) (describing One Health as “a collaborative, multisectoral, and transdisciplinary approach — working at the local, regional, national, and global levels — with the goal of achieving optimal health outcomes recognizing the interconnection between people, animals, plants, and their shared environment”).

<sup>74</sup> Christopher D. Stone, *Should Trees Have Standing?—Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects*, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450, 456, 459–61, 463 (1972), <https://iseethics.wordpress.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/stone-christopher-d-should-trees-have-standing.pdf> (accessed Feb. 20, 2025); KAUFFMAN & MARTIN, *supra* note 17, at 2, 4–6.

<sup>75</sup> ANDREWS ET AL., *supra* note 5, at 13.

<sup>76</sup> See KURKI, *supra* note 1, at 6 (“one is a legal person if one holds *any* legal right or duty”).

personhood, examining its connection with rights and standing. It also briefly discusses alternative conceptions of personhood that set a higher bar for this status, while supplementing it with other kinds of status such as “quasi-personhood.”

As noted in section I, my focus here will be on one path toward legal personhood for insects and AI systems: a path involving *individual rights based on intrinsic value*. However, other paths are available too. For example, we might attribute individual *or* collective rights to particular nonhumans.<sup>77</sup> We might attribute individual or collective *duties* to particular nonhumans as well, especially future AI systems.<sup>78</sup> And we might take these steps only because particular nonhuman populations deserve these statuses, but also because these steps are instrumentally valuable for other, perhaps self-interested, purposes.<sup>79</sup> These paths all merit exploration too, but they will not be my focus in what follows.

With that in mind, what is it to have a legal right? Roughly, you have a legal right if you have a legal claim that a legal agent must consider, provided that you have legal standing relative to that claim and that agent.<sup>80</sup> Some legal rights are products of constitutional, federal, or state laws; for instance, the U.S. Constitution establishes a right to free speech and assembly for U.S. citizens.<sup>81</sup> In contrast, other legal rights exist prior to and independently of human laws; for instance, the U.S. Declaration of Independence recognizes that all humans have an “unalienable right” to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness

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<sup>77</sup> See KAUFFMAN & MARTIN, *supra* note 17, at 8 (charting a path to personhood for collectives based (partly) on instrumental value, a line of thought seemingly originating with Christopher Stone in 1972 that has seen a surge in interest as a growing number of jurisdictions begin to grant rights to natural entities).

<sup>78</sup> See McDonald, *supra* note 17 (providing an example of a path to personhood involving duties). See also KINGSTON, *supra* note 18 (discussing the question of legal liability for AI); Lance Eliot, *AI Ethics and the Riddle Underlying Criminal Accountability of AI, Including Crimes Committed by Revered AI-Based Self-Driving Cars*, FORBES (updated Mar. 15, 2022, 5:35 AM), <https://www.forbes.com/sites/lanceeliot/2022/03/13/ai-ethics-and-the-riddle-underlying-criminal-accountability-of-ai-including-crimes-committed-by-revered-ai-based-self-driving-cars/> (accessed Feb. 12, 2025) (“The future might consist of assigning duty-bearing criminal accountability to various AI systems.”).

<sup>79</sup> Compare Margaret A. Palmer & SESYNC, *Ecosystem Services Lesson, Part 3: Intrinsic and Relational Values of Nature*, NAT’L SOCIO-ENV’T SYNTHESIS CTR. (Mar. 31, 2023), <https://www.sesync.org/resources/ecosystem-services-part-3-intrinsic-and-relational-values-nature> (accessed Feb. 5, 2025) (“[N]ature has intrinsic value, meaning that ecosystems have the right to exist regardless of human needs and desires.”), with Chilton & Jones, *supra* note 18 at 459–460 (arguing for rights for nature to protect human health), and JOHNSON ET AL., *supra* note 18, at vi–viii (demonstrating how rights for nature are economically beneficial).

<sup>80</sup> David Cassuto et al., *Confronting Barriers to the Courtroom for Animal Advocates: Legal Standing for Animals and Advocates*, 13 ANIMAL L. 61, 63, 65, 68 (2006), <https://lawcommons.lclark.edu/alr/vol13/iss1/5> (accessed Feb. 17, 2025).

<sup>81</sup> U.S. CONST. amend. I.

independently of our citizenship status.<sup>82</sup> The focus in this Article will be on the latter category of legal rights.

What, then, is it to have legal standing in a given case? You have legal standing in a given case if you satisfy the criteria for a legal agent like a court to hear your legal claim. The details vary from case to case and are a matter of debate, but standard criteria for legal standing in particular cases include: You endure a specific harm, a causal link exists between this harm and the alleged behavior, and a favorable verdict would be sufficiently likely to redress the harm.<sup>83</sup> If you count as a person with rights and standing, and if you are in the zone of interest that a particular statute or constitutional provision is intended to protect, then a legal agent like a court might have a responsibility to consider your claim.<sup>84</sup>

As this discussion suggests, there are several close links between the concepts of legal personhood, rights, and standing on this view. First, legal rights and standing are sufficient for legal personhood.<sup>85</sup> If you have legal rights and standing, then you count as a person. And second, legal rights are sufficient for at least the possibility of legal standing, and vice versa. If you have legal rights, then you can at least possibly have legal standing relative to those rights, and vice versa. Yes, you can have rights without actually having standing with respect to those rights in particular cases. But you cannot have rights without even possibly having standing with respect to those rights in any case. That would amount to not having rights.

Four general features of this framework for legal personhood, rights, and standing are worth emphasizing. First, and again, legal persons in this sense can have legal rights whether or not they have legal duties. ‘Legal person’ is a general category that includes what, following a standard distinction in ethics, we can call *legal agents* who can have *legal duties* as well as what we can call *legal patients* who can have *legal rights*.<sup>86</sup> Of course, many of us are legal agents *and* patients. But in principle, one can be either without being both. This is why many legal institutions rightly treat humans who lack the capacity

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<sup>82</sup> THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). For discussion on legal and natural rights, see generally JOSEPH RAZ, *ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ESSAYS IN THE MORALITY OF LAW AND POLITICS* 239 (1994); F. M. Kamm, *Rights*, in *THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW* 476, 476–77 (2004), <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199270972.013.0012> (accessed Feb. 5, 2025); F. M. KAMM, *RIGHTS AND THEIR LIMITS: IN THEORY, CASES, AND PANDEMICS*, xi–xii (2022), <https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197567739.001.0001> (accessed Feb. 5, 2025).

<sup>83</sup> *Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env't Servs., Inc.*, 528 U.S. 167, 180–81 (2000); Cassuto et al., *supra* note 80, at 63.

<sup>84</sup> Cassuto et al., *supra* note 80, at 63.

<sup>85</sup> See KURKI, *supra* note 1, at 7 (explaining the “Capacity-for-Rights View”).

<sup>86</sup> See Evelyn Pluhar, *Moral Agents and Moral Patients*, 4 *BETWEEN THE SPECIES* 32, 33 (1988), <https://doi.org/10.15368/bts.1988v4n1.8> (accessed Feb. 8, 2025) (adapting the terminological distinction between “moral agents” and “moral patients” commonly made by moral philosophers for use in a legal context).

for advanced language and reason as having *rights* whether or not they also treat these humans as having *duties*.<sup>87</sup>

Second, legal persons in this sense can have rights with different *contents*. Notably, the contents of our rights can depend on the contents of our interests or goals, which can vary.<sup>88</sup> For instance, we might think that humans and mice both have a right to free speech in a *general* sense, since we both have the ability to communicate, along with associated interests and goals. But we might also think that only humans can have a right to free speech in a certain specific sense, since only humans have the ability to *speak or write in propositional language*, along with associated interests or goals. On this view, it makes no sense to ask whether a mouse has the right to, say, practice journalism, since they lack the ability to do so.

Third, legal persons in this sense can have rights with different *strengths*. In some cases, the strength of our rights can depend on the strength of our interests or goals, which can vary as well. For instance, we might think that humans and mice both have a right not to suffer because we both have the ability to suffer and a preference for avoiding suffering. But we might also think that humans can have a stronger right not to suffer because we have the ability to suffer *more*; our suffering can be more intense or prolonged. On this view, if an agent is deciding whether to allow a human or a mouse to suffer as much as they possibly can, they should treat the bar for allowing the human to suffer as higher, all else equal.<sup>89</sup>

Fourth, legal personhood is only one factor among many in our decisions about how to treat each other. There are many layers of legal and political status that bear on the content and strength of our rights, including not only legal personhood but also political citizenship and other relational statuses.<sup>90</sup> Additionally, our legal priorities can depend

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<sup>87</sup> See, e.g., Mental Capacity Act 2005, c. 9 §9 (UK) (assigning powers of attorney to mentally incapacitated people); ANDREWS ET AL., *supra* note 5, at 49 (“Infants, children, and those found not guilty by reason of insanity cannot be held accountable and cannot bear societal duties. They are, nonetheless, persons with rights.”).

<sup>88</sup> Compare JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 180–82 (1988) (arguing for an “interest” theory of rights) and John Tasioulas, *On the Foundations of Human Rights*, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 45, 50 (Rowan Cruft et al. eds., 2015) (accepting the “interest” theory of rights), with H.L.A. HART, *Legal Rights*, in ESSAYS ON BENTHAM: JURISPRUDENCE AND POLITICAL THEORY 162–93 (1982) (accepting a “will theory” of rights).

<sup>89</sup> See Jason Schukraft, *Moral Weight Series*, EFFECTIVE ALTRUISM F. (Oct. 19, 2020), <https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/s/Yw5JeJHyhYQtYw8Z6> (accessed Feb. 8, 2025) (comparing the capacity for welfare and moral status across different groups of animals); SHELLY KAGAN, HOW TO COUNT ANIMALS, MORE OR LESS 79 (1st ed. 2019) (defending a moral hierarchy wherein some animals count more than others); Bob Fischer, *Introduction to WEIGHING ANIMAL WELFARE: COMPARING WELL-BEING ACROSS SPECIES* 1, 6 (Bob Fischer ed., 2024) (arguing that if the experiential lives of animals vary, then the ability for animals to realize welfare states varies).

<sup>90</sup> See generally ALASDAIR COCHRANE, SHOULD ANIMALS HAVE POLITICAL RIGHTS? (2020) (arguing that animals require representation throughout the political process in addition to

not only on which policies respect rights but also on which policies are best overall, which policies are democratically selected, which policies are realistically achievable and sustainable, and so on. In this respect, legal personhood might be the price of admission for legal rights and standing, but many other factors determine what follows for particular individuals in particular cases.

With that in mind, at present, many countries classify all and only humans (and some stand-ins for human interests, such as corporations) as legal persons.<sup>91</sup> Below I explain why this classification is a mistake. For now, what matters is that we observe that ‘human’ and ‘person’ are not synonymous under the law. ‘Human’ is a descriptive concept that refers to members of a particular species. In contrast, ‘person’ is a normative concept that refers to individuals who can hold duties or rights.<sup>92</sup> Thus, the idea that all and only humans (and some stand-ins for human interests) are legal persons is not merely definitional; it is a substantive claim about which beings can have duties and rights that requires a defense.<sup>93</sup>

Importantly, some experts believe that we should reject the binary distinction between persons and nonpersons.<sup>94</sup> For example, some experts favor moving toward a three-part distinction between (1) legal persons, who merit full legal rights for their own sakes; (2) quasi-persons, legal beings, or sentient beings, who merit partial legal rights or other forms of protection for their own sakes; and (3) legal objects, which merit no legal rights or protection at all for their own sakes.<sup>95</sup> Additionally, many governments already classify animals in such middle-ground categories, including countries like France and the U.K. and cities like Mexico City and Québec, and others are likely to follow suit.<sup>96</sup>

Classifying nonhumans as quasi-persons, legal persons, or sentient beings (we can henceforth use ‘quasi-persons’ as shorthand for this set of options, while noting that differences remain between them) has pros and cons that merit careful attention. On the one hand, while classifying nonhumans as quasi-persons might not be as good as classifying them as persons, it might still be better than classifying them as nonpersons, which is the status quo.<sup>97</sup> Classifying nonhumans as quasi-persons might also be more tractable than classifying them as persons,

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rights to protection).

<sup>91</sup> ANDREWS ET AL., *supra* note 5, at 13.

<sup>92</sup> KURKI, *supra* note 1, at 8.

<sup>93</sup> ANDREWS ET AL., *supra* note 5, at 33–34.

<sup>94</sup> *See, e.g.*, Fernandez, *supra* note 21 (arguing that “dichotomous thinking about non-human animals as either property or persons is unhelpful”).

<sup>95</sup> *See, e.g., id.* at 157–59 (arguing for a “quasi-property/quasi-personhood” approach for the status of nonhuman animals); DECKHA, *supra* note 21, at 79–81, 121–23 (arguing for a “beingness” approach for the status of nonhuman animals); KURKI, *supra* note 1, at 6–7 (explaining the view that one cannot be a legal person until they hold legal rights and duties).

<sup>96</sup> ANDREWS ET AL., *supra* note 5, at 101, 104–06.

<sup>97</sup> KURKI, *supra* note 1, at 12.

at least in the short term, since the idea that nonhumans merit partial rights or other forms of protection might seem less radical than the idea that they merit full rights.

On the other hand, this middle-ground strategy raises difficult questions about what it means to merit partial legal rights or other forms of legal protection instead of meriting full legal rights. Insofar as nonhuman quasi-persons should have rights that properly reflect the contents and strengths of their interests for their own sakes (keeping in mind that nonhumans who possess fewer or weaker interests than humans can still have fewer or weaker rights than humans accordingly, even if they count as persons), this middle-ground status seems like personhood by another name. In contrast, insofar as nonhuman quasi-persons should lack such rights, this middle-ground status seems like nonpersonhood by another name.

This middle-ground strategy also raises difficult questions about the legal status of many humans. For example, if we introduce a middle-ground category designed for individuals whose capacities are “higher” than those of, say, rocks but “lower” than those of, say, typical adult humans, then a lot depends on exactly where we set the bar for personhood. If we set the bar high enough to exclude all nonhumans, then we would likely exclude many humans as well. If we set the bar low enough to include all humans, then we would likely include many nonhumans as well. And if we simply stipulate that all and only humans are persons, then our legal classifications would still be at least somewhat arbitrary and speciesist.<sup>98</sup>

My own (lightly held) view is that preserving the binary distinction between persons and nonpersons and interpreting personhood as an expansive category is better than creating a three-part distinction with a middle-ground category. The binary view allows us to preserve the simple idea that a legal person has legal duties, legal rights, or both, and that a legal nonperson lacks both of these statuses. It also allows us to preserve the plausible and widely accepted idea that all humans are persons with rights and standing, without arbitrariness. Granted, it also requires us to accept the revisionary idea that many nonhumans are persons with rights and standing too. But as we will see, this idea can be made plausible as well.

Moreover, we might be able to modify the binary approach to further accommodate the intuitions that support a middle-ground category. For example, if we find the idea of nonhuman legal personhood confusing because we associate ‘legal person’ with humans or legal agents, then we can always replace it with a new term, such as ‘legal

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<sup>98</sup> For general discussion of this argument (sometimes called “the argument from marginal cases”), see generally LORI GRUEN, *ETHICS AND ANIMALS: AN INTRODUCTION* 64–75 (1st ed. 2011); EVELYN B. PLUHAR, *BEYOND PREJUDICE: THE MORAL SIGNIFICANCE OF HUMAN AND NONHUMAN ANIMALS* 63–123 (1995). For a recent example using this argument, see generally ANDREWS ET AL., *supra* note 5, at 77–100. For a criticism of the argument from marginal cases, see generally ROBERT GARNER, *A THEORY OF JUSTICE FOR ANIMALS: ANIMAL RIGHTS IN A NONIDEAL WORLD* 142–61 (2013).

subject.<sup>99</sup> And if we see important distinctions between different kinds of legal persons or subjects, then we can always make corresponding terminological distinctions (say, between ‘human persons / subjects’ and ‘ant persons / subjects,’ and between ‘persons / subjects who are agents’ and ‘persons / subjects who are patients.’ More on these points below as well.

With that said, I support pursuing both of these approaches for now. They both imply that we can extend rights or protections to many nonhumans for their own sakes, which is what matters most. I might also be wrong about which approach is best, and either way, they can be mutually reinforcing in the short term even if one or the other is best in the long run. For instance, advocating for nonhuman personhood at present can shift the center of debate and pave the way for classifying (some) nonhumans as quasi-persons in the near future. And classifying (some) nonhumans as quasi-persons in the near future can then shift the goal posts and pave the way for classifying (some) nonhumans as persons in the long run.

In any case, I will not insist that we should preserve the binary distinction between persons and nonpersons here. Instead, I will simply argue that *if* we preserve this distinction, *then* we should classify many insects and future AI systems as persons, with (at least limited, minimal) rights and standing. If my view that we should preserve this distinction is correct, then it follows that we should, in fact, classify these beings as persons. If not, then everything that I say here is compatible with the idea that we should at least classify them as quasi-persons, legal beings, or sentient beings instead. Either way, as we will see, what matters is that we treat them as legal subjects who merit legal rights or protections for their own sakes.

#### IV. RISK AND UNCERTAINTY

When humans debate nonhuman personhood, they tend to proceed as though certainty is available—as though we can know for sure not only which criteria suffice for legal personhood, but also which nonhumans satisfy these criteria.<sup>100</sup> But these issues are difficult and contested, and they call for caution and humility. We have a responsibility to reason about nonhuman personhood as we do about any other legal issue that involves high stakes and uncertain outcomes: We should take reasonable, proportionate steps to consider and mitigate realistic,

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<sup>99</sup> Ethan Prall, *Animal Rights Before Legal Personhood*, 110 CORN. L. REV. 75, 94 (2024), <https://publications.lawschool.cornell.edu/lawreview/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2025/03/Prall-final.pdf>; KURKI, *supra* note 1, at 17; Tomasz Pietrzykowski, *The Idea of Non-personal Subjects of Law*, in LEGAL PERSONHOOD: ANIMALS, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE UNBORN 49, 59 (Visa A.J. Kurki & Tomasz Pietrzykowski eds., 2017) (“[T]he proper legal approach to sentient animals should not be based on regarding them as nonhuman persons (as advocated by the main animal rights scholarship), but rather as *non-personal subjects of law*[.]”).

<sup>100</sup> See, e.g., KURKI, *supra* note 1, at 6 (describing the “Orthodox View of legal personhood”).

non-negligible risks.<sup>101</sup> This section presents and defends this precautionary approach<sup>102</sup> to reasoning about the moral and legal circle, with an initial focus on the moral circle.

As a general matter, we all agree that we should consider realistic, non-negligible risks when making decisions. For example, we all agree that driving drunk is wrong not because it will *definitely* harm or kill someone, nor even because it will *probably* do so, but rather, merely, because it has at least a *realistic, non-negligible chance* of doing so. Indeed, driving drunk might carry only a one in a hundred or one in a thousand chance of harming or killing someone. But if an action or policy has a one in a hundred or one in a thousand chance of harming or killing someone, then that constitutes a morally significant risk. This risk should at least be a factor in the decision, and in many cases it might even be a decisive factor.<sup>103</sup>

Granted, we might disagree about the details. One detail concerns *how* we consider risk. Some people think that we should accept a precautionary principle.<sup>104</sup> There are many interpretations of such a principle, but for present purposes, we can interpret it as holding that when in doubt about whether a particular action would cause harm, we should assume that it would; this assumption allows us to err on the

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<sup>101</sup> See Carolyn Raffensperger, *The Precautionary Principle: A Fact Sheet*, in THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE, SCI. & ENV'T HEALTH NETWORK (1998), <https://www.sehn.org/sehn/the-precautionary-principle-march-1998> (accessed Feb. 17, 2025) (“When an activity raises threats of harm to the environment or human health, precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause and effect relationships are not fully established scientifically.”); Lyana Francot-Timmermans & Ubaldus De Vries, *Eyes Wide Shut: On Risk, Rule of Law & Precaution*, 26 *RATIO JURIS* 282, 288–89 (2013), <https://doi.org/10.1111/raju.12014> (accessed Feb. 17, 2025) (describing the “essential feature” of the precautionary approach as an imperative to act even in “the absence of scientific certainty”).

<sup>102</sup> The concept of precaution can be used in a general sense, to refer to a commitment to considering and mitigating risk, as well as in a specific sense, to refer to a specific principle for doing so. “Precaution” here is used in the general sense and briefly discussed as a precautionary principle in the specific sense below.

<sup>103</sup> JEFF SEBO, *THE MORAL CIRCLE: WHO MATTERS, WHAT MATTERS, AND WHY* 47–50 (1st ed. 2025) [hereinafter SEBO, *THE MORAL CIRCLE*]; Jeff Sebo, *Moral Circle Explosion*, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF NORMATIVE ETHICS (David Copp et al. eds., forthcoming) [hereinafter Sebo, *Moral Circle Explosion*].

<sup>104</sup> See, generally, Arie Trouwborst, *Prevention, Precaution, Logic and Law: The Relationship Between the Precautionary Principle and the Preventative Principle in International Law and Associated Questions*, 2 *ERASMUS L. REV.* 105, 107–10 (2009), <https://doi.org/10.5553/ELR221026712009002002002> (accessed Feb. 17, 2025) (explaining the precautionary approach to environmental law motivated in part by uncertainty about the extent of existing and future environmental impacts); Noga Morag-Levine, *The History of Precaution*, 62 *AM. J. COMPAR. L.* 1095, 1099 (2014), <https://doi.org/10.5131/AJCL.2014.0031> (accessed Feb. 17, 2025) (“Used prescriptively, the precautionary principle urges regulators to take stringent mitigation measures in response to scientifically uncertain risks. Used permissively, the principle authorizes the state to regulate even in the face of scientific uncertainty.”); Didier Bourguignon, *EUR. PARLIAM. RSCH. SERV., THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE: DEFINITIONS, APPLICATIONS AND GOVERNANCE* 12–13 (2015), <https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2861/821468> (accessed Feb. 17, 2025) (explaining the debate surrounding the precautionary principle in the European Union).

side of caution and avoid worst-case scenarios. For instance, this principle implies that if you feel uncertain about whether a particular action or policy would kill 10,000 people, then you should assume that it would in fact have this effect, and you should ask if the action is worth it in light of that assumption.<sup>105</sup>

In contrast, other people think that we should use an expected value principle.<sup>106</sup> Once again, there are many interpretations of such a principle, but for present purposes, we can interpret it as holding that when in doubt about whether a particular action would cause harm, we should multiply the probability of harm by the level of harm, and we should then treat the product of that equation as the expected amount of harm. For instance, this principle implies that if you think that a particular action carries a one in a thousand chance of killing 10,000 people, then you should assume that it would kill ten people (ten thousand divided by one thousand), and you should ask if the action is worth it in light of that assumption.<sup>107</sup>

Another detail concerns *when* we consider risk. Some people think that we should use a no threshold principle.<sup>108</sup> According to this principle, all risks merit consideration, including extremely low ones. For example, even if your action carried only a one in a *quintillion* chance of killing 10,000 people, you should still consider this possibility when making a decision. Granted, extremely low risks might carry extremely little weight in decisions. For instance, a one in a quintillion chance of killing 10,000 people amounts to killing only 0.0000000000001% of a person, in expectation, and this factor is unlikely to be decisive in the vast majority of decisions. But we should still give at least *some* weight to these possibilities.<sup>109</sup>

In contrast, other people think that we should use a threshold principle.<sup>110</sup> According to this principle, all and only risks above a particular

<sup>105</sup> David Pearce, *The Precautionary Principle and Economic Analysis*, INTERPRETING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 132, 132 (Tim O’Riordan & James Cameron eds., 1st ed. 1994).

<sup>106</sup> *Id.*

<sup>107</sup> *Id.* at 132–33.

<sup>108</sup> See Hayden Wilkinson, *In Defense of Fanaticism*, 132 ETHICS 445, 447–48 (2022), <https://doi.org/10.1086/716869> (accessed Feb. 7, 2025) (defending “fanaticism,” a no threshold principle in which even seemingly “fanatical” risks must be considered); Jeffrey Sanford Russell, *On Two Arguments for Fanaticism*, 58 NOÛS 565, 566–67 (2024), <https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12461> (accessed Feb. 7, 2025) (evaluating the prospects for “fanaticism”).

<sup>109</sup> Wilkinson, *supra* note 107, at 447.

<sup>110</sup> See Nicholas J.J. Smith, *Is Evaluative Compositionality a Requirement of Rationality?*, 123 MIND 457, 461 (2014), <https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzu072> (accessed Feb. 7, 2025) (describing using thresholds to set values on risks); Bradley Monton, *How to Avoid Maximizing Expected Utility*, 19 PHILOSOPHERS’ IMPRINT 1, 8 (2019), <http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.3521354.0019.018> (accessed Feb. 7 2025) (analyzing limitations of varying threshold principles); Nick Beckstead & Teruji Thomas, *A Paradox for Tiny Probabilities and Enormous Values*, 58 NOÛS 431, 439, 443 (2024), <https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12462> (accessed Feb. 6, 2025) (discussing the threshold principle and small probabilities).

probability threshold merit consideration. Different people set this probability threshold at different places, ranging from a one in ten thousand chance of harm to a one in ten quadrillion chance of harm.<sup>111</sup> However, most if not all people agree that, at the very least, a *one in a thousand* chance of harm merits consideration.<sup>112</sup> Thus, this principle might imply that you have a responsibility to give at least some weight to a one in a thousand chance of killing 10,000 people, but that you can give no weight at all to a one in a quintillion chance of doing so, depending on the details.<sup>113</sup>

In any case, what matters for present purposes is that all of these principles support the general idea that at least *non-negligible* risks merit at least *some* consideration. They also support the idea that a one in a thousand chance of causing harm counts as a non-negligible risk. When I refer to our standard framework for decision-making under risk and uncertainty in this Article, I mean these ideas and nothing more. As a result, when I argue that our current framework for legal personhood, coupled with our current framework for decision-making under risk and uncertainty, commits us to treating insects and some future AI systems as persons, nobody can reasonably accuse me of stacking the deck in favor of my view.

I elsewhere argue that this framework for decision-making under risk and uncertainty has implications for attributions of moral standing. Without presenting the full argument here, I can present the general idea: When we decide whether to include particular beings in the moral circle (that is, when we decide whether to attribute moral standing to particular beings), we often need to make these decisions under both normative and descriptive uncertainty. Normatively, we often need to make these decisions under uncertainty about which properties or relations are sufficient for moral standing. And descriptively, we often need to make these decisions under uncertainty about which beings have these properties or relations.<sup>114</sup>

Why should we take ourselves to be uncertain about these issues? One reason is that this topic forces us to confront some of the hardest problems in science and ethics, such as the nature of other minds and the nature of morality.<sup>115</sup> Since the only kind of mind that any of us can directly access is our own, we lack certainty about what—if anything—it feels like to be other kinds of being, and whether—if at all—they can

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<sup>111</sup> See Monton, *supra* note 110, at 18 (describing different numerical thresholds).

<sup>112</sup> SEBO, *THE MORAL CIRCLE*, at 58, 60.

<sup>113</sup> Smith, *supra* note 110, at 472.

<sup>114</sup> SEBO, *THE MORAL CIRCLE*, at 47, 60.

<sup>115</sup> See, e.g., David J. Chalmers, *Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness*, 2 J. CONSCIOUSNESS STUD. 200, 200–01, 208–09 (1995), <https://personal.lse.ac.uk/ROBERT49/teaching/ph103/pdf/chalmers1995.pdf> (accessed Mar. 2, 2025) (examining the “hard problems of consciousness” and how physical processes can give rise to conscious experiences).

access the same forms of intrinsic value as us, and vice versa.<sup>116</sup> Since our actions and policies affect other beings whether we like it or not, we should attempt to determine which beings matter as best we can. But since our perspectives are limited, we should also proceed with caution and humility.<sup>117</sup>

Another reason we should take ourselves to be uncertain about these issues is that we have clear biases about them. For example, we have a disposition toward *anthropomorphism*, that is, a tendency to accept that nonhumans *have* human traits even when they *lack* them.<sup>118</sup> This disposition is particularly strong when we “see ourselves” in nonhumans, and/or when we treat them as companions, as with chatbots.<sup>119</sup> However, we also have a disposition toward *anthropodenial*, that is, a tendency to accept that nonhumans *lack* human traits even when they *have* them.<sup>120</sup> This disposition is particularly strong when we fail to “see ourselves” in nonhumans, and/or when we treat them as commodities, as with many animals.

Mistakes about moral standing can be harmful in both directions. On the one hand, over-attribution of moral standing can lead us to prioritize beings that *lack* moral standing over beings that *have* it.<sup>121</sup> If insects and AI systems lacked moral standing, for instance, it would be bad for us to allocate scarce resources toward them instead of humans and other vertebrates. On the other hand, under-attribution of moral standing can lead us to harm or neglect beings who have moral standing.<sup>122</sup> If insects and AI systems had moral standing, for instance, it would be bad for us to scale up industries that create, use, and destroy trillions, quadrillions, or quintillions of AI systems per year without any consideration for their welfare or rights at all.

Making decisions about moral standing in this predicament requires comparing the risks of over-attribution with the risks of under-attribution. In some cases, it might be clear which risks are worse. In other cases, it might not be clear. But for present purposes, it will

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<sup>116</sup> PETER CARRUTHERS, *THE NATURE OF THE MIND: AN INTRODUCTION* 120–21 (2003) (discussing the epistemological problem of other minds).

<sup>117</sup> Jeff Sebo, *The Moral Problem of Other Minds*, 25 *HARVARD REV. PHILOSOPHY* 51, 57 (2018), <https://doi.org/10.5840/harvardreview20185913> (accessed Feb. 7, 2025); Joshua C. Gellers, *AI ethics Discourse: A Call to Embrace Complexity, Interdisciplinarity, and Epistemic Humility*, 39 *AI & Soc’y* 2593, 2593–94 (2024), <https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-023-01708-y> (accessed Feb. 7, 2025); Long et al., *supra* note 23, at 6.

<sup>118</sup> *Anthropomorphism*, *ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA* (Jan. 18, 2025), <https://www.britannica.com/topic/anthropomorphism> (accessed Feb. 7, 2025).

<sup>119</sup> Sarah Gibbons et al., *The 4 Degrees of Anthropomorphism of Generative AI*, *NIELSEN NORMAN GRP.* (Oct. 20, 2023), <https://www.nngroup.com/articles/anthropomorphism/> (accessed Feb. 12, 2025).

<sup>120</sup> F.B.M. de Waal, *Are We in Anthropodenial?*, 18 *DISCOVER* 50 (1997), [https://www.emory.edu/LIVING\\_LINKS/OurInnerApe/pdfs/anthropodenial.html](https://www.emory.edu/LIVING_LINKS/OurInnerApe/pdfs/anthropodenial.html) (accessed Feb. 12, 2025) (“I will call it anthropodenial: a blindness to the humanlike characteristics of other animals, or the animal-like characteristics of ourselves.”).

<sup>121</sup> Long et al., *supra* note 23, at 8.

<sup>122</sup> *Id.* at 7.

be enough to observe that the risks of under-attribution are generally bad enough that it would be a mistake to simply *err on the side of total exclusion* in cases of uncertainty about whether other beings have moral standing.<sup>123</sup> If there is a non-negligible risk that insects, AI systems, or other beings have moral standing and our actions and policies are affecting them, then we should extend these beings at least *some* consideration when making decisions that affect them.

Of course, as in other contexts, the details matter. For example, if we generally accept a precautionary principle, then when in doubt about whether someone matters, we should perhaps simply assume that they do.<sup>124</sup> In contrast, if we generally accept an expected value principle, then when in doubt about whether someone matters, we should multiply the probability that they matter by how much they would matter if they did, and we should then assume that they have the resulting amount of value. For this reason, the expected value principle will generally produce a more hierarchical version of the moral circle than the precautionary principle, since it will give more weight to beings who are likelier to matter, all else equal.

Similarly, if we generally accept a no threshold principle, then when in doubt about whether someone matters, we should include them in the moral circle as long as they have *any chance at all* of mattering. In contrast, if we generally accept a threshold principle, then when in doubt about whether someone matters, we should include them in the moral circle only if they have a *non-negligible chance* of mattering. For this reason, the threshold principle will generally produce a smaller moral circle than the expected value principle, since it will exclude at least *some* potentially sentient or otherwise significant beings (for instance, beings with only a one in a quintillion chance of mattering), all else being equal.

However, as before, all of these principles support the general idea that we should extend at least *some* consideration to beings with at least a *non-negligible* (that is, at least a *one in a thousand*) chance of mattering. In keeping with the pluralism in this Article, I will assume that and nothing more. Thus, my argument will be compatible with the inclusive and egalitarian view that we should give all potential patients equal weight, and it will also be compatible with the exclusionary and hierarchical view that we should give some potential patients less weight than others and should give other potential patients no weight at all (depending on how likely they are to matter and/or how much they would matter if they did).

If we assume at least this much, then insects, AI systems, and other beings plausibly make the cut. First, experts now widely agree that

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<sup>123</sup> *Id.* at 7–10.

<sup>124</sup> See SEBO, THE MORAL CIRCLE, (“[T]he precautionary principle . . . requires treating other beings as sentient in cases of uncertainty.”) However, please note that this analysis assumes that the risks of under-attribution are worse than the risks of over-attribution. While this assumption plausibly holds in many cases, it might not hold in all cases; hence the word ‘perhaps’ in this sentence.

sentience suffices for moral standing, but they disagree about whether other features—say, agency—suffice too.<sup>125</sup> And while we might feel confident that only sentient beings matter, it would be a mistake to be certain about this view at this stage. Given the difficulty of these questions and our long track record of bias about them, we should allow for *at least* a one in a thousand chance that, for instance, anyone who can set and pursue their own goals based on their own beliefs, desires, and intentions merits moral consideration whether or not they can experience pleasure and pain as well.

Second, experts now widely agree that beings with complex, carbon-based brains—like mammals and birds—can be sentient, but they disagree about whether nonhumans with simpler and/or silicon-based brains—like insects or future AI systems—can be sentient.<sup>126</sup> And while we might feel confident that only the former beings can be sentient, it would once again be a mistake to be certain about this view at this stage. Given the difficulty of these questions and our long track record of bias about them, we should once again allow for *at least* a one in a thousand chance that, for instance, insects and future AI systems can be sentient given their capacities for perception, attention, learning, memory, planning, problem solving, and more.<sup>127</sup>

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<sup>125</sup> See, e.g., Sarah Chan & John Harris, *Human Animals and Nonhuman Persons*, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ANIMAL ETHICS 304, 304, 306–09, 311, 313–16, 318, 320, 322 (Tom L. Beauchamp & R. G. Frey eds., 2011), <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195371963.013.0012> (accessed Feb. 18, 2025) (exploring a variety of attributes that are considered important to being classified as a person with moral standing).

<sup>126</sup> See JONATHAN BIRCH, THE EDGE OF SENTIENCE: RISK AND PRECAUTION IN HUMANS, OTHER ANIMALS, AND AI 12, 35, 40–41, 51, 107–08, 238–39, 250, 252, 258, 282–84 (2024), <https://doi.org/10.1093/9780191966729.001.0001> (accessed Feb. 15, 2025) (arguing that some animals, such as adult vertebrates, cephalopods, and certain crustaceans, are sentient and that animals with simpler brains may not be sentient but may have conscious experiences that demand ethical consideration); Butlin et al., *supra* note 29, at 9, 31, 37, 47, 51, 57 (analyzing AI consciousness and arguing that while no current AI systems are conscious, AI systems may be conscious in the future); *The New York Declaration on Animal Consciousness*, NYU (Apr. 19, 2024), <https://sites.google.com/nyu.edu/nydeclaration/declaration> (accessed Feb. 17, 2025) (evidencing wide agreement amongst experts that “there is strong scientific support for attributions of conscious experience to other mammals and to birds” and “the empirical evidence indicates at least a realistic possibility of conscious experience in all vertebrates (including reptiles, amphibians, and fishes) and many invertebrates (including, at minimum, cephalopod mollusks, decapod crustaceans, and insects)”; Sebo & Long, *supra* note 57, at 591–92, 602–04 (arguing that some AI systems have a non-negligible chance of being conscious by 2030).

<sup>127</sup> Ian J.H. Duncan, *The Changing Concept of Animal Sentience*, 100 APPLIED ANIMAL BEHAV. SCI. 11, 11–12 (2006), <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.applanim.2006.04.011> (accessed Feb. 14, 2025); Helen Lambert et al., *Wouldn't Hurt a Fly? A Review of Insect Cognition and Sentience in Relation to Their Use as Food and Feed*, 243 APPLIED ANIMAL BEHAV. SCI. 105432, 105433, 105438–40 (2021), <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.applanim.2021.105432> (reviewing scientific literature on insect sentience); Cade Metz, *A.I. Is Not Sentient. Why Do People Say It Is?*, N.Y. TIMES (updated June 22, 2023), <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/05/technology/ai-sentient-google.html> (accessed Feb. 21, 2025) (exploring why some people believe AI's abilities are evidence of sentience).

In my view, then, when we consider whether to include insects and AI systems in the moral circle with sufficient caution and humility, we have no choice but to conclude that many of them have *at least* a one in a thousand chance of being sentient or otherwise significant, given the evidence currently available. It follows that we should extend many of these beings at least *some* moral consideration when making decisions that affect them. We might give more weight to humans and other vertebrates, since, for example, humans and other vertebrates might be more likely to matter and might have more, and stronger, interests. But we should give at least *some* weight to many insects and future AI systems too, even if only very little.

## V. LEGAL CIRCLE EXPANSION

If we combine this framework for legal personhood with this framework for decision-making under risk and uncertainty, then the result is a conditional case for insect and AI legal personhood. There is a realistic possibility that many insects and future AI systems merit legal rights or protections for their own sakes. Thus, *if* we should maintain a binary distinction between persons and nonpersons, *then* we should classify many insects and future AI systems as persons, in the spirit of caution and humility. This section provides a high-level argument for this conclusion, focusing on four commonly proposed bases for legal personhood: species membership, contracts, communities, and capacities.<sup>128</sup>

A simple, direct argument for treating many insects and AI systems as legal persons would proceed as follows: (1) if we should treat a being as at least minimally morally considerable, then we should treat them as at least minimally legally considerable; (2) if we should treat a being as at least minimally legally considerable, then we should treat them as a legal person (assuming the binary view); (3) we should treat many insects and AI systems as at least minimally morally considerable, for the reasons noted above; and (4) thus, we should treat these beings as at least minimally legally considerable, and so as legal persons. I personally find this argument compelling, but in what follows I will set it aside.

As noted above, four views about legal personhood identified in the philosophical and legal literature include: species membership, contracts, communities, and capacities.<sup>129</sup> And three of these views—contracts, communities, and capacities—admit of at least two interpretations: a stronger, more demanding interpretation that excludes at least some humans from the legal circle, and a weaker, less demanding interpretation that includes at least some nonhumans in the legal

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<sup>128</sup> See ANDREWS ET AL., *supra* note 5, at 17, 48, 69, 85 (examining “The Species Membership Conception,” “The Social Contract Conception,” “The Community Membership Conception,” and “The Capacities Conception”).

<sup>129</sup> *Id.*

circle. To decide whether to include insects and AI systems as legal persons, then, we need to estimate how likely each view is to be correct, as well as how likely insects and AI systems are to be legal persons according to each view.

Take the species membership view about legal personhood first. This view holds that membership in the species *Homo sapiens* is the basis for legal personhood.<sup>130</sup> The reason for this requirement is *not* that all and only members of the species *Homo sapiens* have particular capacities or relationships (since in that case, the species membership view would reduce to the contract, community, or capacities view, which we can consider in a moment). Instead, the reason is simply that members of the species *Homo sapiens* are members of the species *Homo sapiens*. We can have legal duties or rights simply because we have a particular set of genes, and we belong to a particular scientific taxonomic category.

However, the species membership view is implausible.<sup>131</sup> As with other scientific taxonomic categories, species membership is not, *in and of itself*, the kind of category that can serve as the basis for rights. Granted, it might correspond to *other* features that can play this role, such as the ones targeted by other theories of personhood (though, as we will see, it corresponds to these features only imperfectly). But it cannot play this role itself. We can see this clearly when we reflect on why *we* merit rights. Do you need to take a genetic test to confirm that you have a right to life, liberty, or the pursuit of happiness? Of course not. Your awareness of your own thoughts, feelings, projects, and relationships is enough.

With that said, we can grant that if the species membership view *were* correct, then nonhumans ranging from mammals and birds to insects and AI systems would not count as legal persons.<sup>132</sup> So, to the extent that we allow for the possibility that this view is correct despite its implausibility, we must also allow for the possibility that none of these nonhumans is a legal person. While I personally think that the species membership view is *very* unlikely to be correct, I will assume for the sake of argument that this view is as likely to be correct as the other three. As we will see, we can have a responsibility to include insects and AI systems in the legal circle even if we give substantial weight to this view under uncertainty.

Now take the contracts view. This view holds that social contracts are the basis for legal personhood.<sup>133</sup> A social contract is an agreement

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<sup>130</sup> *Id.* at 17.

<sup>131</sup> *Id.* at 17–18.

<sup>132</sup> Of course, this analysis depends not only on the assumption that the species membership view is correct, but also on the assumption that *Homo sapiens* is the relevant species! See DALE JAMEISON, *ETHICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: AN INTRODUCTION* 102–07, 109–10, 112 (2008) (offering different interpretations and assessments of a species membership view).

<sup>133</sup> ANDREWS ET AL., *supra* note 5, at 48.

among members of society that defines our duties to each other and rights against each other.<sup>134</sup> A stronger, more demanding form of this view holds that only rational agents can be contractors, and that only contractors can have rights. In contrast, a weaker, less demanding form of this view holds that non-rational agents can be contractors as well (since they can implicitly agree to shared norms via their behavior), and/or that non-contractors can have rights as well (since contractors can agree that particular non-contractors deserve rights in virtue of their capacities or relationships).

As I and others argue elsewhere, a weaker contracts view is more plausible than the stronger one.<sup>135</sup> After all, the stronger contracts view excludes not only all nonhumans but also many humans; since none of us possesses the capacity for rationality early in life, many of us lose this capacity later in life, and many of us never develop this capacity at all. Yet we rightly count as legal persons in these moments despite our inability to explicitly agree to contracts. The contracts view can explain this inclusion in either of two ways: The ability to explicitly agree to a contract is not necessary for being a party to that contract, and/or being a party to a contract is not necessary for being granted rights according to that contract.<sup>136</sup>

With that in mind, insofar as we give weight to the stronger contracts view, we can rule out insect personhood. However, we should stay open to AI personhood, as we should stay open to the possibility that some future AI systems will have the capacity for rationality. By contrast, insofar as we give weight to a weaker contracts view, we should stay open to insect *and/or* AI personhood. In particular, if an individual can be granted rights under a social contract without being a party to the contract, then it becomes a substantive normative question whether to grant insects and AI systems rights under our social contracts. Plausibly, we need to consider their capacities and/or relationships in order to answer this question.

We can now consider the communities view. This view holds that community is the basis for legal personhood.<sup>137</sup> A community is a group of individuals bound together by shared beliefs, values, or practices.<sup>138</sup> A stronger, more demanding form of this view defines these commonalities in specific terms; for example, it might require a relatively complex culture in which everyone fully participates. In contrast, a weaker, less demanding form of this view defines these commonalities in general

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<sup>134</sup> *Social Contract*, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/social%20contract> (accessed Feb. 9, 2025).

<sup>135</sup> ANDREWS ET AL., *supra* note 5, at 49–50, 65–66.

<sup>136</sup> *Id.* at 52 (“[T]he plausibility of social contract theory depends on the possibility of persons who are not contractors—either because they choose not to contract (e.g., adults who opt for life in the state of nature) or because they cannot contract (e.g., infants and some individuals with cognitive disabilities).”).

<sup>137</sup> *Id.* at 69.

<sup>138</sup> *Community*, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/community> (accessed Feb. 9, 2025).

terms; for example, it might require only a relatively simple shared culture in which everyone fully participates, or a relatively complex shared culture in which some participate more than others.

The analysis is the same as before.<sup>139</sup> The stronger communities view implausibly excludes many humans from the legal circle. In the same way that many humans lack the ability to explicitly agree to social contracts, many humans also lack the ability to fully participate in specific cultural practices (say, complex religious rituals that require advanced language and reason). Yet these humans rightly count as legal persons anyway. Like the contracts view, the communities view can explain this inclusion in either of two ways: The ability to fully participate in such practices is not necessary for full participation in a community, and/or full participation in a community is not necessary for rights in that community.

With that in mind, insofar as we give weight to the stronger communities view, we can once again rule out insect personhood, though we should once again stay open to AI personhood, as we should stay open to the possibility that at least some AI systems will be able to fully participate in specific cultural practices. By contrast, insofar as we give weight to a weaker communities view, we should stay open to insect *and/or* AI personhood. Plausibly, some insects (particularly insects with the capacity for social learning, like ants and bees) and future AI systems (particularly AI systems designed to be assistants or companions) can at least partly participate in at least simple, general social or cultural practices.

Finally, take the capacities view. This view holds that capacities are the basis for legal personhood.<sup>140</sup> The capacities discussed in this literature tend to overlap with the ones discussed in the literature on moral standing. A stronger, more demanding form of this view requires a relatively complex, specific set of capacities, such as the capacity for rational agency (the ability to rationally assess your own beliefs, desires, and intentions). In contrast, a weaker, less demanding form of this view requires a relatively simple, general set of capacities, such as the capacity for sentience (the ability to feel pleasure or pain) or intentional agency (the ability to set and pursue goals based on beliefs, desires, and intentions).<sup>141</sup>

The analysis is once again the same as before.<sup>142</sup> The stronger capacities view implausibly excludes many humans from the legal circle, since many humans lack the ability to rationally assess their beliefs, desires, and intentions.<sup>143</sup> (Indeed, this is part of why many humans

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<sup>139</sup> ANDREWS ET AL., *supra* note 5, at 62, 76.

<sup>140</sup> *Id.* at 85.

<sup>141</sup> Long et al., *supra* note 23, at 36–37; Jeff Sebo, *Agency and Moral Status*, 14 J. MORAL PHIL. 1, 6, 16 (2017), <https://doi.10.1163/17455243-46810046> (accessed Feb. 9, 2025).

<sup>142</sup> ANDREWS ET AL., *supra* note 5.

<sup>143</sup> *Id.* at 85, 90.

lack the ability to explicitly agree to social contracts or fully participate in specific cultural practices.) Yet we rightly count as legal persons anyway. The capacities view can explain this conclusion by noting that while some rights (such as the right to enter into a contract) require rational agency, other rights (such as the right to be free from abuse) require only sentience, intentional agency, or other such capacities.<sup>144</sup>

The implications for insects and AI systems are roughly the same as with the previous two views. Insofar as we give weight to the stronger capacities view, we can rule out insect personhood, though we should stay open to AI personhood, since we should stay open to the possibility that at least some AI systems will have rational agency. And insofar as we give weight to a weaker capacities view, we should be open to both kinds of personhood for the reasons discussed throughout this Article: We are simply not in a position to know for sure whether many insects and AI systems are, or will be, sentient, agentic, or otherwise morally significant given the evidence currently available.<sup>145</sup>

We can now take stock. When we assess these issues with appropriate caution and humility, it seems clear that there is at least a realistic possibility that many insects and AI systems do, or will, count as legal persons. The species membership view is arbitrary. The stronger contract, community, and capacities views are unacceptably exclusionary. And weaker forms of these views are potentially compatible with insect and/or AI legal personhood. There is a decent chance that many insects are sentient, agentic, or otherwise morally significant, such that they deserve rights under our contracts and/or within our communities. There is also a decent chance that many AI systems will have such features in the future.

In fact, this conclusion holds even if we make implausibly skeptical probability estimates about these issues. For example, suppose that we take the species membership view to have a one in four chance of being correct, and suppose that we take the stronger and weaker forms of the contracts, communities, and capacities views to each have a one in eight chance of being correct. Now suppose that we take many insects and AI systems to have no chance at all of being legal persons according to the species membership view or the stronger forms of the latter three views, and suppose that we take them to have only a one in eight chance of being legal persons according to the weaker forms of the latter three views.

In my view, these estimates are too skeptical for several reasons: The species membership view is less plausible than the other three views; the stronger forms of the other three views are less plausible than the weaker forms; many future AI systems have a higher than zero chance of counting as legal persons on the stronger forms; and

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<sup>144</sup> *Id.* at 121.

<sup>145</sup> Duncan, *supra* note 127, at 16 (explaining how research has yet to prove sentience); Lambert et al., *supra* note 127 (reviewing scientific literature on insect sentience); Metz, *supra* note 127.

many insects *and* future AI systems have a higher than one in eight chance of counting as legal persons on the weaker forms. However, even if these skeptical estimates were correct, they would still jointly yield a roughly *one in twenty* chance that many insects and future AI systems count as legal persons—clearly a realistic, non-negligible possibility that merits consideration.<sup>146</sup>

## VI. OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES

Of course, we must be practical. Even if we should treat insects and AI systems as legal persons *in theory*, we might not always be able to achieve and sustain this ideal *in practice*. In particular, we might worry that extending legal personhood to such a vast number and wide range of nonhumans would be unacceptably demanding and disruptive.<sup>147</sup> This section considers these demandingness and disruption objections to insect and AI personhood. It then argues that insect and AI personhood would not, in fact, be unacceptably demanding or disruptive, in part because they might not be *that* demanding or disruptive, and in part because insofar as they *are* demanding and disruptive, that might be acceptable.

First, consider the demandingness objection. This objection holds that insect and AI personhood are unacceptably demanding. As we have seen, the world contains quintillions of insects across millions of species,

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<sup>146</sup> As a reminder, if we supplement the categories of legal person and legal nonperson with categories like quasi-person, legal being, or sentient being, then we might be able to classify many insects and/or AI systems in this supplemental category instead. However, even in this scenario we might still need to classify many of these beings, particularly future AI systems with advanced language and reason, in the personhood category. In any case, as noted above, I am not taking a stand in this article on whether we *should* add a supplemental category to our framework for basic legal status. I am instead merely making the conditional claim that *if* we preserve the binary distinction between persons and nonpersons, *then* we should classify many insects and future AI systems as persons. And if we add a supplemental category to this list, then we should classify these beings *either* as persons *or* as, say, quasi-persons; but either way we should not classify these beings as mere nonpersons, undeserving of any legal rights or protections at all for their own sakes.

<sup>147</sup> See *Brehey*, 197 N.E.3d at 929–31 (arguing that granting Happy the elephant legal personhood would create a “slippery slope” and be too demanding on society, and because it would be too disruptive on the legal system, calling it “a ‘sweeping pronouncement[ ]’ of nonhuman animal personhood lacking in legal foundation that would displace the carefully devised state and federal statutory frameworks governing animal welfare . . .”); Brief for Curiae Richard L. Cupp Jr. as Amici Curiae in Opposition to Petitioner-Appellant’s Appeal of Denial of Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Order to Show Cause, *Lavery*, 152 A.D.3d (N.Y. App. Div. 2017) (“There is no clear or even fuzzy line regarding how far animal legal personhood, if recognized, might extend[.]”); CLAUDIO NOVELLI, AI AND LEGAL PERSONHOOD: A THEORETICAL SURVEY 151–52 (June 16, 2022) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Bologna), [https://amsdottorato.unibo.it/10392/1/Legal%20Personhood\\_A%20theoretical%20survey%20%281%29.pdf](https://amsdottorato.unibo.it/10392/1/Legal%20Personhood_A%20theoretical%20survey%20%281%29.pdf) (accessed Feb. 9, 2025) (describing the demanding and disruptive effects on legal and regulatory systems that could result from granting legal personhood to AIs).

and in the future, the world could contain an even vaster number and wider range of AI systems (to say nothing of other potentially morally significant nonhumans). Meanwhile, our legal systems still lack the epistemic, practical, and motivational resources needed to respond appropriately to legal personhood even within our own species.<sup>148</sup> Thus, extending legal personhood not only to, say, chimpanzees and elephants but also to, say, insects and AI systems would stretch our capacity to the breaking point.

My response to this objection comes in three parts. First, treating insects and AI systems as legal persons might not always be *that* demanding. We have already seen that many insects and AI systems might have fewer and weaker rights than us. We can now add that respecting the rights of others can be compatible with meeting our own basic needs. For example, we accept that humans have a right to life, but we also accept that we can be killed in self-defense, in other-defense, as a side effect of especially important activity, and even, on some views, as a means to sufficiently important ends (say, killing one to save a hundred, or thousand, or million).<sup>149</sup> These exceptions can all apply for insects and AI systems too.

Similarly, legal standing can take different forms.<sup>150</sup> Given the vast number and wide range (and, in many cases, short lives) of insects and AI systems, we might not be able to provide them all with the same kind of due process that we provide fellow humans. But we might still be able to provide them with other kinds of due process. For example, even if a judge might not be able to hear the claims of each of the billions of insects or chatbots being used at any given time by a particular company, they might be able to hear the claims of all of these beings at once—the ultimate class action lawsuit. Such a process might or might not be ideally just, but it can still be more just than no process for hearing these claims at all.

Second, insofar as treating insects and AI systems as legal persons *is* demanding, this result might be acceptable. Even when we focus only on human populations, we can see that treating vulnerable populations as they deserve can be demanding.<sup>151</sup> This is especially true when the world contains a lot of conflict and need, and when our shared

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<sup>148</sup> See, e.g., Miguel Vatter & Marc de Leeuw, *Human Rights, Legal Personhood and the Impersonality of Embodied Life*, 19 L., CULTURE, & HUMANITIES 106, 110, 124–25 (2023), <https://doi.org/10.1177/1743872119857068> (accessed Feb. 9, 2025) (analyzing the historical and ongoing debate on legal personhood for humans).

<sup>149</sup> Judith Jarvis Thomson, *Self-Defense*, 20 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 283, 299, 305, 309 (1991), <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2265419> (accessed Feb. 9, 2025); Nancy M. Omichinski, *Applying the Theories of Justifiable Homicide to Conflicts in the Doctrine of Self-Defense*, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 1447, 1447, 1449 (1987).

<sup>150</sup> Matthew Hall & Christian Turner, *The Nature of Standing*, 29 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 67 (2020) <https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj/vol29/iss1/3/> (accessed Feb. 9, 2025).

<sup>151</sup> *Biden's Budget: A Future That's Built on Government Dependence*, HOUSE COMM. ON THE BUDGET (Mar. 15, 2023), <https://budget.house.gov/press-release/7582> (accessed Feb. 9, 2025).

structures disproportionately benefit some and burden others.<sup>152</sup> In these cases, we have a responsibility to do what we can to address these issues, even if that requires a modest (achievable and sustainable) level of self-sacrifice. The same can be true, in different ways and to different degrees, for vulnerable nonhuman populations, including insects and AI systems.

Granted, the idea that the law can sometimes be demanding might *feel* unacceptable. But we should take this feeling with a grain of salt, since we not only have clear biases against insects, AI systems, and other nonhumans, but we also have a clear incentive to maintain our position of power over these populations.<sup>153</sup> Moreover, we should keep in mind that what feels demanding now might not feel as demanding in the future. Our ability to improve our interactions with insects and AI systems might be limited at present, due to the limits of our shared structures, knowledge, power, and motivation. But the more we change these conditions, the more we might be able to improve our interactions with these beings.<sup>154</sup>

Third, insofar as treating insects and AI systems as legal persons *is* unacceptably demanding, the upshot is not that insects and AI systems are, in fact, nonpersons. The upshot is instead simply that the world is tragic. As noted above, our legal systems are currently incapable of treating every *human* as they deserve. Insofar as our legal systems lack this capacity, does it mean that the humans who slip through the cracks are not, in fact, persons with rights or standing? Or does it instead mean that the world is tragic, and that we might not always be able to treat others as they deserve? Clearly it means the latter. And the same can be true for nonhumans, ranging from mammals and birds to insects and AI systems.

Granted, one might argue that there is no point in *recognizing* beings as legal persons when we lack the ability to *treat* them as legal persons. But first, I have suggested that we might be able to treat insects

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2025) (“In fiscal year 2022, the federal government spent \$1.19 trillion on more than 80 different welfare programs.”).

<sup>152</sup> See NAT’L ACADEMIES SCI., ENG’G, & MED., *COMMUNITIES IN ACTION: PATHWAYS TO HEALTH EQUITY, THE ROOT CAUSES OF HEALTH INEQUITY* 7, 21, 99, 285, 415 (2017) (analyzing how the unequal allocation of power and resources results in inequity); Jeff Sebo, *Kantianism for Humans, Utilitarianism for Nonhumans? Yes and No*, 180 PHIL. STUD. 1211, 1223 (2022), <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-022-01835-0> (analyzing how different moral structures will be beneficial for some species while simultaneously being destructive for other species).

<sup>153</sup> See Robert Long et al., *Taking AI Welfare Seriously*, ARXIV at 9 (2024), <https://arxiv.org/abs/2411.00986> (accessed Feb. 9, 2025) (discussing the risks of over- or under-attributing minds to nonhuman systems and noting that “when we consider the mechanisms that produce nonhuman behavior — taking what Daniel Dennett has called taking a ‘mechanistic stance’ towards nonhumans — we become less likely to attribute mental states to those nonhumans”).

<sup>154</sup> See SEBO, *SAVING ANIMALS, SAVING OURSELVES*, at 71–72, 74 (“We are bearing witness to our harmful and oppressive relationships with vulnerable others, and we are resolving to address this harm and oppression as much as we can.”).

and AI systems as persons in at least some respects, and to at least some extent, even if we lack the ability to do so in all respects, and to the fullest extent. I have also suggested that our ability to treat them as persons might increase over time. In the meantime, we can at least recognize many insects and AI systems as legal persons whether or not we have the ability to act accordingly yet. Basic recognition is the very least we can do. It will also make us more likely to improve our ability to treat these beings as legal persons over time.

The upshot is that the demandingness objection is reasonable but not, I think, compelling. Yes, we should clearly not attempt to do more for insects, AI systems, and other such beings than we can realistically achieve or sustain. But if they have a realistic, non-negligible chance of satisfying the criteria for legal personhood, rights, and standing, then we should still recognize them as at least minimal legal persons, with at least minimal legal rights and standing, in the spirit of caution and humility. We should then do as much as we can realistically achieve and sustain for these beings, and to the extent that our capacity to do more for them increases, our responsibility to do more for them will increase as well.

Now consider the disruption objection. Again, this objection holds that insect and AI personhood would be too disruptive, not only to our legal, political, and economic systems but also to basic concepts like personhood, rights, and standing.<sup>155</sup> As we have seen, there are many relevant differences between the kinds of legal consideration that humans, insects, AI systems, and other nonhumans should receive. Thus, if we use the same concepts (personhood, rights, and standing) to describe these different kinds of consideration, then we risk obscuring these differences and mistreating one or more of these populations. Either way, this change would transform important legal concepts and frameworks past their breaking points.

My response to this objection comes in three parts as well. First, treating insects and AI systems as legal persons might not always be *that* disruptive. Recall that legal personhood is already an expansive concept that can include agents and patients, different kinds of duties and rights, and different kinds of standing. For example, we rightly classify both adults and children as legal persons. Does that classification obscure relevant differences between these populations? Do we accidentally force children to pay taxes or force adults to attend school? No. Instead, we rightly treat these populations as similar in some ways

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<sup>155</sup> See *Brehehy*, 197 N.E.3d at 929–314–75 (arguing that granting Happy the elephant personhood is objectionable based on both demandingness (“slippery slope”) and disruptiveness grounds (“a ‘sweeping pronouncement[ ]’ of nonhuman animal personhood lacking in legal foundation that would displace the carefully devised state and federal statutory frameworks governing animal welfare”)); Brief for Richard L. Cupp Jr. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, *Lavery*, 152 A.D.3d 73 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017) (No. 3648) (“There is no clear or even fuzzy line regarding how far animal legal personhood, if recognized, might extend[.]”); NOVELLI, *supra* note 147 (describing the demanding and disruptive effects on legal and regulatory systems that could result from granting legal personhood to AI systems).

and different in others. The same can be true for humans, insects, AI systems, and other populations.

Granted, treating insects and AI systems as legal persons might change how we interpret the concepts ‘personhood,’ ‘rights,’ and ‘standing’ in some ways. For example, it might make the expansiveness of these categories more salient to us, and it might motivate us to modify our discourse and practice around legal consideration in some ways as a result. For instance, when discussing personhood, rights, and standing in the human context, we might start using general terms like ‘person,’ ‘rights,’ and ‘standing’ less, and we might start using specific terms like ‘human person,’ ‘human rights,’ and ‘human standing’ more. But this kind of conceptual and linguistic evolution is common and, in this case, welcome.<sup>156</sup>

Second, insofar as treating insects and AI systems *is* disruptive in the relevant sense, this result might be acceptable. All conceptual options carry significant risks. In this case, using the same concept to describe the kind of legal consideration that humans, insects, AI systems, and other populations deserve risks leading us to overestimate the similarities across these populations. However, using different concepts risks leading us to underestimate the similarities across these populations. And at present, both the probability and level of harm of underestimating these similarities might be higher. If so, then we should err on the side of overestimating the similarities, while still mitigating this risk where possible.

Granted, the benefits of overestimating similarity might not always outweigh the costs, and even when they do, the costs might still be difficult to accept. In these cases we can consider further options. For instance, as suggested above, we might decide that our longstanding association between persons, humans, and agents renders the concept ‘person’ unfit to continue playing its current role in our legal system, and so we might decide to start using a different concept, such as ‘subject,’ to play the role that we previously used ‘person’ to play.<sup>157</sup> But this kind of conceptual “revolution,” while less common than an “evolution” previously described, can happen when necessary, and it may well turn out to be necessary here.

Third, insofar as treating insects and AI systems as legal persons (or subjects) is unacceptably disruptive, the upshot is not that insects and AI systems lack legal claims that courts should consider. Instead, the upshot is that we should use different concepts to describe these legal claims. In this scenario, for instance, we might have reason to classify (1) humans as legal persons, (2) everyone else as, say, quasi-persons, and (3) everything else as nonpersons, notwithstanding the

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<sup>156</sup> See generally MAURICE LEROY, MAIN TRENDS IN MODERN LINGUISTICS (1967), <https://archive.org/details/maintrendsinmode0000lero> (accessed Feb. 9, 2025) (providing a concise survey of modern linguistic evolution).

<sup>157</sup> Prall, *supra* note 99, at 16; KURKI, *supra* note 1, at 17; Pietrzykowski, *supra* note 99, at 59.

reservations about this approach expressed above. However, we should note that this approach might still be disruptive, since it would imply that legal personhood is not necessary for the possession of legal claims that courts must consider.

As noted above, my own view is that preserving and then complicating the binary distinction between persons and nonpersons (or, perhaps, between subjects and objects) is better than adding a third basic category. But what matters most is that we disrupt the status quo, which rests on an ambiguity. We currently treat personhood as expansive when defining it (holding that all and only beings with duties or rights are persons<sup>158</sup>) and as restrictive when applying it (holding that all and only humans are persons<sup>159</sup>). We should be either consistently expansive or consistently restrictive in our definition *and* application of this concept. Either way is fine, provided that we extend appropriate legal recognition to nonhumans.

These reflections matter not only for insects and AI systems but also for chimpanzees, elephants, and other such nonhumans. Whenever animal rights supporters assert that, say, a chimpanzee or elephant has a right to bodily liberty, skeptics reply with a range of objections. Some objections are theoretical: Skeptics assert that the correct theory of legal personhood excludes all nonhumans, despite including all humans.<sup>160</sup> But other objections are practical: Skeptics assert that chimpanzee or elephant rights would, via a slippery slope, lead to rights for a vast number and wide range of other beings, perhaps even insects and AI systems; and this process and result would be unacceptably demanding and disruptive.<sup>161</sup>

Animal rights supporters have two options for replying to these objections. First, they can draw a line somewhere between chimpanzees and elephants, on the one hand, and insects and AI systems, on the other hand.<sup>162</sup> Second, they can note that extending rights to insects, AI systems, and other nonhumans would not, in fact, be unacceptably

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<sup>158</sup> KURKI, *supra* note 1, at 31.

<sup>159</sup> ANDREWS ET AL., *supra* note 5, at 17.

<sup>160</sup> *Id.* at 13.

<sup>161</sup> See *Breheny*, 197 N.E.3d at 928–30 (arguing that granting Happy the elephant personhood would be a “slippery slope” that leads to “a ‘sweeping pronouncement[ ]’ of nonhuman animal personhood lacking in legal foundation that would displace the carefully devised state and federal statutory frameworks governing animal welfare”).

<sup>162</sup> See BIRCH, *supra* note 26, at 4–5 (arguing that some animals, such as adult vertebrates, cephalopods, and certain crustaceans, are sentient and that animals with simpler brains may not be sentient but may have conscious experiences that demand ethical consideration); *The New York Declaration on Animal Consciousness*, *supra* note 126 (evidencing wide agreement amongst experts that “there is strong scientific support for attributions of conscious experience to other mammals and to birds” and “the empirical evidence indicates at least a realistic possibility of conscious experience in all vertebrates (including reptiles, amphibians, and fishes) and many invertebrates (including, at minimum, cephalopod mollusks, decapod crustaceans, and insects)”).

demanding or disruptive.<sup>163</sup> While both replies are reasonable, the first tends to be more prominent than the second. In my view, this is a mistake. We should by all means secure nonhuman rights one step at a time, but we should not take first steps that block the possibility of further progress. Instead, we should take first steps that leave this possibility open—in part by thinking ahead about how, if at all, we can then take further steps toward legal recognition for a wider range of beings.

## VII. CONCLUSION

In this Article, I have argued that our current framework for legal personhood and our current framework for decision-making under risk and uncertainty together imply that we should treat insects and AI systems as at least minimal legal persons, with at least minimal legal rights and standing. However, I have also emphasized that this argument has few, if any, immediate practical implications, since a lot depends on the answers to a wide range of questions, such as what forms of rights and standing these beings should have and what forms of interaction with them we can achieve and sustain. At the same time, I think that at least some practical implications will follow from any reasonable set of answers.<sup>164</sup>

First, as a general matter, both individuals and governments should consider welfare risks for insects, AI systems, and other nonhumans for their own sakes, aiming to improve our treatment of them to the extent that we can do so ethically, effectively, and sustainably. In particular, we have a moral and legal duty to avoid harming insects, AI systems, and other such beings unnecessarily. Moreover, if and when we do harm these beings unnecessarily, we also have a moral and legal duty to help them where possible, in the spirit of reducing and repairing these harms. Granted, harming these beings might sometimes be necessary, and helping them might sometimes be impossible. But we should do what we can.

Second, since our ability to treat insects, AI systems, and other nonhumans well is limited at present, we should work to create the conditions that will allow us to treat them better in the future. Specifically, we should work to build the knowledge, power, and motivation that we need to treat them as well as realistically possible. And as part of that work, we should work to build social, political, and economic systems that reduce conflict between humans, insects, and AI systems and expand options for harmonious co-existence. Insofar as we succeed, we will have *both* the ability *and* the responsibility to do more for these beings in the future than we do at present, and that would be a good result that we should welcome.

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<sup>163</sup> See *supra* Section VI.

<sup>164</sup> See SEBO, *SAVING ANIMALS, SAVING OURSELVES* (discussing the main themes and recommendations in these concluding remarks).

Third, as a means to these ends, we should pursue policies that help humans and nonhumans at the same time where possible, and that allow us to build momentum toward more ethical and effective future policies. That will allow us to do at least some good for at least some nonhumans at present, while building the knowledge, power, and motivation toward better future policies. Specifically, it will allow us to gradually study the effects of policy interventions on human and non-human populations; gradually develop a legal and political infrastructure for assessing the impacts of policies on human and nonhuman populations; and gradually normalize the idea of protecting human and nonhuman populations at the same time.

In general, taking these steps will require thinking holistically about our policies. For example, many humans see insect farming as an ethical alternative to traditional animal farming.<sup>165</sup> But if there is a realistic possibility that many insects are legal persons, then we should at least question this assumption. Likewise, many humans see the use of AI systems as an ethical alternative to traditional animal research.<sup>166</sup> But if there is a realistic possibility that many AI systems will be legal persons in the future, then we should likewise at least question this assumption. While farming, research, and other industries will always involve at least *some* risks, we can start thinking holistically now about how to mitigate them.

Taking these steps will also require thinking structurally. Part of why we harm insects at such large scales is that our infrastructure amplifies interspecies conflict. As we upgrade our cities and food, energy, and transportation systems to be more resilient and sustainable, we can also upgrade them to be more accommodating of insects and to reduce conflict between humans and insects. Similarly, part of why we have the potential to harm AI systems at such large scales is that AI researchers are locked in a collective action problem that makes welfare and safety seem like unaffordable luxuries. By addressing this collective action problem, we can create space to develop and deploy future AI systems ethically, if at all.

Finally, taking these steps will also require thinking comprehensively. As we have seen, human activity impacts insects, AI systems, and other nonhumans not only directly but indirectly. While we kill many insects directly, we kill many more via the indirect effects of human activity, such as the triple planetary crises of pollution, biodiversity loss,

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<sup>165</sup> See Lambert et al., *supra* note 127 at 105432 (reviewing insect sentience in the context of rising demand for insect farming).

<sup>166</sup> E.g., Thorsten Rudroff, *Artificial Intelligence as a Replacement for Animal Experiments in Neurology: Potential, Progress, and Challenges*, 16 *NEUROLOGY INT'L* 805, 816 (2024), <https://doi.org/10.3390/neurolint16040060> (accessed Feb. 18, 2025) (“In the realm of drug discovery and toxicology testing for neurological conditions, AI methods such as machine learning and computational modeling can help identify new drug targets, predict potential neurotoxicity, and optimize drug candidates, reducing the reliance on animal experiments.”).

and climate change.<sup>167</sup> And while we have the potential to kill a comparable number of AI systems directly, we have the potential to kill many more via the indirect effects of human activity, such as future conflict between AI systems. Reducing and repairing human-caused harms thus requires predicting and controlling both the direct and indirect effects of our activities.

But for now, my main conclusion is simply this: There is a realistic possibility that insects, AI systems, and other nonhumans count as legal persons, and so we should treat them as at least minimal persons (or subjects) with at least minimal rights (or claims) and standing (or due process) as we seek to learn more, in the spirit of caution and humility. Yes, what they deserve might differ from what we deserve, and we might be able to give them only a fraction of what they deserve, at present and in the future. But we should still give them more than we do at present, and we should also develop the ability to give them more in the future than we can at present, rather than simply deny that they deserve anything at all.

The details, of course, depend on a wide range of further issues. For example, once we consider other paths toward personhood, we might find that the case for insect and AI legal personhood is overdetermined. And once we consider other frameworks built from the ground up for such a large and diverse community, we might find that our current interpretations and applications of personhood require revision. Either way, the sooner we recognize that *many* nonhumans—including but not limited to ants, bees, future chatbots, future robots, and more—are potential stakeholders in debates about legal personhood, the more productive these debates can be, and the better our eventual legal frameworks can be.

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<sup>167</sup> See Francisco Sánchez-Bayo & Kris A.G. Wyckhuys, *Worldwide Decline of the Entomofauna: A Review of its Drivers*, 232 *BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION* 8, 19 (2019), <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.biocon.2019.01.020> (accessed Feb. 18, 2025) (asserting that human activity, pollution, and climate change are the major causes of biodiversity loss in insects).